FROM AN AMERICAN LEGATION

IRA NELSON MORRIS

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FROM AN AMERICAN LEGATION

by

IRA NELSON MORRIS

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CONTENTS

Chapter	I.	My Arrival in Sweden	3
Chapter	II.	Sweden and the Swedes	17
Chapter	III.	Helping War Victims	31
Chapter	IV.	War Miseries	51
Chapter	V.	Stopping the Leaks	70
Chapter	VI.	The Contradictions of Neutrality	92
Chapter	VII.	The Spies' Stamping Ground	108
Chapter	VIII.	Wooing for Sweden's Sympathies	129
Chapter	IX.	Echoes of the Russian Collapse	147
Chapter	X.	Red, White and German	172
Chapter	XI.	The Incubation of New States	194
Chapter	XII.	Russian Interventionists	206
Chapter	XIII.	Diplomatic "First Aid" to Americans	224
Chapter	XIV.	Post War Hunger	241
Chapter	XV.	An Age-Old Controversy	253
Chapter	XVI.	Thoughts towards Reconstruction	269
Chapter	XVII.	"Hope Springs Eternal from the Human Breast"—Pope	284

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FOREWORD

So many books have been written around the events of the last seven and more years in Europe that one hesitates to add to their number. I have nevertheless ventured to do so, feeling that the labour would not be in vain.

It was my good fortune to spend all the years of the war at Stockholm as the American Minister to Sweden, and few if any other neutral countries afforded a closer view of what was happening during all that troubled period. There agents of the central powers worked and intrigued against agents from the allied and associated powers, spies from every country pitted their wits against each other—and against the Swedish authorities. Possessing a potential military power of more than five to six hundred thousand splendid soldiers, Sweden was ardently wooed by both belligerent groups for her support. Her geographical position made her the gateway to Russia, which was our ally until

revolution paralyzed the armies of the Tsar of all the Russias, and for a time threatened disaster to our common cause. It was inevitable that the attitude of the Swedish government was an object of eager interest throughout the war, and equally inevitable that its persistent refusal to abandon its neutrality was often misunderstood by peoples convinced that they were fighting to overthrow militarism and autocracy. Today, with the perspective of three years of peace, I believe that there will be general agreement that the government not only acted in the best interests of Sweden, but of the whole world. Sweden's entrance into the war on our side, even if it had been possible, would not have materially shortened the conflict, and there would have been one more country with a shattered economy to rebuild.

Some of the things told in this book are undoubtedly known. The course of the Finnish rebellion of the winter of 1918, to mention but one thing, was rather fully reported at the time by the American journalists in Sweden. However, even they would be the first to admit that daily journalism can merely report the high re-

liefs, and that there were many details which were not known to them at the time. I believe that many of the facts reported here are new, but in any event, I feel that the summary which is given, gathering, as it does, the important facts into one short chapter, may not only be of value to the general reader, but may be welcomed also by the historians who will one day treat these events as trained historians do treat such events. It is perhaps hopeless to try to add to history regarding the events in Russia during the two revolutionary periods, but here, too, I have felt that a condensed summary might not be out of place for purposes of reference.

I need hardly say that there are many matters of interest which cannot yet be told, although I should like to tell them. I sympathize fully with the democratic demand for open diplomacy, but this demand, it seems to me, can properly have regard only to final commitments of nations to specified courses of conduct, and cannot reasonably require a disclosure of all negotiations leading up to the final action. Such a disclosure would not only serve no good end, but might even on the contrary tend to disturb the

good relations of nations, to say nothing of the personal side of the matter. The reader can, however, console himself with the thought that, while some of these disclosures might interest him and satisfy his curiosity, they would not add greatly to his stock of useful knowledge.

One impelling reason for the writing of the book has been my wish that my American readers might gain some added knowledge of Sweden, that country which has contributed so much to the building up of our own land and to which we are bound by so many ties. To that end I have included a chapter about Sweden which, may, I hope, be not without interest. For the historical details I have drawn freely on a two-volume work on Sweden issued by the Swedish government and entitled "Sweden." This work was compiled under the direction of Dr. J. Guinchard, chief of the Bureau of Statistics of the City of Stockholm. I recommend it unreservedly to all who would know more about this rugged land up under the polar star.

The book started out to be a mere record of reminiscences, but gradually developed somewhat beyond the lines I had marked out in ad-

vance. For that reason I have not always troubled myself about the chronological sequence. It was necessary to relate some things out of their temporal order.

IRA NELSON MORRIS.

Stockholm, in February, 1922.

FROM AN AMERICAN LEGATION

Chapter I. My Arrival in Sweden

Throughout Europe certain men are, as it were, born to diplomacy. Just as there are "old officer families," so there are "old diplomat families," where some member of the house has been in the diplomatic service of his country for generations. In America, however, diplomats, like Topsy, just grow. A beginning has lately been made toward adopting the European system by promoting secretaries of legations to be chiefs of missions and, generally, by retaining men whose training and services have been such as to enhance their usefulness as representatives of the United States abroad. One cannot but approve of this course, for it stands to reason that men whose whole lives from earliest manhood have been devoted to diplomacy have a tremendous advantage over men who lack this training. That my colleagues in the service were able to

overcome their handicaps, and that they conspicuously held their own with the trained diplomats of Europe during the critical years that lie behind us testifies rather to their good qualities than to the excellence of the system.

During extensive travels in the years before the World War I had been impressed with the opportunities which an American diplomatic representative has of furthering the interests of his country, both material and spiritual. In a broader sense, too, it is not too much to say that, in thus furthering the interests of his own country, he can do a service to mankind in general at the same time, for upon the degree of understanding with which he apprehends and reports on the sociological, political and economic conditions of the country to which he is accredited depends in large measure the degree of understanding which the two countries in question have for each other. And when two peoples understand each other they are much more than half way toward sympathy and even liking for each other. State borders may some day disappear, as the political internationalists would have us believe, but until they do—and that will

probably be a long time—a man cannot be better employed than in trying to minimize the points of possible friction between his own and other nations.

The prospect of serving my country in this manner attracted me. I knew Europe well, and some of its languages; I had enjoyed a severe business training, and had studied international law. Hence when an opportunity came to enter the diplomatic service I thought it wise to accept it. The Secretary of State entrusted me in 1913 with a special diplomatic mission, primarily to Italy, but also to various other European countries. The government was pleased to regard the result of my efforts on this mission as a considerable success.

The winter and early spring of 1914 brought a number of vacancies in the American diplomatic posts abroad. Political and personal friends interested themselves, urging me to take up a diplomatic career, knowing I was prepared to make the material sacrifices which such a position requires of the man who takes it. This, by the way, is one of the things that ought to be altered, and which probably will be altered some

day. The United States is too rich a country to require its diplomatic representatives abroad to dig deep into their private purses in order to represent their country properly. This is a matter into which I do not feel that I can go at length, because of its very personal nature, but it is disclosing no secret to say that there are very few foreign posts which do not require their holder to make a contribution of many thousands of dollars yearly above his salary in order to do governmental work which has to be done. This ought not to be so. That it has so long continued to be so is probably due in part to the belief current among a large part of the people in the United States that an ambassador or minister has nothing to do except put on his good clothes and attend dinners. I am normally a kind-hearted person, but I often wish that one of these naïve individuals could have been forced to go through a working day at the Stockholm Legation in any one of the war years. He would have been much more ready for bed than for a dinner when the evening came. There is probably no single class that worked harder during the whole war and had less to show for it

than the men in America's diplomatic posts in Europe, from the chiefs of missions downward. And it is pleasant to be able to record that they did it not only uncomplainingly, but gladly. It is a bit anticipatory, but I may remark here that I never met an American ambassador or minister who was not proud of the way in which his staff supported him.

At the beginning of July, 1914, I was asked whether I would go to Sweden as minister. The offer was an enticing one. Nobody, of course, could foresee the tremendous importance which Sweden was to assume during the war, but its very geographical position indicated to me a degree of importance which, I felt, had too often been overlooked. The gateway to Russia, the natural transit-land for a big part of the commerce of the North, richly endowed with splendid harbours, it offered possibilities for work which attracted me. And there was still another reason. I knew many Swedes in America, and they were the sort of men and women to make one eager to be accredited to their land. Hence I declared my willingness to take the post offered, and on July 6th President Wilson

sent my appointment to the Senate, which unanimously confirmed it twelve days later.

We Americans are still not very thoroughly grounded in European history, but we have at least learned enough to make us look back with wonder on the manner in which we failed to see the shadows of coming events in July, 1914. The Austrian Archduke's murder at Serajevo appeared to most of us, even those who knew something of Europe to be merely another tragedy in the life of the aged Kaiser Frans Josef, of which there had been so many that his pathetic cry, "Nothing is spared me!" uttered when his wife was murdered years before, must excite commiseration.

Suddenly Europe was ablaze with war, almost over night. I packed hurriedly and went to Washington. The Secretary of State directed me to proceed to my post as soon as possible. I left the same evening for New York to catch the Norwegian steamer *Bergensfjord,* the only one available, which was to sail the next day, August 11th. When two days out we saw the first indications of war—two speedy British cruisers. They spoke the ship, but did not

board her. On the eighth day out, while off the north-west coast of Scotland, four other British cruisers stopped us, lowered boats and sent officers and men aboard. They held us up four hours, but took no one off the *Bergensfjord,* despite the fact that there were many German reserve officers on her. None of the belligerent countries had yet learned all the fine points of carrying on war. For some weeks after the opening of hostilities it was no more difficult to cross the borders of the various combatant states than it is today, three years after the war is allegedly over. And it was much less expensive, for the various countries had not yet gone into the passport-and-visum business as a commercial undertaking.

The Norwegians, with that kindly courtesy which, as I was afterwards to learn is so characteristic of the Scandinavians, placed at my disposal a private railway coach from Bergen. Landing on August 21st, we were in Christiania on the following day and reached Stockholm on August 23rd. I notified the Swedish Foreign Office on the next day of my arrival and asked for an audience to present my credentials to

King Gustaf V. Until this has been done, a diplomat at a foreign court has, of course, no official standing.

A day or two later I was informed that the gala state carriage would call for me at a certain hour on August 31st. On that day I prepared for its coming by donning the gala uniform of an American diplomat—an evening suit, and in the forenoon! What we and the English call evening dress is merely formal, ceremonial dress everywhere on the Continent, and can be worn at any time of day with propriety, provided that the occasion justifies it, but it is difficult for the average American to feel at home in it before sundown.

When the royal state carriage drew up in front of the American Legation it formed a striking contrast to the modest clothing of the man who was to ride in it. It was made nearly two centuries ago and is mainly of glass and gilt. Splendidly caparisoned horses drew the carriage; there were postillions, outriders and guards in gala uniform. Count Adam Lewenhaupt, Royal Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps, accom-

panied the carriage to escort me and introduce me to the King. It was my first introduction to the formalism that still marks the Swedish court, despite the democratic nature of the King and the whole people. They see incorporated in these things the majesty of their state, not of a person or persons, and have thus far retained the forms and ceremonies of ancient days.

After a sort of triumphal procession we reached the royal palace, where the approach was lined by soldiers, in full-dress uniforms, standing with arms presented. Chamberlains in gold lace received me at the door, other officials in gold lace bowed me into the next room. My evening suit was the only foil to gay uniforms and rows of shining decorations. Then the King, in the uniform of one of the regiments of which he is the chief, greeted me; I read a short address, saying in part:

"It is my pleasant duty to present to you my letter of credence as Minister of the United States of America to Your Majesty's government, and at the same time to express to you the personal esteem and

sincere friendship of the President and people of the United States for Your Majesty and the people of Sweden.

"I do not feel that I come as a stranger to a strange land, for America gratefully acknowledges her indebtedness to Sweden. More than two million of her best citizens claim this country as their natal land, and I can assure you that no people receive a warmer welcome to our shores.

"I have been instructed to maintain and promote by my best efforts the cordial relations that have always existed between the two countries. It shall ever be my aim to keep this feeling always the same, and, if possible, to make even closer this relationship, and to do everything possible in developing the growth and best interests of the two countries."

The King replied:

"I thank you most sincerely for the friendly greeting you bring me from your President and from the people of the United States.

"Many are the marks of sympathy Sweden receives from the United States, due perhaps, as you say, in some way to the good behaviour of the numerous Swedes settled over there, and I am glad to

hear that not only your instructions, but also your personal feelings will direct your effort to work for the development of the relations between the two countries to their mutual benefit.

"I assure you that nothing will be spared on this side to facilitate your work, and I wish you a hearty welcome to Sweden.

"Now, let's sit down and talk."

The half hour of informal conversation that followed revealed the catholic nature of His Majesty's interests. Everything appeared to interest him. Unwittingly, however, I touched on one sore spot for the second time. There should be especial bonds between our lands, I reminded him again, because there are some two million Swedes in the United States.

"That's all right for you," said the King, "and I am glad they are popular and well liked and all that, but we need them here. What you are good enough to call your gain is most decidedly our loss. We don't like to see our people leaving Sweden."

There are a good many kings who do not look the part, but King Gustafus V is decidedly not

one of them. Like his two brother princes on the other Scandinavian thrones, he is well above six feet in height, carries himself erect and conveys at the very outset an impression of both physical and mental vigour, which better acquaintance only intensifies. He possesses in a high degree the happy faculty of combining the dignity of royalty with kindliness and thoroughly democratic sentiments. I should say that his most outstanding trait is his deep sense of the responsibility of his high position. Even Sweden's very few republicans admit ungrudgingly that the King's every action is dictated by a desire to serve the best interests of the whole Swedish people. This has been strikingly evinced by his willingness to work together with Socialists. It may be recalled that Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany designated all Socialists as "fellows without a fatherland," and not only refused to have anything to do with them, but also used all his power to keep them from any participation in governmental affairs, despite the fact that they were long the strongest party in Germany. King Gustaf's attitude is quite different. Despite the fact that Socialism and

Royalty are as incompatible as fire and water, the King has worked loyally with the two Socialist cabinets of the last years, recognizing in them men who, however, much he may believe their tenets to be false, are nevertheless Swedes and devoted to what they conceive to be the best interests of their fatherland. More he does not ask. Nor does it detract from the praise due him that the Swedish Socialist leaders, internationalists though they believe themselves to be, have happily not confounded internationalism with anti-nationalism, as have some of the Socialistic parties of Germany.

As is but natural, King Gustaf enjoys in high degree the love and respect of his people. This is particularly true as to the Swedish peasants, who are still, despite the country's increasing industrialization, its backbone. When, some time before the outbreak of the World War, a great procession of peasants came to Stockholm to demonstrate in favour of the maintenance and development of Sweden's national defence, the sturdy farmers from Dalecarlia addressed the King as *Du* (thou), the familiar mode of address which a child would employ in speaking to

his father, and the King was plainly more gratified than he would have been by the formal "Your Majesty." An aged peasant, without waiting to be asked, took a seat beside the King, and, still using the familiar second person singular, asked him questions about the Queen, the Crown Prince and other members of the royal family, as if he had been talking to a neighbouring peasant. And the King answered the questions just as if he really had been that neighbouring peasant.

Convinced republicans may not be impressed by this, but there can be no question that, so long as any state is committed to a monarchic form of government, such relations between the King and his people are powerful factors for good government.

Chapter II. Sweden and the Swedes

The average American's conception of Sweden would probably be summed up something like this:

"Sweden is a little country way up in the north of Europe, where all the men are named either Ole or Oscar and all the women Hulda or Lena. The country is covered with snow and ice most of the time and the people live on stockfish and hard black bread."

H. L. Mencken, in his biting "American Credo," has written as one article of all good Americans' faith, "that the Swedes are stupid fellows and have very thick skulls."

All this is, of course, an exaggeration, yet it is still true that we know rather less about Sweden than almost any other European country. This state of affairs is now beginning to be altered by

the devoted and intelligent efforts of such organizations as the American-Scandinavian Foundation—efforts which I have been glad to be able to help along in a modest way—but there is still much to do.

Let us have a look at this "little" country up in the north of Europe. It is nearly a thousand miles long and three hundred wide. With a total area of 173,000 square miles it is not much smaller than France, but the same size as Germany after the latter's loss of former German territory as a result of the Treaty of Versailles, and one and one half times larger than the British Isles together. It has a population of just under six millions, and another two millions live outside the kingdom, chiefly in the United States and Finland. This population is a little less than that of Belgium and some 60 per cent more than that of Switzerland. It will be seen that, in comparison with its area, Sweden is thinly populated, although the density of population is greater than that of any other country lying in the same latitude.

In at least two respects, and perhaps in a third, Sweden occupies an absolutely unique place

among the countries of the world. No other race in Europe has dwelt uninterruptedly so long upon the same territory, no other race has enjoyed a continuous national statehood so long, and no other race, with the possible exception of the Basques in the Pyrenees, is of such unmixed blood.

For at least five thousand years, and probably even a thousand more, the country known today as Sweden has been inhabited by the same race. Traces of occupancy have been found which go back ten thousand years, but it has been impossible to determine whether those early inhabitants were also of the same race. In any event, the Swedes have dwelt in Sweden since the beginning of the neolithic period, a record unequalled by any other people. The Danes, it is true, also show nearly as long a period of occupancy, but they suffered at various times from admixtures of foreign races who did not reach the less easily accessible Sweden.

About the year 500 A. D., an energetic family of Svealand, named Skilfingar, of which little is known except by legend, seized the ruling power in that district and began to extend its rule by

military conquests. The territory of this race seems, however, to have been dissolved into small states, corresponding roughly to the present Swedish provinces. Throughout this period and the succeeding two centuries, the *Gudahov* or God's House at Upsala, the seat of the priests of Balder, Thor, Odin and the other divinities of the North, steadily increased its influence over the people of the various provinces, and with its support King Ingjald was eventually able to subjugate the various petty rulers and thus lay the foundations of the Kingdom of Sweden. The date when this happened is not definitely known, but it was probably around 700 A. D. Hence Sweden as a national state is about twelve hundred years old, or much older than any other state in all Europe.

I have referred to the homogeneous character of the country's people. Hardly more than one per cent of the total population is composed of races of alien blood—in large part the Lapps and Finns in the extreme north. In respect also of religion the Swedes occupy a unique position. More than 99 per cent of the total population belongs to the Swedish state church—the Lutheran

—and of the other one per cent, all but one-tenth of one per cent are Protestants, mainly Baptists and Methodists. I note in passing the curious fact that although Emanuel Swedenborg was a Swede, there are only some 300 Swedenborgians in Sweden, most of the religion's followers being in England and America.

Beginning with the century following the establishing of its national unity, Sweden entered into the history of the world in which it ever since has played a part—of course with frequent intervals—astonishingly important with regard to its small population. Her entrance on the state came under the Vikings, who, from about 800 up to the middle of the eleventh century, harried the coasts of Europe as far south as the straits of Gibraltar. Slowly they made their way up the great rivers of Russia, and the very name of that land comes from the Viking Rurik, chief of "all the Rus" or oarsmen of Eastern Sweden. Toward the end of the ninth century Rurik established his rule around Lake Ladoga and the city of Novgorod.

From this time until into the eighteenth century the Swedes were almost continuously oc-

cupied in warfare, either in internal conflicts or against external enemies. Under the rule of the Vasas, beginning with King Gustafus Vasa, who came to the throne in 1523, Sweden was first welded into a harmonious nation and speedily began to assume a place of first importance in Europe. The Reformation brought about the collapse of the Catholic Livonian Federal States, and Sweden, sworn to Protestantism, dependent on the Baltic ports for the bulk of her commerce, seized the lion's share of the former federated states. Esthonia became Swedish. Gustafus Adolphus, the famous grandson of Gustafus Vasa, entered the Thirty Years' War quite as much to protect Sweden's political interests in the Baltic as on behalf of Protestantism. When this long conflict was ended in 1648, Sweden held the mouths of all the rivers of Germany and nearly all the lands along the shores of the Baltic. Two treaties brought her at this time the provinces of Southern Sweden which had theretofore belonged to Denmark. By 1658 the Swedish kingdom embraced all of present Sweden, Finland, Esthonia, Livonia, Hither Pomerania, Wismar, Bremen and Ver-

den, a total area almost twice as great as the Sweden of today.

Nearly all this vast territory outside Sweden proper was lost by the treaties that ended the Great Northern War, the titanic struggle which that extraordinary king, Charles XII, attempted to carry on alone against most of the world. Sweden, bled white by her terrible sacrifices, weary of carrying for more than a century and a half a load which would have tired the largest country, retired to the boundaries which nature had assigned her. Of all her conquests outside Sweden proper there remained only Finland, Hither Pomerania and the city of Wismar. Finland was lost in 1809, when the ill-starred King Gustafus Adolphus IV brought upon his country a war with Russia. Upon the conclusion of her peace with Denmark, which occurred five years later, Norway was united with Sweden, and in compensation Sweden handed over to Denmark her last possession on the other side of the Baltic—the northern part of Hither Pomerania. Since this time Sweden has enjoyed an uninterrupted period of external and internal peace. The union with Norway

was dissolved by an amicable agreement in 1905.

I have gone into these pages of Swedish history somewhat at length because I believe they are not generally well enough known in the United States, and also because without knowing them, it is impossible to understand the Swedes completely. Many of their most outstanding characteristics are the direct heritage of the days of the kingdom's greatness—of days whose memory still survives in the folksongs and folklore of a dozen peoples on the continent, and, still more markedly, in the governmental institutions of all the countries along the Baltic Sea.

Seen against the background of this history, the most outstanding Swedish characteristics become understandable. A friend of mine often declares that the Swedes have enough pride to equip a people of sixty millions instead of six. It is natural that they should have. From their long struggles comes also that personal bravery that makes the Swede such a highly prized soldier wherever wars are to be fought, and—and this above all—the almost fierce love of freedom that so especially characterizes the people.

Sweden had complete freedom of the press before any country of Europe, except Holland, and for more than a hundred years that freedom has been jealously protected.

Other factors have also contributed to strengthen the Swedes' love of freedom. Sweden has, since Gustafus I liberated this country from Danish domination in the beginning of the sixteenth century, never been conquered by a foreign foe. The very character of the country is reflected in its people. It is rocky, only in small part tillable, and, in the northern part, intensely cold in winter. The struggle to wrench a bare existence from inhospitable nature has always been hard, and wherever one finds such conditions one finds also a rugged, self-reliant race. The Swedes are industrious, frugal and economical—inevitable results of their surroundings—and there is no more honest people on earth.

A slight tendency to melancholy can often be observed. It is a noteworthy thing that nearly all the old Swedish folksongs are in a minor key. The suicide rate is also high. On the other hand, some of the world's most beauti-

ful lyric poetry has come from Sweden—the self-revelation of a physically strong, healthy folk which loves life. Physical vigour is one of the most striking characteristics of the people. The Swedes are among the world's tallest races —probably, indeed, the tallest—and, together with Norway and Denmark, have the lowest death rate and the greatest longevity.

The Swedes combine strikingly two characteristics which at first sight might appear incompatible—they are a highly aristocratic and at the same time a highly democratic folk. A sweeping democratization of the government and political life generally has been effected within the last few years without affecting unfavourably the somewhat formal manner of intercourse, and without bringing in its train that fierce insistence upon a levelling downward of things of the mind and spirit which certain newly democratic countries appear to confuse with real democracy. The aristocratic tendency of the Swedes has to do less with the aristocracy of birth than with the aristocracy of brains and achievement. Certain old families, both noble and commoner, are still highly re-

garded because of their family connections, as is the case in every country, but the Swede who accomplishes something worth while immediately finds that nobody asks whether he is the son of a nobleman or of a peasant. I know no country where excellence of achievement more surely elevates a man to high position.

Swedish hospitality is delightful and warm-hearted, but less indiscriminate than is the case in many lands. One American official, who come to Stockholm in the last year of the War, complained bitterly to me that the Swedes were anti-American.

"I've been here three months and not one has invited me home to dinner," he said.

He was astonished when I told him that it was a very fortunate man indeed who received an invitation to a Swede's home in such a short period of acquaintanceship. But when one has shown himself worthy to receive such an invitation, he finds that there are no limits to the hospitality that is vouchsafed him.

Beneath all his formalism and somewhat stiff courtesy, the Swede of every class is kind-hearted, helpful, and, as I have written, demo-

cratic in the best sense of the word. I often relate an incident which I saw in my first months in Stockholm. A workman, drawing a heavily loaded handcart, was having much difficulty in pulling the cart through a hole in the street where some paving-stones had been removed. A member of an old, well-known family came along the sidewalk, silk-hatted, irreproachably dressed, observed the man's predicament, stepped quickly from the sidewalk and helped push the cart through the hole. The workman removed his cap, bowed and said "Thank you"; the other man removed his silk hat, bowed and said "Don't mention it." Then both went their way. It is a trifling incident in itself, but so characteristic that I feel that it is in place here.

"Politeness costs nothing," protested the old woman, when her priest remonstrated with her for having genuflected when the name of Satan was mentioned. Not only does it cost nothing, but it is indubitably an asset everywhere, and especially in European countries, where one of the largest political parties sees one of its chief ends in the arraying of class against class, with the inevitable weakening of the state which that

brings. The workman and the silk-hatted man may oppose each other's politics violently, but so long as common usages of courtesy are observed by both of them their political and economic contests will be conducted in a manner which will not divide their respective classes into bitter enemies—the sickness which today affects so many European lands.

Sweden's contributions to the world in all lines of human endeavour have been so great that one would have to write a book on that subject alone if one desired to do justice to them. But while these contributions are well known, it is too often forgotten that they were made by a nation numbering less than six million souls. If there had been a hundred millions, as in the United States, all of the same average ability and education, imagination is hardly able to picture what the harvest would have been. I often wonder whether our Olympic athletes, when they see what their Swedish rivals accomplish, pause to consider that we have more than fifteen times as much material to draw from.

I am tempted to write more along these lines, but that would lead too far for the limits which

I have set myself. However, I felt that I must give some description, however inadequate, of the people among whom it has been my fortunate lot to spend the last eight years.

Chapter III. Helping War Victims

I have referred to my feeling, at the time I accepted the post at Stockholm, that it offered great opportunities for important work. When the war broke out I realized that this meant still more work, but not until I actually arrived at Stockholm did I begin to understand even dimly just how much more. I found Jefferson Caffery, who had been Chargé d'Affaires of the Legation, beset by anxious Americans who had suddenly come to depend on their diplomatic representatives abroad with a flattering confidence that these would know just what to do and how to do it.

Most of the first callers were travelling Americans who had been surprised by the war "somewhere in Europe." Many of them were without means, and all were insistent on getting back to America at the first possible moment. They

came mainly from Germany and Russia. Hundreds of Americans who had been used to travelling in *cabins de luxe* were grateful to get a bunk in the steerage at any price. It is easy to see now that the fears of these refugees were really groundless, but Americans had had no experience of war, and especially not of a war of such colossal proportions from the start.

For fully two months they poured into the Legation. Among them was a band of American Indians, belonging to some Wild West show. I found them encamped in the Legation's courtyard. They were decidedly less stoical than the Indians who made our early ancestors so much trouble; anxiety and even fear shone through their warpaint.

The question of furnishing transportation to the refugees was difficult at first, but finally an army mission, made up of Captain Schindel, Captain Colvin (later military attaché), and Lieutenant Phipps, arrived from Washington with American gold. Eventually everybody who wanted to go home was sent on his way, but it meant much trying work, and the applicants were often too badly scared to be reasonable. I

regret to have to say that few of them ever took the trouble to express their gratitude for what was done for them.

This work was hardly out of the way before orders came from Washington for my Legation to act as official representative in forwarding to our Embassy at Petrograd all communications relative to the matter of looking after the German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war in Russia. This work speedily assumed large proportions.

In addition to assisting in looking after German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war in Russia, this Legation also negotiated diplomatic matters, through our Embassy at Petrograd, which the Central Powers desired to transact with Russia. Sometimes I negotiated directly with the Russian Legation in Stockholm but more frequently with my colleague, Ambassador Francis in Petrograd.

It is customary during a time of war that the nations involved ask some neutral country to look after their interests in the enemy countries. Of course they must do this since they themselves are unable to negotiate with the country with

which they are fighting. Hence Washington was asked by the Central Powers to look after their interests in Russia.

The Russians, in their early invasion of East Prussia, and the Germans, in their fall campaign, had both taken hosts of prisoners. Those taken by the Russians, or caught back of the Russian lines, included thousands of non-combatants, mostly women and children. Russia was utterly unprepared for taking care of such numbers as were captured, and the situation threatened great hardship for these unfortunates. Herr Reichenau, the German Minister at Stockholm, and Baron Lucius von Stoedten, his successor, were at the American Legation daily. The work became so heavy that I was compelled to establish a separate bureau for war-prisoner work. The telegrams and letters concerning German prisoners ran into the hundreds daily.

The German government's interest and activities on behalf of its captured soldiers were intense. I frequently received from a half million to a million marks weekly for the Germans in Russia and sometimes the sum was much greater. The mark was then worth 24 cents.

I find a letter from the American Embassy in Petrograd, dated December 31, 1915, and advising me that 250,000 roubles had that day been received for the relief of German prisoners, "making a total of one million roubles received this week," said the letter. The Austro-Hungarian government was, however, either poorer or less efficient than the German, probably both. There was continuous difficulty in getting enough funds for the barest needs of the Austro-Hungarians in Russia, up to the time when our entrance into the war compelled me to abandon this humane work. In April, 1916—to cite but a single instance—Count Hadik, the Austrian minister, requested me to advise our ambassador in Petrograd that Austria would send 350,000 roubles monthly for relief work. The ambassador replied that a round half million was needed.

In the light of what we know now about the quality of the Austrian soldiers, certain reports of American diplomatic and consular officers in Russia in 1914 are interesting and significant. They had done all they could to bring about the repatriation of all Austrians in Russia who

would in certain circumstances be permitted to leave the country, but a very large number refused to go back, although they were told that they would receive no financial assistance if they remained. They preferred Siberia to Austria. There were altogether about 160,000 non-combatant subjects of the Dual Monarchy and twice as many Germans in Russia at the outbreak of the war. Among them were several notable personages, of whom I recall best Prince Ferdinand Radzwill. The Prince, who was at Olyka, in Volhynia, when the war came, was 83 years old, but it was nevertheless not possible for me to get permission for him to leave the country until December, 1916.

Bad as it was at the beginning, the lot of the unfortunate prisoners of war was eventually rendered worse as to great numbers of them by mutual "reprisals." In February, 1916, for instance, Baron Lucius directed my attention to the fact that the Russian government, in a declaration given out two weeks earlier, had asserted that the conditions of internment at various places, including Orenburg in Astrachan, had been investigated and found "entirely satisfac-

tory," whereas Secretary Sterling of the American Embassy at Petrograd, in a report giving the result of his personal inspection at Orenburg, had declared that he found dreadful conditions. Baron Lucius requested me to call the Russian government's attention to this contradiction and to request that Russian authorities "make unexpected trips of investigation to the camps, as is done by the German authorities."

What steps were taken by the Russian government I do not know, but they were in any event regarded by the German government as unsatisfactory. In the following June, Baron Lucius informed me that his government had been advised that three hundred German and Austrian officers in Astrachan were confined in rooms whose windows were closed day and night, were not permitted to exercise or indulge in the most harmless pastimes, and even forbidden to sing. Three had become insane, one had died and one had committed suicide. The Minister asked me to inform the Russian government that three hundred Russian officers were receiving the same kind of treatment, and that the German reprisals would remain in force until the German

government should be informed that a representative of the American Embassy had personally ascertained that the conditions complained of had been bettered.

Four days later the Russian government retaliated with an allegation that the German government was refusing to permit relief parcels from The Hague to be sent to Russian prisoners. It threatened, if this attitude were not abandoned, to take corresponding steps.

These are but two of hundreds of similar instances; such mutual recriminations and reprisals were kept up throughout the conflict. It all forms a sad commentary on the brutalizing effect of war. War is cruel and damnable enough at best, without adding unnecessary suffering for helpless men whose chief crime appears to have been that they were born under this flag instead of that.

But there was one lighter and more hopeful aspect. That was the splendid manner in which America devoted itself to lessening the hardships of the prisoners and their families. As a result of the passions aroused after America had joined the belligerents and the work for enemy

countries had had to cease, the great humanitarian work done in the first two and a half years of the war may very well have been forgotten—probably, indeed, has in large part been forgotten. But it deserves to be remembered.

The Red Cross and the Young Men's Christian Association were quickly in the field. In August, 1915, came the constitution of the Rockefeller Foundation Relief Commission, with Messrs. Warwick Greene, Wickliffe Rose, E. P. Bicknell, Henry James, Jr., and Collin Herrle. Dr. John R. Mott and Mr. A. C. Harte bore the brunt of the Y. M. C. A. work. All these organizations enjoyed from the very beginning the hearty and efficient co-operation of the Swedish Red Cross, at whose head was Prince Charles, brother of King Gustaf. Another devoted and energetic worker was Crown Princess Margaret of Sweden.

The position of the Crown Princess was extremely difficult all through the war. Herself an Englishwoman, daughter of the Duke of Connaught, her inmost sympathies must naturally have been with the English, but as consort of the future King of Sweden she was obliged to

be absolutely neutral, so far, at least, as outward conduct went. At that, I do not believe it was hard for her, for she was a big-hearted, Christian woman, for whom the nationality of the suffering never came into consideration. Naturally she did all that she could to alleviate the lot of her former countrymen—I recall especially that one of her first inquiries through me was for information as to the fate of a Colonel Gordon, of the famous Gordon Highlanders,—who had been taken prisoner by the Germans—but scores of her letters to me were inquiries into the condition of Germans, Austrians, Russians, in short, of whoever was suffering. I give here, as characteristic of the Crown Princess, the following extract from one of her letters of inquiry:

"Please forgive my seeming exigency, but the terrible anxiety of the families must be so awful that I cannot help feeling that every minute means hours of suspense to them."

That a cultured Englishwoman wrote "terrible" and "awful" in the same sentence seems to me of deep psychological interest; it was the

letter of a noble soul too deeply moved by human suffering to take heed of the niceties of purist rhetoricians. I would not have had her seek for synonyms that might better please the literary critics.

Most of us fall a little short of the best that is in us, but Crown Princess Margaret did not. Whatever she could do she did, and she not only helped by precept and example, but herself sewed garments for the families of the prisoners of war. Her untimely death on May 1, 1920, threw the whole kingdom into mourning, for she was as universally beloved as she was respected. "The lights have gone out in the palace," said the great Socialist leader, Hjalmar Branting, with tears in his eyes, when he heard the news—and it is highly unorthodox for Socialists to mourn for the death of royal personages.

To recapitulate all that was done by American humanitarianism for the relief of the distressed in the first two years of the war would lead too far—and would perhaps be dry reading, for it would be but repetitions of stories about widows and orphans fed and clothed, wrecks of human-

ity restored to their families, the homeless sheltered, the despondent cheered. But what has perhaps been forgotten is that these forces for good kept up their work even after the rupture of relations between the Central Powers and America, and were willing to continue it even after we were in the war, if it had been possible. It may be doubted, also, whether the scope of the work planned is generally known.

After two years of experience in relief work, the various organizations engaged planned, at the end of 1916, to extend their efforts greatly. In December of that year Dr. Mott, in a letter to Mr. Harte, outlined the plans for the creation of a sort of international committee for prisoners' relief. Heads of this committee were to be Dr. Mott, Mr. Harte, Mr. Greene and Herr Ador of the International Red Cross. The committee was to act as general "clearing-house" of prisoners' relief, with its seat in some neutral country. The Red Cross was prepared to expand its already excellent organization for the exchange of prisoners, and the Rockefeller Foundation announced its willingness to make an initial con-

tribution of $300,000, and also to contribute another $200,000 toward a million dollars.

By February, 1917, the plans were well matured. Mr. Greene sent to the State Department an urgent recommendation for the dispatch of a supply-ship for prisoners of war—intended to be but the first of many. Crown Princess Margaret signified her willingness to be a member of the committee of relief. The British ministers at Stockholm and Copenhagen recommended to their governments that the passage of this and other similar ships be facilitated by the British government. Germany gave preliminary guarantees of safe passage, which were to be confirmed later in a conference, already arranged, with Prince Max (Maximilian) of Baden and Major-General Friedrich of the German War Ministry.

"America would furnish an impressive demonstration of humanitarianism, we believe, if all or part of this shipload for suffering prisoners of war were donated," wrote Mr. Greene to the Department of State.

On February 22, 1917—after the breach with

Germany—the Rockefeller Fund advised Mr. Greene of its readiness to charter the first vessel, provided the belligerent governments would guarantee safe passage. Such a guarantee was given by England on March 24th and by Germany on April 2nd—unfortunately too late to be taken advantage of.

Despite the entrance of America into the war, preparations for prisoner-relief work continued for some time. However, arrangements were made to substitute neutrals for Americans in direct contact with prisoners in German prison-camps. Mr. Harte, in a letter to Major-General Friedrich on April 23, 1917, wrote that neutrals would take up the actual work among the prisoners, and he hoped co-operation would still be possible. Major-General Friedrich replied promptly that Germany would welcome a continuance of the work along the lines laid down. The Austrian Minister of War also informed the Y. M. C. A. that the entrance of America into the war would not only not compel the American workers to leave Austria, but that their activities would be limited as little as possible.

That all these humanitarian plans came to naught was perhaps unavoidable. But it is none the less regrettable.

The American Red Cross in Sweden was organized by my wife at Stockholm in 1914. All the American women in the Swedish capital and many Swedish women as well joined in the work, meeting every week at my home, Oakhill, to sew garments and pack boxes. It was my wife's privilege to buy the material needed, all of which eventually had to be secured from America. As early as Christmas, 1914, six large boxes of hospital supplies were sent to Germany, Austria and Russia, and further supplies and wearing apparel were thereafter sent every six months.

In November, 1915, as a result of the suggestion of Crown Princess Margaret, hundreds of Allied prisoners in Germany and German and Austrian prisoners in Russia were "adopted," and a regular correspondence was carried on through the Swedish Red Cross with the families of the prisoners. Food, reading matter, tobacco and clothing were sent to the prisoners, and considerable clothing to the families, as well

as occasional sums of money. When the export of these supplies from Sweden became impossible, under the kingdom's various export prohibitions and the actual lack of available commodities, the Swedish-American Red Cross applied to the King for permission to incorporate, which was granted. Incorporation was affected in June, 1918. In the winter of 1918–19 hundreds of men's, women's and children's garments were sent into Reval, Riga, and other Baltic cities, as well as into the devastated countries of Middle Europe. Hospital supplies were also sent. Most of these articles were distributed by the Y. M. C. A. and Red Cross. In the winter of 1919–20 the work was continued, clothing and underwear being sent to all points in the Baltic provinces, as also to many places in Finland.

For what we were happily in a position to do, the gold medal of the Swedish Red Cross was awarded to Mrs. Morris. The King himself was kind enough personally to pin this medal on my wife. I feel a sort of pride about it which is, perhaps, pardonable in the circumstances.

Among all the humanitarian activities of the

Red Cross, probably none brought greater joy to those immediately concerned than did the various exchanges of prisoners between Russia and Germany. The first of these pathetic trainloads passed through Sweden on November 5, 1915. My wife and I went to Hallsberg, a station not far from Stockholm, where the trains from Germany and Russia met. Mlle. Nekluduff, sister of the Russian Minister at Stockholm, accompanied us. Similar scenes have been described so often by abler pens that I can say nothing new about it, but I must confess that I was shaken by what I saw concerning both German and Russian prisoners. The prisoners exchanged were, of course, only those as to whom it was certain that they would never again be able to bear arms. Some were legless, others armless, others blind, and still others—pitiful sight—witless or insane from their sufferings. It was here that I first began to realize what a horrible thing war is.

Scores of the exchanged prisoners were merely going home to die—and they realized it. Some of the prisoners were the merest boys; others were white-bearded. A Russian priest of the Greek Catholic Church, distributed ikons

among the unfortunates, and, led by him, some of the stronger sang old Russian hymns. Many of them, however, were too weak or too apathetic to sing. All through the following years of the war these tragic trainloads passed through Sweden, but this was the only one I saw. It was the only one I wanted to see. All these exchanges of prisoners were carried out by the Swedish Red Cross, under the direction of Prince Charles.

The prison-relief work brought me into contact with many interesting persons. One of these was Prince Max of Baden, Chancellor of Germany during the revolution, who came to Stockholm in December, 1916, for a conference with the Russian senator, Arbuzow. I was asked to attend the conference, because of my familiarity with the work that had been going on. I met Prince Max several times, and was impressed by him. He appeared to be a man of broad mind and humanitarian ideals. The tribute paid him by former Ambassador Gerard in his book, "My Four Years in Germany," was fully deserved. The Prince worked much with

Crown Princess Margaret, who was related to him in some manner.

Senator Arbuzow, with two of his colleagues, represented Russia on behalf of these conferences, I remember him as a man of the highest type of character who occupied important positions in the Russian Red Cross and other great organizations doing humanitarian work in Russia. Arbuzow was doing everything in his power to relieve the suffering and misery of the prisoners and I cannot comment too highly upon the results of his efforts.

Another man with whom I worked was Count Albert Apponyi of Hungary, whom I entertained in America while he was the guest of President Roosevelt. Count Apponyi came to Sweden repeatedly on prisoner-relief work as representative of the Austrian government. He had grown very old, but had lost none of his former vigour and mental alertness. In several conferences which I had with him before America entered the war I was repeatedly impressed by his genuine desire for peace. He abhorred war, but was swept along with the current.

From an American Legation

Reference to war-prisoner and general humanitarian work would not be complete without especial mention of Mr. A. C. Harte. The obvious sincerity of his purposes and his high personal character won the confidence of all whom he met, friend or foe. To the last he was trusted fully by the Central Powers as well as the Allies. It was largely due to his personal efforts that the conditions in the prison camps generally improved steadily. His various assistants were in every way worthy to associate with him. All of them were splendid examples of unselfish Americanism at its finest.

Chapter IV. War Miseries

When conditions exist which are bad and unwarranted, the right way to change these conditions is to let them be known and light thrown upon the subject. What will help toward the discontinuing of wars is for the public to realize the miseries which war necessarily brings about. I am therefore writing in this chapter some of these horrible conditions which have existed during this past war.

Speaking from the broad view of humanity, it does not seem right to make a comparison of the wretched phases of one side with the other. I could enumerate and re-open many of those well-known horrors which happened during the war, but it seems to me of little purpose to speak of those affairs which so shocked the civilized world.

I have before me the volumes published of the bulletins of the International Red Cross in Geneva covering each year of the war. In these vol-

umes I have read again of the protestations which the International Red Cross published on behalf of civilization. I have also read over again the reports and statements made by well-known people who thoroughly investigated and confirmed those German actions which had so stirred the world. However, it is not the intention of this book to arouse any feeling toward the former Central Powers; on the contrary, to help in effacing the bitterness born of the war and establish a better feeling.

I am giving the following sketch taken from the Swedish Red Cross reports which were sent to my Legation concerning the conditions of the prisons in Russia, as it was the Legation's duty to transmit such reports to interested parties concerning conditions existing in prison camps in Russia. I have written on these matters to show definitely the inevitable horrors which result from war, and which must exist in various forms in all warring countries. Russia was both handicapped by being obliged to care for so many prisoners which came so suddenly to them, and more especially by the climatic conditions in Siberia where the temperature as we all know

is intensely cold and hard. Moreover the Russians themselves are accustomed to an extremely rugged hardy life, different from that of these prisoners. I did not have the personal observation or experience concerning conditions which existed in prison camps in Germany, Turkey or Austria, and I am not giving this report with the intention of any basis whatsoever or comparison between Russia and other countries. Conditions as we all know from official reports widely circulated show that the conditions of the camps in Germany and Turkey were fully as objectionable and deplorable in other forms as those described in Russia, however, I am not speaking of these conditions as these reports did not come to my Legation as we were only handling prisoner affairs as regards Russia.

The reader who suddenly finds himself confronted at this late date with Red Cross statistics of relief work and with descriptions of conditions in prison-camps, as he is confronted in this chapter, may have a right to demand an apology. But he will get none.

I doubt greatly whether the work done by the devoted men and women of the Swedish Red

Cross is as well known generally as it deserves. In any event, it can do no harm to tell it again. And I am very sure that, despite the hundreds, yes, thousands of columns that have been given to descriptions of conditions in the prison-camps, especially those of Russia, the report of the Swedish Red Cross contains details that are new. But these, too, even if they be perchance well known already, can and should be told again and again. I know nothing that should more powerfully stir the sympathies of all humane men and women than the recital of the terrible sufferings of these unfortunate victims of national passions. I do not see how any one can read them without resolving to do all that he or she can to see that such things shall never again be possible, in a world calling itself civilized. And if but a few score of those that read this book make such a resolve, something will have been gained.

I have already described the beginning of the exchange of prisoners inaugurated through the efforts of the Swedish Red Cross. It was soon followed by the establishing of a regular transport of clothing, medical and surgical goods and

provisions from the Central Powers to their prisoners in Russia, and from Russia to the Central Powers. The transports from Russia, however, were minimal, the great bulk of all the transports being from Germany and Austria-Hungary to Russia. The first trainload for the prisoners of the Central Powers left Torneo for Irkutsk and Tomsk on February 14, 1916, the last on March 30, 1918. The Swedish Red Cross was willing to continue the work after the last-named date, but the Bolshevists had liberated all prisoners when they came into power, and these were scattered all over Russia, the camps being broken up, so that any organized effort to help them was rendered impossible.

Between the two dates mentioned, no less than 41 trainloads, comprising 1,016 cars, had passed Petrograd on their way to the various prison-camps.

What these transports meant for the helpless prisoners in Russia is indicated by the kind and quantities of goods which they included. There came from Germany, among other things, 114,000 uniforms, 112,000 pairs of shoes, 140,000 suits of underwear, 475 cases of serums, medicines, surgical instruments and disinfectants,

and some 100,000 packages of food. From Austria-Hungary, which, as I have earlier pointed out, sent less money to her prisoners than did Germany came no less than 375,000 uniforms, 177,000 pairs of shoes, 300,000 blankets, 70,000 suits of underwear, 55,000 tins of condensed milk, 20,000 tins of preserved meat, 3,200 cases of medicines, surgical instruments, disinfectants, etc., and many other things—a really surprising showing for a country which was suffering so terribly as was the Dual Monarchy. In comparison with the respective numbers of prisoners, however, Austria-Hungary's gifts were much smaller than were Germany's, for, as we shall see later, the vast bulk of the prisoners held in Russia were from the Dual Monarchy. This was due in part to the fact that there were more Austro-Hungarians engaged on the east front, but also in large part to the fact that the German soldier of the old days was made of sterner fighting stuff than his more polished but less rugged cousin from farther south, and was more in the habit of making prisoners in Russia than of being made a prisoner. The total value of the supplies handled by the Swed-

ish Red Cross for the Central Powers approached 100,000,000 Swedish crowns. The organization's delegates stationed in Russia also expended many millions more for the relief of the unfortunate victims of the war, and assisted furthermore in the distribution of large sums of money placed at their disposal by the Red Cross organizations of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and also, in 1916, by the American Y. M. C. A., with whose delegates they co-operated, as also with the Red Cross delegates from Denmark, at whose head stood His Royal Highness Prince Valdemar of Denmark.

The prisoners of the Central Powers were divided roughly into three groups as regards their locations: those in Siberia, in European Russia and in Turkestan. The Swedish Red Cross comments that

"it is a singular fact that the German prisoners, and especially the officers, were always transported to the most distant camps in Oriental Siberia."

It continues:

"If the necessary dispositions had been made in advance for receiving in the camps the great num-

bers of prisoners transported many of them would have been saved. But this was by no means the case. Neither the Germans, Austrians nor Turks were accustomed to a temperature of 50 degrees below zero centigrade (58 below fahrenheit). A great number died from the cold alone."

The Russian soldier's main food was coarse bread, but the most of the prisoners were accustomed to a better fare, and they fell victims to stomach complaints as a result of their food, which, in addition to bread, consisted mainly of thin soup. Everywhere typhus, scurvy, pest and infections of the skin carried them off in great numbers. According to the reports of the Swedish Red Cross delegates, the prisoners in Russia were nowhere furnished with mattresses or blankets. At the hospital in Vojenni the sick lay on the floor, and so crowded together that it was difficult to walk among them. At Dauria the Russian guards themselves were attacked by the pest, the so-called "black-death," and the camp became utterly isolated from the outer world—with consequences which can be imagined. At Barnaul it was necessary to bring all the water from the River Ob, two-thirds of a

mile away. In 1918 there were 1000 prisoners there, but it often happened that food was received for only 300, despite the utmost efforts of the commander. At Orloff, government of Vjatka, the Swedish inspectors found 1000 ill out of a total of 1356 prisoners, most of them with typhus. Many died.

The situation of the prisoners in Siberia, moreover, grew steadily worse as the war went on, and by 1919

"the sufferings of the prisoners assumed fearful proportions, especially in those camps that were in the hands of the counter-revolutionaries. The conditions there were so horrible that they defy description. In certain camps the prisoners were deliberately permitted to die of hunger or disease."

"The manner in which the counter-revolutionaries treated the prisoners of war in Siberia constitutes one of the worst atrocities committed during the war. Testimony as to this can be given by all the delegates of the societies of the Red Cross of the different lands who were in the districts during the year 1919."

The prison camps in European Russia were in general much better than those of Siberia, par-

ticularly because of the milder climate: however, those at Archangel and in the government of Vologda resembled those in Siberia, and the worst of all were the camps along the lines of the Murman and the Black Sea Railways. When the Swedes were first able to visit the former district, which was not until 1917, they found "that the reality was quite as bad as it was represented by the stories told by prisoners of war." The prisoners were moved from one place to another without any warning or any time to make preparations. They were transported long distances with nothing to eat, and then herded into wretched plank barracks, which, in the winter months, they had to clean of snow before they could enter them.

Clothed in rags, the wretched men lay on wooden benches swarming with vermin. Their food was insufficient in quantity and of a quality quite inappropriate to the climate. Ninety per cent of them suffered at one time or another from scurvy. Invalids were transported to a so-called hospital in open waggons when the thermometer stood 30 degrees below zero.

The reports regarding the terrible hardships

of the prisoners working on the Murman Railway and of the bad treatment inflicted on a large number of German officers in Russia as measures of reprisal for the alleged bad treatment of Russian prisoners in Germany moved the presidents of the Swedish Red Cross and the Danish Red Cross, Prince Charles and Prince Valdemar, to unite in a protest in the autumn of 1916. They telegraphed jointly to the German Emperor and the Tsar of Russia, insisting that the situation of the prisoners in the Murman district be ameliorated, and that all "reprisals," both in Russia and Germany, be done away with. The result of this action was a promise by both monarchs that there should be no more reprisals.

Unfortunately, however, this was by no means the end of the sufferings of the hapless prisoners. In 1917 the Swedish Red Cross received a report that the situation of the men employed in constructing the Black Sea Railway demanded immediate intervention. Delegates who went to the scene discovered that the report was only too well grounded. I quote from the report of the Red Cross:

From an American Legation

"In the autumn of 1917, 10,000 prisoners, Germans, Austro-Hungarians, Turks and Bulgarians, were working on the construction of this line. It traverses a veritable land of malaria. At the very commencement of the line, at Novosenaki, five men on an average were dying daily. Between Gagri and Gudayty, on a stretch of 43 kilometers (about 26 miles), the average number of deaths per day was from 30 to 40. It can be affirmed without exaggeration that of the prisoners occupied on this construction, half died of fevers or other maladies due to the climate. But the hard work also contributed to weaken them. They were compelled to slave in a shameless manner. The assertion that the majority of the prisoners had been sent thither from the Murman district in order to cure them of scurvy was regarded by the Swedish delegates as a piece of bitter irony.

"The hospitals were in a most lamentable condition; in that at Novo-Gagri nearly every prisoner brought there died. The food was beneath all criticism. In many districts they received nothing but gruel and hot water for tea. The misery among them became finally so fearful that the Russian population, at Baku, for example, expressed its indignation over the treatment to which the prisoners were subjected.

"In order not to irritate the native population too much, the most seriously ill prisoners were transported to the island of Nargin, 8 kilometers from Baku. But no hospital was established for them there. The unfortunates, afflicted with malaria, dysentery and scurvy, were abandoned to their fate, without medicines and without caretakers. There was not even water on the island; it had to be brought from Baku."

The Swedish delegates succeeded, but only with the greatest difficulty, in getting these prisoners brought to Baku. They were also able to bring about considerable reforms in the condition of the hospitals.

The delegates had much difficulty in obtaining permission to visit the prison camps in Turkestan, since these were under an exclusively military administration. They found the situation generally better than in most places in regard to lodgings but the sanitary conditions were appalling. The maladies so prevalent in the East, typhus, malaria, variola, exanthematic typhus, etc., were found in all the camps. There was an extremely high mortality, due both to climatic conditions and insufficient nourishment. At

Solataja-Orda, in the period from May to September, 1915, 900 of the total 6,000 prisoners died of malaria. At Skobelev, 2,000 men died, about 25 per cent of all the prisoners on the spot, and similar proportions were found elsewhere.

The field covered by the Swedish Red Cross increased steadily all through the war. A description of the scope of their work in a single district gives an idea of what they accomplished. This was in the district lying about Ekaterinaburg, which eventually became the centre of all activities for the eastern part of the Ural. When the Bolshevist victory in the autumn of 1917 set the prisoners of war free, they began streaming into Ekaterinaburg, seeking something to eat. The burden fell upon the Swedes alone, whom the authorities permitted, albeit with great reluctance, to organize a relief work having its central point in the city and covering no less than 120,000 square kilometers. In this immense district there were organized 33 hospitals, adequately equipped with beds and bedding, medicines and sanitary equipments, and staffed by doctors appointed by the Swedish delegates. Five other hospitals were organized in Ekate-

rinaburg itself; further a convalescent home and a bath establishment capable of giving 2,000 baths a day.

One of the Swedish delegates, Sven Hedblom, at the head of the work in Charabovsk, which was included in the Ekaterinaburg territory, paid with his life for his devotion to humanitarian work, being murdered in October, 1918. After the Bolshevist revolution the Czecho-Slovaks in the district arrested him repeatedly. He was arrested again in May, 1918, together with a Norwegian assistant, and released, after being robbed. In October he was again arrested by a band, under the leadership of the Cossack Ataman, Kalmykoff, robbed of a very considerable sum of money belonging to the Swedish Red Cross and hanged, together with his Norwegian colleague, Opshaug, in a railway carriage by a Czech named Julinek, who acted under the orders of Kalmykoff. Another Swedish Red Cross delegate was murdered by the Bolshevists in January, 1919.

The work done by the Swedish Red Cross in Russia was but one aspect of its activities. In the winter of 1918 it equipped four ambulance

detachments for relief work in connection with the civil warfare in Finland. In the winter of 1920 it sent a relief expedition in Poland and organized a hospital service and a bacteriological laboratory for combating typhus. It used all efforts from the spring to the summer of 1919 to get permission from the victors in the war to repatriate the prisoners of the Central Powers still in Russia especially those in the eastern part of the country—some 36,000 Germans and 150,000 Austro-Hungarians—but its efforts failed. This matter was finally entrusted to the Norwegian explorer, Dr. Frithjof Nansen by the League of Nations in March, 1920, and he was able to get 38,000 men transported back to their homes in Germany or the former Dual Monarchy, and 44,500 Russians were repatriated, but the great bulk of the prisoners were compelled to spend another winter in Siberia.

The Swedish Red Cross has done much to alleviate suffering in the lands most severely affected by the war. It has organized homes for tubercular children in Vienna and near Lille, France; a home for war-orphans in Thuringia, Germany, creches in Budapest, and various other

benevolent institutions. A château at Haga, near Stockholm, generously placed at the disposition of the Red Cross by King Gustaf, had been used as a home for undernourished children. Nearly 4000 undernourished children were cared for during the summer of 1919 in Sweden, coming from the Baltic provinces, Germany, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and Russia. Poland, France and Belgium were invited also to send their quota of children at the expense of the Swedish Red Cross, but refused. The number of children thus cared for rose to 14,400 in 1920. Altogether the Red Cross have cared in Sweden for over 21,000 in this way. It has also expended for the benefit of the poor, sick and destitute from Central Europe, including Germany and Austria, the equivalent of about nine million French francs.

I feel it appropriate before finishing this chapter to pay a well deserved tribute which belongs to Russia. Perhaps there is no country in the world whose people have been more inspired with reverence to their Emperor as the rank and file of the Russian people. They were dominated with the highest spiritual belief in

their Tsar and showed by fact as well as form this great allegiance which they felt toward the Head of their religion. This spiritual allegiance and this devout patriotism inspired them all through the war to the greatest sacrifices and hardships in fighting for the Allied cause.

Before the war one kept continually hearing of movements going on within Russia which pointed toward a more democratic government; that it would only be a matter of time when the great rank and file of the peoples, the Russian peasants, would be coming more into their own.

The psychology of Russia's progress is difficult to analyse. Neither the nation nor the Russian people have been easy to understand. The blending for generations with other nations has produced in the peasant a simple, childlike, trusting, kindly person. Perhaps one reason why we do not understand the Russian people better is because with this childlike simplicity there is mixed a mentality that has much in it of fatalism and mysticism.

Russia's great achievements in art, medicine, literature, science, and the development of higher ideals of civilization is too well known

to be commented upon. Therefore with a nation having these great and natural qualities, there eventually must evolve out of Russia something big and useful to the world, and I feel confident that in time great things will be contributed to the world by these millions of people who are now suffering under their great trials and tribulations.

Chapter V. Stopping the Leaks

Up to the very last our government and people had continued to hope that not all avenues to peace were closed. In the first week of January, 1917, only a month before America broke off relations with Germany, King Gustaf had cabled President Wilson:

"I beg you to accept my best wishes for the coming year. I am happy to join you in your noble peace action."

From the very outset every step possible had been taken not only to restore peace, but to preserve it among the other countries of the world. A prominent rôle in these efforts was played by William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State at the time. In October, 1914, upon his instructions, I had negotiated with the Swedish government a treaty, one of a large number of

similar treaties, in which the contracting parties agreed that all disputes of every nature should, in cases contemplated by article 9 of the agreement for the settlement of international disputes, concluded at The Hague on October 18, 1907, he referred to a permanent international committee for investigation and report. It was agreed further that no hostilities might be begun before the report of this committee had been submitted.

Secretary Bryan cabled me on October 13, 1914:

"You might suggest that this is one of a series of treaties of which 27 have already been signed and two more will be signed tomorrow. They embody a plan upon which I have been labouring for nearly ten years. I have signed nearly all the others, and feel a personal interest in affixing my signature to these treaties."

It is customary for a country's diplomatic representative to sign such treaties on behalf of his government, but in this case I sent the treaty to Washington so that Mr. Bryan himself might sign it. It must have been a sad disappointment to him—indeed, it was a sad disappoint-

ment for every lover of peace—to discover later of how little value were even the most solemn treaties and obligations between nations.

One of the best advertised, albeit most futile, of all efforts for peace was the Ford expedition. I was notified from Washington in December, 1915, of the expedition's plans, and advised that the undertaking had no official standing. Hence, while we were all in sympathy with their slogan of "Get the boys out of the trenches by Christmas," we could give them no official sanction or recognition.

The party arrived in Stockholm in March, 1916. There were some forty members, including a large delegation of journalists and magazine writers, members of various women's clubs, pacifist organizations, etc. The Swedes in general and the Swedish press, although quite as eager for peace as anybody, were inclined to look upon the whole expedition as a tragically humorous undertaking. Themselves neighbours to two of the belligerent lands and better informed than the Americans about the clash of interests that caused the war, they were as-

tounded at the expedition's remarkably naïve conception of the way to end the war.

The expedition held several peace meetings in Stockholm, and established a bureau there which was maintained until America came into the war. Despite the slightness of the out look for accomplishing much, a number of prominent Scandinavian friends of peace interested themselves in the work and placed their services at the disposal of the organization that was formed. They did their best, but the Fates—wearing the disguise of this world's imperialists and materialists—made their task an impossible one.

The entrance of America into the great conflict materially altered my position over night. From being my duty to preserve strict neutrality as against all belligerents—and neutrals—it suddenly became my duty to do everything in my power to help defeat Germany. This involved, among other things—and that was one of the things that especially concerned me—the using of all possible means to prevent food or war supplies being sent from or through Sweden to Germany. While the extent of such traffic has

been somewhat exaggerated as has also the extent of assistance which Germany received indirectly from Denmark in the form of food and other materials, nevertheless it was of greatest importance, and so, in concert with my colleagues from the Allied countries, I began directing my attention to the stopping of all leaks.

It is very obvious that countries bordering and adjacent to Germany, economically hampered and short of food, could not afford to ship food into Germany. Hence the importance of the Allied blockade being carried out in the strictest manner. Of course, it will be readily understood that the object of the Allies in preventing food and economic assistance reaching Germany was to assist in breaking Germany's courage and energy. I have been informed from the most reliable sources in Germany that the food shortage throughout Germany caused by the Allied blockade, was one of the prime reasons which assisted in bringing about Germany's capitulation.

One of the chief exports from Sweden to Germany in the summer of 1917 consisted of meats. There was a very valid reason for this,

as one can see now, although at the time it caused us all much anxiety. The Swedish harvest of 1917 was the poorest for years. There was little more than half the ordinary crop of hay, a deficit of 300,000 tons of wheat and of 400,000 tons of rye, which, in Sweden as in all European countries, is the principal bread-cereal. Importations of all kinds of fodder, including the important oilcakes, which had been largely used by the Swedish farmers, had stopped. The use of breadstuffs and potatoes as fodder had been forbidden. The government saw itself compelled to sanction the export of 15,000 horses and considerable quantities of beef-cattle because there was no fodder for them. The slaughter of meat cattle assumed serious proportions. What it meant is indicated by the fact that whereas Sweden had 1,925,668 dairy cattle in 1913, there were but 1,634,982 left at the end of 1918, and much of this was young stock.

Some of my colleagues were in favour of bringing every possible pressure to bear to stop all these exports completely. Quite apart from the question of the practicability of such measures, it appeared to me that we should be the

losers rather than the gainers by it. I have already pointed out how Sweden was dependent on Germany for certain necessaries, including especially coal, drugs and dyes. Coal, it is true, could also be obtained from England, but the freight and insurance together climbed to more than ninety Swedish crowns, normally some $23.00 a ton, whereas Germany delivered coal at Swedish harbours at a rate but a fraction of that for English coal. Moreover, the combined available receipts from both England and Germany were far below Sweden's normal requirements. In the first five months of 1917, for instance, the kingdom received but 467,000 tons, against the promised 750,000 tons and against actual imports of 2,097,000 in the same period in 1915.

In a report to Washington in May of this same year I pointed out the danger of trying to compel Sweden to stop all exports to Germany. Germany refused to accept payment in money for what it was able to export, requiring instead the so-called "compensation" articles, horses, meat, woodpulp, iron-ore, etc. If these Swedish exports were stopped, it undoubtedly meant

that Germany would retaliate by likewise stopping her exports. The Allied and Associated governments, however, were directly interested in the coal question. The Swedish railways were already seriously hampered by the shortage of coal. Many trains had been taken off altogether, and the rest of the service had been cut down. A further reduction would have seriously imperiled the rapid transit of goods designed for our ally Russia.

As a result of my representations on this matter, no drastic steps were taken. The proposed steps would not have helped our cause at all, and would have imposed an unnecessary hardship upon Sweden, which was already beginning to face a serious shortage of food—a shortage which was aggravated by the Germans' ruthless submarine campaign. Only a week after my recommendation to the State Department, to mention but one of dozens of similar incidents, the Swedish steamers *Vesterland, Viking* and *Aspen,* with a total of 10,000 tons, carrying foodstuffs for Sweden, were torpedoed in the North Sea, with the loss of ten lives.

Apart from the purely "compensatory" arti-

cles, however, my colleagues and I felt that certain exports were going on that could and should properly be stopped. At the end of May, 1917, I transmitted to the State Department a note pointing out that the blockade of Germany would undoubtedly be rendered more effective if the United States should forbid the exportation of all merchandise designed for any country adjoining Germany except upon license duly issued, and that such license should be granted only upon the undertaking of the importer not to re-export the wares. The British, French, Italian and Russian ministers sent similar notes to their respective governments. As to Sweden we recommended that a further condition be that transit to Russia should be permitted of all articles not included in a royal Swedish decree of January, 1915, that is to say, munitions of war.

Action along the lines recommended was taken in October, 1917, with the establishing by Presidential proclamation of the War Trade Board, designed to effectuate the already existing embargo and to control the export of goods in order to prevent their falling into the hands of

the enemy. Since the leakage from Sweden was believed to be greater than in any other neutral country, not only in the re-export of food and other materials, but also of materials fabricated from raw materials secured in America, the first branch of the War Trade Board was organized in that country.

Mr. Clarence Clark Zantzinger of Philadelphia was sent to Stockholm from London as a special representative of the board, and I cannot comment too highly on his efficient work. He arrived in December. Mr. E. B. Robinette, who had been given the rank of lieutenant commander in the navy and appointed as assistant naval attaché, also helped in the work. His services were of the greatest value to this Legation during the trying years of the war and he left many friends in Sweden behind him. We worked hard to devise a system which should come as near as was humanly possible to stopping all leaks. That we succeeded fairly well is indicated by the fact that the system which we devised was used as a model for similar boards established later in other neutral lands.

In connection with this work the Inter-Allied

Trade Committee was formed, originally composed of Mr. Zantzinger as representative of the American Legation, Captain Gaston Monnet of the French Legation, Captain Rose of the British Legation and Signor Sibilia as the Italian representative. This made possible a close co-operation of all the Allied governments. The committee eventually developed an elaborate machinery and became the central bureau for the issuing of licenses.

With their application for the issuance of a license, applicants were required to give assurances in writing that the goods in question would not be re-exported to an enemy country in any form, or employed in any manner for the benefit of that country. They were compelled also to furnish similar undertakings from their eventual customers. No exceptions were made. The same undertaking was required even from the private individual who wanted to buy a suit of clothing outside Sweden.

A highly effective instrument of the War Trade Board was the black list. Persons or firms known to be trading with the enemy, or even under suspicion of it, were blacklisted, and

their names were reported to the control boards of all the Allies. Not only were licenses refused to all such persons or firms, but they were given to understand that the end of the war would not terminate their commercial ostracism. It is hard now to remember that passions ran so high in those days, but it is, after all, hardly more than three years since thousands of persons in the various Allied countries were forming organizations which solemnly promised that they would never, never again buy anything made in Germany or have any dealings with a German. In the light of what we know now, we realize that they omitted one necessary qualification: "Unless we can buy cheaper from Germans."

Some grievous mistakes were made in framing the black list; many names came on it that never ought to have been there. But the exigencies of warfare, unfortunately, cannot take much account of the rights of the weak. The only excuse to be offered is that these black lists helped win the war. And that was all we were thinking of at that time.

The Luxburg affair, which came to light in

the middle of September, 1917, seriously weakened the Swedish government's position and strengthened proportionately the position of my colleagues and myself. It will be recalled that Baron Löwen, who was Swedish Minister to Argentina, was found to have been sending coded messages for the German Minister to Buenos Ayres, Luxburg, one of which was the famous one about torpedoing ships so that they should disappear without leaving a trace (spurlos versinken).

The Swedish government was gravely concerned by this incident, and by the flood of criticism which the disclosures evoked all over the world. The foreign minister called on me to express regret. The government, he declared, had no reason to suppose that the contents of the telegrams were harmful. A sharp protest had been made to Berlin, with a demand for an explanation as to why Swedish courtesy had been abused in this manner. The minister repeatedly assured me that Sweden would have withdrawn from the German Minister in Argentina the privileges which had been granted to him as a matter of courtesy if it had had any

reason to suppose that he would abuse it, or that the Entente objected to it. The Swedish government, he said, would not again transmit messages for any of the belligerents, and he begged me to do all possible to assure my government of Sweden's firm determination to be neutral.

The Swedish cabinet's position was further shaken by the condemnation of almost the entire Swedish press, with the exception of a very few hidebound conservation organs. The revelations came also at an unfortunate period for the government then in power, since an election was impending.

In the circumstances it was perhaps but natural that the Foreign Minister attempted to minimize the effect of the disclosures by accusing me of having accepted from the Swedish government similar diplomatic privileges to those accorded the German minister in Argentina. He declared:

"One of the chief faults alleged against the Swedish government is that it transmitted German cablegrams in cipher through the Swedish foreign office and through Swedish representatives in time of war.

"When America broke off diplomatic relations with Turkey, Sweden agreed to act for the United States in looking after American interests in Turkey. As a result of this agreement, all communications and cablegrams from Washington were sent to the American Legation in Stockholm, which in turn sent them to the Swedish government for transmission. In this connection the government handled many cablegrams which were in code."

I want to state emphatically that the Swedish government was in physical possession of this code, the so-called "blue code." The original of all such messages, moreover, was submitted to the foreign office in French. The Foreign Minister requested me to visit him one morning and showed me the statement, which he said would be published at 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the same day. I objected vigorously, pointing out the the communication was utterly misleading, in that it failed to state that the Swedish government was in possession of the American code in which all the messages were drawn up. After a somewhat heated discussion the Swedish Foreign Minister, following a conference with his colleagues, drafted a communiqué which

was fully satisfactory to me. In fact, I helped word it.

It is a further fact that when I requested the Swedish government to forward our communications—and this request was not made until April—I specifically stated that no letters or cablegrams should be forwarded without the knowledge and consent of the Swedish government. Thus the charge that the American government had also acted improperly is seen to be utterly untenable.

I have elsewhere referred to the fact that the sentiment of the Swedish people as a whole was somewhat pro-German. Looking back at those days with the perspective of the post-peace-treaty period and free from the passions of the time of war, I realize that the Swedish government did all in its power to be really neutral. or, in the last analysis, no government, be it republican or monarchic, can dictate to its people how they shall think about any great issue. At that time, however, those of us who represented the Allied and Associated governments were gravely disquieted by many phases of the situation.

I should like to call attention to the fact that throughout the entire time I was in Stockholm during the war the Allied ministers and myself worked in the closest conjunction, sympathy and intimacy. There was the strongest feeling of co-operation and mutual interest in all matters. In fact we were like one close and intimate family in which there were no secrets. My friend and colleague, the British Minister, Sir Esme Howard, from the very inception of the war, had a very difficult position to maintain in Sweden because of the manner in which England's policy against the Central Powers indirectly affected the Swedes. It is very gratifying for me to say that in spite of this he was one of the most popular diplomats in Stockholm. I attribute this liking to his extreme frankness and honesty. A man of high spiritual character who was at all times influenced by the motive of doing the very best, he was generally beloved throughout Sweden and did much to alleviate criticism towards certain of the Allies' policies.

In September, 1917, one of my colleagues proposed that a united protest against Sweden's

allegedly unneutral attitude be handed to the Swedish government and also made public. While I understood fully the feeling that dictated this proposal, I felt that the action would none the less be a grave mistake. In any event it could be construed as an unwarranted interference in Sweden's internal affairs, and this would the more surely be the case because of the approaching elections. Sir Esme Howard took the same view. In a message to the State Department I referred to the proposed action and set forth my views in detail. Washington, I am happy to say, agreed with me, and thus a serious tactical error was prevented.

That this decision had been a wise one was proved in the following month, when a new cabinet, which, to our way of thinking, offered much greater guarantees of actual neutrality, was formed in Sweden.

I was greatly strengthened in my attitude against bringing undue pressure to bear on Sweden by the clear-sightedness of Colonel William Colvin, American Military Attaché. Colonel Colvin opposed vigorously all plans to sharpen the embargo against Swedish vessels.

The idea that this would force Sweden to terms was, he pointed out, quite erroneous. As a trained military man he realized what Sweden's adherence to our enemies would mean. Her geographical position would have enabled her virtually to block all shipments of material or troops intended for Russia, or at least to make them very difficult and dangerous. And perhaps even worse would have been the addition to the enemy forces of Sweden's brave and splendidly trained army, some 600,000 men, organized on German models and fitting in with the German army almost as readily as an equal body of German troops.

It was obvious, however, that the Allies must find more tonnage for the successful conduct of the war. Sweden, with a large commercial fleet, naturally came into consideration in the connection. Some of my colleagues were insistent that this fleet should be taken and put into the Allied service. Such an action, however, would have affronted any nation, and especially the proud Swedes, and so, quite apart from the moral aspects of the question—which also had their weight with me—I objected vig-

orously to any such steps, which, I felt, might not merely offend Sweden bitterly, but even throw her physically into the arms of Germany.

I am glad to say that Washington viewed the matter in the same light. Instead of the proposed drastic action, conferences were initiated looking to an adjustment which should be as satisfactory to Sweden as the circumstances permitted. These negotiations lasted several months. Finally, in June, 1918, an agreement was reached by which Sweden in return for various concessions placed 400,000 tons of shipping at the disposal of the Allies. Under the agreement, Sweden was to be permitted to import grain, fodder and wool from Australia and Argentina, saltpeter from Chile, and oil, phosphates and cotton from America. Altogether the extra importations permitted ran to some 250,000 tons. Sweden agreed further to restrict certain exports to Germany.

Many extreme actions became absolutely necessary. I recall one such case in connection with one of the largest banks of the country.

Some time after we entered the war I received a cablegram from Washington stating

that a certain large banking house in Sweden had a very big credit with an important banking firm in Boston, and that there was reason to believe that at least part of this sum was of German origin and still owned by Germans. Accordingly I sent for the chief director of the Swedish bank and, without explaining the situation to him further, asked him if he would allow me to see the bank's books concerning this American credit.

The director refused flatly. Under Swedish law, he declared, no foreigner need be permitted to inspect the books of a Swedish bank. I told him that the matter was regarded by my government as of prime importance, and that I must insist upon seeing the books. He remained obdurate, and I saw myself compelled to issue a sort of ultimatum, to the effect that if I did not have his assent by 5 o'clock the same afternoon, I should be compelled to notify Washington of his refusal. And that, I pointed out, might mean the black list, with all that it would imply for an institution doing an international financial business.

The director said he would like first to have

an opportunity to call a meeting of the other directors and discuss the matter. I agreed to wait until this could be done.

In the evening he reappeared and said the directors had consented to give me a statement as to the accounts in question. This showed that Washington's suspicions were well founded, for a considerable part of the money in question was shown to be the property of Germans. As a result we were able to control that part of the account.

Chapter VI. The Contradictions of Neutrality

Hardly any other neutral nation was placed in such a difficult situation by the breaking out of the war as was Sweden. The country was seriously affected both economically and politically. It was far from being a self-supporting land, either in respect of foodstuffs or raw materials for its extensive industries. It imported annually an average of about 400,000 to 500,000 tons of breadstuffs and fodder and quantities of other foodstuffs. I subjoin a few statistics, which show not only the average imports before the war, but also how these were cut down as a result of the blockade.

Articles	*Average imp.*	*Ton.*		
	1911–1913	*1916*	*1917*	*1918*
Grain, flour, fodder and similar products	481,601	355,000	151,609	111,735
Colonial produce—rice, coffee, etc.	70,397	76,376	23,020	32,928
Cottons and wool, etc...	46,720	46,707	15,232	11,524
Oils, fats and similar products	228,637	216,991	58,171	45,985

The foregoing were but a part of the articles which Sweden was compelled to import. She was dependent on foreign countries—chiefly England and Germany—for coal, on Germany for aniline dyes, drugs, chemicals and potash, on America for copper and rubber. The outbreak of the war automatically reduced the available supplies of many of the articles named, and later on the blockade prevented the securing of more than a trifling part of even such supplies as existed.

Quite as serious for Sweden herself and decidedly more serious for other countries was the political situation created by the great conflict. Virtually all material as well as sentimental considerations inclined many classes of Swedes, especially the upper classes, to sympathy with the German cause. People who did not and still do not understand this would do well to study both geography and history more thoroughly, and also the social structure and heritages of the Swedes.

From 1809, when Finland was lost by Sweden, every morning's sun had cast the threatening shadow of Russia across the Gulf

of Bothnia and the Baltic Sea. This was the third time in less than a century that pieces of Swedish territory had been lost to Russia—the Baltic provinces, Finland (with the Aaland Islands). Icebound for half the year, Russia cast her eyes westward toward Sweden, with that country's wealth of open harbours. The Aaland Islands, but a cannon-shot from the Swedish coast belonged to Russia.

In view of this continuous, century-old menace from a great military power it was but natural that an enemy of Russia became automatically a friend of Sweden. And even those Swedes who did not like Germany could not hope for a Russian victory, which would have merely darkened the shadow hanging over them.

Sweden's commercial relations with Germany have already been referred to briefly. Industrial Germany, producing great quantities of good and cheap wares, was but four hours away across the Baltic—much nearer than any other great state. Germany not only sold goods to Sweden, but also bought great quantities from her, especially her high-grade iron-ore,

wood-pulp and many other articles. The industrial and commercial relations of the two lands were extensive and intimate.

There were also other factors which inevitably tended to make the Swedes more or less sympathetic to Germany. The Swedes are themselves a Teutonic people. Her army is built up on German principles, her professional men are many of them former undergraduates or graduates of German universities.

In the circumstances it is not to be wondered at that opinion was predominantly pro-German, especially in certain classes. That much of this sympathy was eventually lost was due to two factors—the destruction of Russia as a great power by the revolutions of 1917, and the ruthless submarine campaign of Germany. The revolutions made illusory the fears that had so long coloured the whole Swedish mentality; the submarine campaign took heavy toll of Swedish lives and property. There were 247 ships with a total tonnage of 267,644 torpedoed, mine-sunk or otherwise destroyed through the war, with the loss of 397 lives. Another 33 ships with 23,935 tons and 397 persons disappeared

without trace and probably suffered the same fate. Of course some of these ships were lost through the Allied mines but by far the main part was sunk by German submarines or mines. It is probable that by the close of the war the predominance of sentiment in Sweden had become pro-Ally.

With the outbreak of the war a strong agitation was begun by certain elements in favour of joining the war on Germany's side. This movement, called "Activism," seriously embarrassed the government, which from the very outset realized that Sweden's most vital interests demanded that she remain neutral. The Activist leaders were mostly men of prominence, high standing and great influence, which made the government's situation especially difficult. Some of the members of the government themselves, notably Prime Minister Hjalmar Hammarskiöld, who was in office when the war broke out and remained until into 1917, made no secret of their sympathies to Germany but they did not permit their personal feelings to sway them from the course which they con-

ceived to be dictated by their country's best interests.

The government repeatedly took occasion to assert its desire to maintain neutrality. This was done notably by the King, in his speech from the throne when opening the Riksdag on January 17, 1916. Prime Minister Hammarskiöld, in a speech to the Riksdag in the same month, declared that the government would maintain its neutrality. Its actions had been dictated solely by Sweden's interests, not by sympathy for the one or the other belligerent. He added, with a possibly prophetic vision:

"The present constellation of nations is not everlasting and in other circumstances one of the nations at war may bitterly regret that, in order to gain temporary and other doubtful advantages, it has broken treaties and clauses of international law which it will afterwards be too late to re-establish."

In August, 1916, Prime Minister Hammarskiöld, in an interview with an American correspondent—the only interview granted by him

during his term of office—again emphasized Sweden's intention to remain neutral. In the following December Foreign Minister Knut Wallenberg made a similar declaration in an interview with the Stockholm correspondent of the *Pester Lloyd* of Budapest. Similar assurances were given me personally on different occasions in 1917 by Johannes Hellner, then Foreign Minister, and also by King Gustaf in January, 1916.

The occasion of His Majesty's talk with me at that time was a matter which, in the years that we were in the war and ever since, most of us have perhaps forgotten. The American government had sent a series of sharp protests to Great Britain against interference with American trade and the stoppage of the regular parcel-post. The King asked me to advise the government at Washington that he had read the American notes with interest and complete approval.

The import restrictions imposed upon Sweden began to make themselves felt early in 1915, and in April of that year the government began to assume the control of grain. In De-

cember, 1916, the consumption of flour and bread was regulated and restricted and as the war went on and the blockade became sharper almost all necessities of life were put under State control and the consumption restricted in a very sensible way. Every citizen had quite a little pack of different food cards and only in exchange for coupons could be procured the necessary rations. Also the imports and exports were put under severe State control. Petroleum was one of the important things in which there was a serious shortage. Thousands of homes in Sweden were without illuminants —for fat for candles was also almost impossible to obtain—the shops in smaller cities were compelled to close at sundown, and the prisoners in the prison at Vännersborg could have no light in their cells. More serious still was the fact that the biggest part of Sweden's fishing fleet, such an important factor in the country's economic life, was laid up because there was no petroleum for the motors.

Large exports from Sweden to Germany in the first months of the war had played an important part in bringing about a shortage of neces-

saries. Sweden has been severely criticized in same quarters for permitting this, but Sweden was not, after all, the only country whose citizens tried to make what money they could out of the conflict. It may be unkind to recall the fact, but before our entrance into the war Americans not only sold what they could to the Allies, but also got through whatever they could for the Germans. The steamer *Andrew Welsh* of San Francisco, to mention but one instance of many, successfully ran the British blockade and landed 36,000 sacks of beans in Halmstad on November 26, 1916. The American steamer *Carolina,* trying the same thing in January, 1916, with a cargo of 5000 hides from New York, was captured and taken into Kirkwall.

Trade negotiations were undertaken between Sweden and Great Britain in July, 1915, but were eventually broken off in October. Thereupon the British proceeded in November of the same year to form a company called the Transito Company, which alone had supervision over goods destined for Sweden or Russia. Axel R. de Bildt, a Swede, was the first sole director of the company, of which an Englishman was man-

ager. Its formation was severely criticized by the whole Swedish press, as well as by Swedish business men, and the Foreign Office felt compelled to issue a formal statement setting forth that the Transito had no connection with the Swedish government.

But it was far from being the Swedes alone who suffered by these restrictions. By the fall of 1916 American commerce with Russia was greatly hampered by the fact that Sweden, as a retaliatory measure against Great Britain's action in placing Sweden on rations, had decided to refuse transit to all goods destined for Russia except upon the receipt of "compensation" from Great Britain or Russia in the form of commodities. In a message to the State Department at the end of this same year I pointed out that this seriously handicapped our traders, since we had less readily available the means of offering the compensation demanded.

Many of the Legation's activities in this year especially were taken up in endeavouring to help Americans to do business. The Legation was in daily receipt of complaints from business men who asserted that their legitimate business

was being interfered with in an unreasonable manner. Whatever it was possible to do was done. I quote from a letter of mine to a complainant in July, 1916:

"I have to inform you that both of these commodities are on the list of prohibited exports. It is not known whether licenses could be procured in individual cases, but if American interests are involved the Legation is always willing to do everything it properly can to further such interests."

I may remark here that that was a principle which I have always tried to carry out in all the years it has been my privilege to represent the United States abroad. I recall with pleasure that I was able to be of much service along these lines all through the years before we came into the war.

I remember particularly that I was able in February to secure permission for the export of a considerable quantity of aniline dyes to America, and in the following month I succeeded in getting permission for the transit of 4000 tons of binder-twine from America to Russia, a part

of which, of course, had to stay in Sweden. These are but two of many similar cases.

American business men were under a hot cross-fire during all these months, for they were hindered not merely by the British, but by the Germans as well. The Germans cared not at all whether goods afloat belonged to neutral or to enemy powers. In May, 1916, for instance, the steamer *Brage,* from Nyköping to Copenhagen, with a cargo of iron and iron wire destined to America, was seized by a German warship and brought into Swinemunde, where the cargo was confiscated.

I may note here that one of the disastrous effects of the long blockade against Sweden was sadly apparent in the beginning of February, 1918, when the physicians and hospitals found themselves facing a serious shortage of even the most essential things, such as anæsthetics, castor oil, quinine, rubber gloves, cotton gauze, etc. Upon my earnest recommendation to our government, permission for the import of one hundred tons of these supplies was granted.

More and more the blockade against Sweden

had been sharpened. In October, 1916, new negotiations for a trade agreement between the Allied powers and Sweden were opened in London, and Sweden was offered the importation of a limited amount of supplies on Sweden's agreement that it would not re-export any of them and would permit free transit to Russia, with no restrictions. An agreement was hampered by Sweden's resolute insistence that her position as a neutral power compelled her to refuse transit to all things that could be used in the actual conduct of the War, including automobiles, and the negotiations were broken off in February. On February 14, 1917, Great Britain notified the Swedish government that Swedish ships then in British ports would not be permitted to depart until the arrival of an equal amount of Swedish tonnage. It goes almost without saying that the Swedish Foreign Office was intensely indignant, but it was helpless, as it was also helpless, when, two weeks later, it was notified that all ships must put in at a British port for examination. A fortnight later Kirkwall was designated.

The darkest days were beginning for all the

neutrals. Yet even then the Swedish government never wavered in its firm determination not to be drawn into the conflict. On April 10, 1917, the foreign minister again took occasion to assure me verbally that the Kingdom would maintain its neutrality even if the United States came into the war. I have already referred to the fact that Prime Minister Hammarskiöld's personal sympathies inclined toward Germany, and to the criticism that this brought upon him and Sweden from certain quarters. Today, however, after the passions engendered by the war have softened, it must be admitted that this course as an official was really dictated solely by what he conceived to be Sweden's best interests. He refused to recognize any black lists, and he protested vigorously against every attempt from every side to do away with former treaties or agreements.

At the end of 1915, the State Department had instructed me to inform Minister Hammarskiöld that he had been agreed upon by China and the United States as joint commissioner on an international committee of five formed under the treaty of September 15, 1914, between the

two countries, and that his expression of willingness to serve would give President Wilson great pleasure. The minister accepted the post and expressed his appreciation of the honour.

An incident which occurred in the second year of the War inclines me not to be too greatly impressed by complaints against the neutrality of anybody. Up to the time America broke off diplomatic relations with Germany the Stockholm Legation, as has been set forth, was looking after German and Austrian interests in Russia, and I was in constant conference with the ministers of both those powers. Moreover, I had implicit instructions from Washington to maintain the strictest neutrality.

In the course of my official entertaining in the spring of 1915 Mrs. Morris and I invited the German minister and some of his staff to dinner at Oakhill, and afterward to the annual *concours hippique,* one of the big events of the season in Stockholm and always attended by royalty and society. The day of the event, the *Lusitania* was torpedoed.

It would have relieved me if a note had come from the Baron, saying that he was ill and could

not attend, but none came. He was one of my dinner guests that evening, and afterward at the horseshow. I heard echoes of it for months afterward from persons who appeared to feel that I should not have entertained the German minister at such a time. Yet there was nothing else for me to do. There is mighty little pleasure in being neutral, either for a country or an individual.

Chapter VII. The Spies' Stamping Ground

My colleague, Dr. Maurice Francis Egan, has referred to Denmark during the War as "the whispering gallery of Europe." The designation applies in even higher degree to Sweden. The kingdom's geographical position made it the natural central point for the operations of the spies of all belligerent countries, and their number increased steadily as the conflict proceeded, despite the vigilance of the Swedish authorities, who personally escorted scores of these undesired (and undesirable) visitors to the Swedish border and saw to it that they crossed it. The government showed a praiseworthy impartiality in such expulsions. Germans, Frenchmen, Englishmen, Italians—no matter of what race, they were thrown out of the country if it was discovered that they were abusing its hospitality by making secret reports about the

enemy to their respective governments. After America came into the War, the same thing happened to many American spies.

(I recall, by the way, reading during the War an article in an American magazine in which the writer referred naïvely to "spies of the Central Powers and agents of the Entente." I cannot swing myself up to this giddy height of discrimination. "Spy" is not a pleasant name, and it is not a pleasant job, but it is a necessary one when War must be carried on.)

Some of these spies (or "agents") were very stupid, but some very clever. I recall that my wife and I were neatly taken in by one in the winter of 1915, when Mrs. Morris received a telegram from Germany, asking if she would have rooms engaged in a hotel for a certain Baroness von Z who intended to spend a few weeks in Stockholm to recuperate. Since the name was well known to us, we complied with the request. Shortly after the Baroness's arrival she called on one of Mrs. Morris's "at homes" and introduced herself. She was a woman about 60 years old, with grey hair and a sweet, pleasant face, a motherly sort of woman to whom

one would feel inclined to confide all one's troubles. Not until many months afterward did we learn that she was a German spy, commissioned to feel out Allied officials and to get as much information in general as she could for the use of the German government.

It was our Consul General, Ernest L. Harris, whose suspicions were aroused when she made him an offer of a big commission if he could secure for her large shipments of copper for Germany. The Swedish police eventually gathered enough evidence against her to justify them in ordering her to leave the country. It is a testimony to her cleverness that in the first months of her stay in Sweden she was received not only by many prominent Swedish officials, but also met the King, himself.

I find, moreover, to my *post facto* horror, in going through the records of the war days, that an American who was undoubtedly a German spy succeeded in carrying it through without being discovered although the Allied authorities should have known about him. This man had visited me in December, 1914, having previously obtained from proper authorities offi-

cial permission to enter Russia. He had a letter from Count Hadik, the Austrian Minister at Stockholm, stating that the man had arranged with the German government to visit German subjects detained in Russia, if possible, and to provide for their wants. Count Hadik stated also that the man was willing to extend his inspection to Austrians and Hungarians provided there were no objection to this. So the man went on his way. Later, and until well into 1915 the American Legation at various times transmitted to him through the Petrograd Embassy many communications from the German foreign office.

After America came into the War the same individual turned up in Stockholm in the guise of a business man trying to make deliveries of necessaries to Russia. And neither myself nor any of my Allied colleagues recalled his previous history!

I doubt whether, on the whole, many incidents of this kind occurred, but not even the best arrangements for co-operation could prevent all of them. In August, 1917, we came across a striking instance of lack of co-operation between

Russia and the other Allied governments. The Russian government then was, of course, the revolutionary government of Kerensky, but we had nevertheless expected better things of it. What we discovered was that Russia had made an agreement with Sweden to furnish the latter country 20,000 tons of oilcakes in return for a quantity of half-finished steel casings which were to be converted into shells. This order was to be duplicated mutually in 1918. At that time, of course, we were all bent on preventing Sweden from securing anything in addition to the food and fodder rations which had been decided upon by the Allied and Associated governments, and 40,000 tons of oilcakes would have played a big rôle in the country's economic life. My Allied colleagues and I joined in a protest to the Russian government, but before any action could be taken on it the Bolshevik revolution came, and the Bolshevik government paid no attention to protests from "capitalistic" governments. However, it also paid no attention to the old government's contracts and undertakings, so that the final result was quite as satisfactory in respect of at least this one deal.

The Spies' Stamping Ground

Wherever one went in those troublesome days in Stockholm, one could be fairly sure that one was being watched. The city's chief hotel was infested with spies. It is pretty safe to assert that most of them drew salaries for reports which were of little value. It was undoubtedly the experience of all the belligerent governments that a great part of their expenditures for their spy service was thrown away. I remember one earnest American, whose zeal and sense of self-importance were in inverse ratio to his knowledge of the situation, who sent me harrowing reports in the summer of 1918 of German recruiting of Finns through Sweden.

"Those Finns who, upon reaching Sweden are discovered to be really Russians," he reported, "will be excused from serving and will receive a pension for life of 200 Swedish crowns (normally $53.60) per month."

Such an opportunity would, in everyday language, have been pretty soft for all those Russians in Finland that did not love work. Another man, who was accompanying Yudenitch's army, marched that ill-fated general into Petro-

grad at least a half dozen times within one month. To be accurate, he did not quite march him in, but he reported that Petrograd would be occupied within various optimistic periods, varying from 48 hours to as long as four days. The events of the years since have more than justified the doubts that made me chuck many of these reports into my waste-basket at the time and greatly tone down those which I sent on to Washington.

On the whole, I fear that at the beginning the German spies were rather better than ours. They not only had the advantage of years of militaristic training, but they also knew conditions in Sweden—and Europe—better than did the Americans. I learned after we had come into the war that they had been able frequently to get hold of the waste-paper from the baskets of the various legations, ours among them, and that experts in such work were employed in piecing the scraps together. However, whatever they got from our waste-baskets did them no good.

All governments not only paid large sums for useless reports, but—what is still sadder—all were frequently badly cheated by their agents.

I recall especially one charming elderly couple in Stockholm. They spent much of their afternoons and evenings in the dining-room or café of one of the principal hotels, and appeared to be enjoying life, albeit in a non-obtrusive manner. Not until toward the close of the war was it learned that there was every reason why they should enjoy life, for they had been receiving comfortable sums monthly from both belligerent groups as secret agents. Nor were they the only ones.

Certain enterprising messenger-boys did a land-office business by making money from Allied agents to give them copies of the dispatches of the legations of the Central Powers, and from the Central Powers for copies of the Allied dispatches.

It was inevitable that even many transactions which were quite legitimate but outwardly suspicious often caused inconvenience to innocent persons. Washington, for instance, reported to me that it was gravely concerned about the cruises about the Panama Canal district of a motor-vessel belonging to the Johnson Line of Sweden. These cruises looked suspicious, and

the authorities wanted to know more about them.

I sent for Mr. Axel Axelsson Johnson, head of the company, whom I knew very well, and asked him for information. He was disposed to regard the whole matter as none of my business—and ordinarily, I must admit, it would have been none of my business. I explained to him, however, the seriousness of the matter in time of war, and pointed out what dire results continued suspicion would have for him. He told me that the cruises were undertaken simply to prospect for possible sources of oil. Many of his steamers were already oil-burners and others were to be converted. It had never occurred to him that the operations around the canal zone could be regarded as suspicious.

It may be some consolation for the Swedes who, for one reason or another, came under suspicion to learn that there were many Americans in the same boat.

I was considerably amused late in 1917 to receive a communication from an official American source, casting grave suspicion upon an American then in Stockholm. The suspicious persons were astonished and perhaps not a little

abashed when I informed them that the man in question had come to Stockholm to do special Ally publicity work under the direct supervision of the British Legation.

Some extremely valuable detective work was done by the various Allied and Associated legations in Stockholm. In January, 1917, I was informed by the British Legation that a man posing as Donald Hunter was in reality a German spy named Peter Beyer. It had been learned that he was in possession of a forged American passport, but no action was taken at that time because, carefully watched as his steps were, he could do no harm, and, on the other hand, valuable information could be gained through him.

Hunter (or Beyer) was permitted to sail for New York on the steamer *Stockholm* on December 30, 1916, under the name of Pierre Humbert and bearing a Swiss pass. Although we were not yet in the war I was directly interested in this case because the man was believed to be a member of the gang which had been trying to destroy American shipments by means of the so-called "blue-pencils," incendiary contrivances

which, inserted in a cargo, burst into flames within a certain period. Washington was informed of the man's coming and was thus able to look after him.

Much trouble was caused in the first months of the war to the nations that later became our allies by the comparative ease with which American passports could be secured. Before 1914 the American government was rarely called upon to issue a passport to anybody—for almost no European nations required them for travel except Russia, Turkey and the Balkan states, if these be reckoned to Europe, and the average American did not know that there was such a thing. At the outset of the war any person who could convince the diplomatic and consular representative wherever he happened to be that he was a real American could get a passport. These first passports, moreover, did not contain the photograph of the holder. The result was that scores of them fell into the hands of citizens of all the belligerent nations, and were used to outfit secret agents. It will be recalled that Hans Lody, the German spy, who was executed in the Tower of London early in the con-

flict, was equipped with an American passport.

As indicating the extent to which American passports were misused, I note that in August, 1917, I received from our Embassy in Petrograd a list of more than 25 passports which had been stolen in the period from October 13, 1916, to June 29, 1917. American seamen's certificates were also an article highly prized by secret agents everywhere, and many were stolen.

The Germans showed an especial partiality for falsifying American documents relating to the less known countries. In September, 1917, I came into the possession of facts showing that considerable numbers of renegade Roumanians had been equipped by the German espionage service with papers written in the Roumanian language, stating that the bearers were American citizens and purporting to be signed by Mr. Vopicka, the American Minister at Bucharest. They also bore the American seal. Many forged passports also began turning up at this time. They were written on paper bearing the proper watermark, but the seal, engraving and even the size varied slightly from the genuine passports. It is an astounding thing

that otherwise clever forgers should make a document whose falsity could be readily discovered by the simple method of measuring its length and breadth with a ruler!

Some of these forgeries unquestionably succeeded, but I doubt whether the number was great. Occasionally the discrepancy between the bearer and description were too great to deceive anybody. I recall particularly one instance which was not without its amusing side—amusing because it was so clumsy. In June, 1917, a man appeared at the Legation in Stockholm and presented a passport made out to Cyril Brown, a well-known American journalist, who had spent the first two years of the war in Germany as correspondent for the New York *Times* and later for the New York *World,* and who had, after the breaking off of relations with Germany, transferred his activities to Scandinavia. The bearer of the passport not only did not look like a typical American journalist, but he could not even talk English and appeared to be almost utterly illiterate. He gave his occupation as circus performer. The number on his passport was the same as that of the genuine

passport held by Mr. Brown, who, upon my request, forwarded his passport for comparison. I need hardly say that the activities of the illiterate American journalist who could not talk English came to a sudden stop right there and then, in so far, at least as these activities were based upon the possession of an alleged American passport.

A considerable number of cases of misuse or attempted misuse, however, was undoubtedly due simply to innocence or ignorance. The following letter, written by a Swede who had lived some years in America to an American friend, was intercepted by the censor in 1917:

"If I could only be back in America! Will you lend me your American passport? You can buy one again for $5.00 and I will pay you back. Send in plain envelope."

A great number of enemy spies operated under the protection of genuine Swedish passports. Not that the Swedish authorities deliberately issued passports to unauthorized holders, but because, up to May, 1917, it was decidedly easier to obtain a passport in Sweden than in any of the

belligerent or many of the neutral countries. They were issued not merely by the Foreign Office in Stockholm, but also by the governors of each of the Kingdom's twenty-four provinces, and in some instances by police officials. The system permitted great abuses and was a source of much perplexity to all the Allied legations and consulates, and later to the American officials as well.

During the first two and a half years of the war the *modus operandi* was this. A German agent in Sweden, located in some rural village, would induce some country youth to apply for a passport by mail, the regulations then existing not requiring personal application. When the application was approved, the applicant would be called upon to send his photograph by mail. Then the agent would persuade the applicant to send in a picture of some German agent whom it was desired to send to one of the enemy countries. The unsuspecting official attached the photograph to the passport and mailed it to the applicant who then handed it over to the German agent for a consideration.

On April 12, 1917, I sent a message to the

State Department setting forth the situation and pointing out that the Scandinavian countries, because of their geographical situation, had been the base of much German espionage. I recommended therefore that all aliens departing from Scandinavian ports for America should be required to obtain visas from our legations or consulates, and also that all holders of American passports should be obliged to have them verified before departure for the United States. Regulations along this line were issued almost immediately and they checked enemy espionage greatly. In the following months of the war literally thousands of applicants for permission to go to the United States were refused.

In October, 1917, as a result of my representations to the Swedish government, the Swedish regulations regarding passports were drastically revised. The number of authorities who might issue them was greatly reduced, and the foreign office also advised me that, whenever passports should be issued for a visit to the United States, the American consul would receive a statement giving the name of the holder, the number of his passport and a duplicate of the photograph

attached thereto. This loyal attitude of the Swedish government greatly lightened our work.

I have referred earlier in this chapter to expulsions from Sweden, and to the fact that citizens of all the belligerent nations—and some neutrals as well—had been the victims of the government's determination not to let Sweden be used for belligerent purposes by either of the groups at war. One of such cases affecting Americans was of particular interest.

In the last few months before we came into the war an occasional caller at the American Legation had been a rather distinguished looking man, who carried an American passport. He had—or at least used—a doctor's title, stated he was a 32d degree Mason, and claimed relationship with some well-known American families. There was something mysterious about him which caused us to be on our guard from the outset, although there was no evidence that he was not what he claimed to be.

In March, 1917, a cry of distress came from him in the form of a telephone message, stating that he had been arrested, was then at the central police-station, and was to be expelled from the

country. Mr. Alexander R. Magruder, first secretary of the legation, went to the police-station personally, but was not able to see the man. He was informed by the police that P—— (I refrain from giving his name) had been in telegraphic and postal communication with Protopopoff, the former procuror of the Russian Synod, and that there were strong reasons for believing him to be a spy, and, furthermore, other charges against him which made him an undesirable.

A few days later P—— wrote me a long letter from Copenhagen. He declared that the Stockholm police had treated him like a common criminal, taking his finger-prints and then photographing him with a numbered metal tag pinned to his coat. While this was going on, he complained, he had pointed to some pictures on the walls of the room and asked who they were.

"Murderers and highway robbers," was the answer.

P—— admitted that he had been in communication with Protopopoff, but declared that he had known him personally since 1913. He also claimed acquaintanceship with other high per-

sonages in the old Russian court, and declared that he had been planning to go to Russia to make deliveries of various goods to the army.

Although I had a feeling that the police undoubtedly had reasons for their action, the man was nevertheless an American and I felt it my duty to ask the Swedish Foreign Office for details. The Foreign Office replied that P—— had defrauded many persons by the exercise of occultism, hypnotism and mindreading, and that there were also other factors rendering his further presence in Sweden highly undesirable. It is a fact that P—— claimed to be an occultist; I rather imagine that the other charges were true. In any event, there was nothing more to be done in the case.

In June, 1917, two German-Americans, holding department passports, were discovered on the Danish coast signalling with lanterns and revolver-shots, apparently to German submarines, three of which had been seen off the coast a day earlier. The men were accompanied by a German woman who claimed to be the wife of one of them, and another man, carrying an American passport, was proved to have been in

their company earlier, but had disappeared. For some reason, however, the trio were set free.

This is perhaps as good a place as any to refer to a legacy of the war which, while perhaps trivial compared to most other legacies, is nevertheless a nuisance. I refer to the retention of the requirements for the visaing of passports. Despite the fact that the war has been ended more than three years, both the United States and virtually all European countries still refuse to be satisfied with a passport regularly issued by the bearer's government, but require also a visum. This visum, moreover, is granted for but a limited period—only a fortnight in certain countries. The requirement might be excused if any real attempt were made to investigate the records of the applicants, but in most countries it is merely a matter of form, which takes hours, often days, of time, and imposes heavy extra expenses upon all travellers. The chief sufferers are Americans.

By way of retaliation, foreign governments generally charge Americans $10 for a visum, since that sum is charged by the American government. An American coming to Sweden to

sell goods pays $10 for the Swedish visum; a German coming to Sweden to sell goods pays 60 cents. By the time similar fees have been paid in a dozen countries—and Europe, since the Versailles Treaty, is a patchwork quilt of tiny countries—the difference amounts to something. I doubt whether the income received from this source is sufficiently large to play any rôle whatever in comparison with the loss of time and money and the annoyance caused by the visum nuisance.

I recommended in the early summer of 1919 that American citizens in Sweden be no longer obliged to secure an American visum for their return to America, and the recommendation was accepted. I would like to see this nuisance done away with everywhere.

Chapter VIII. Wooing for Sweden's Sympathies

Germany was quick to take advantage of her sympathetic bonds with Sweden. In the first months it hoped, perhaps even expected, to induce Sweden to join the war on its side. But even after these hopes had been abandoned a propaganda system of tremendous extent was built up and maintained until the final crash. By 1918 there were no less than 800 German propagandists in Sweden whose names were known to our publicity agents, and these, of course, were but a part of the whole number. The Germans carried on every available means for influencing public opinion in Sweden. They seem to have had inexhaustible funds at their disposal. One way they had of influencing public opinion was through the daily press and by means of literature extensively circulated throughout the country. Pamphlets, magazines,

photographs and half-tones, used in a clever and deft way, were distributed right and left. In addition to this, moving picture houses in Sweden were leased by the Germans in which they carried on much effective propaganda. There was also a great number of lectures held, especially by German scientists of high standing.

Much had been done by the Allies in the way of counter-propaganda in the first two and a half years of the war, but without great apparent results. In the early summer of 1917, however, efforts along this line were redoubled. Mr. Robinette was directed to co-operate with the Allied agents in the establishing of a new agency to distribute current cabled news to the daily newspapers, and, in general, to do whatever possible to gain sympathy for the Allied cause.

The news agency situation in Sweden had long been a cause of worry to the Associated and Allied representatives. The director of the existing news agency, the Swedish Telegram Bureau, was strongly and outspokenly pro-German—a fact which, in those days of high passions was amply sufficient to cause all of us to look at him and his undertaking with less ob-

jective eyes than would normally have been the case.

The first object was the organization of a new agency, and the scheme was eventually carried through, although the heads of the three great agencies, Havas, Reuter and the Associated Press, at first objected to the plan which they regarded as ill-advised. While the Swedish Telegram Bureau was undoubtedly under strong German influence, they nevertheless felt that it was on the whole distributing Allied news fairly, and they feared that a rupture and the establishment of a competing bureau might result in reducing the space allotted to Allied news in the Swedish press.

Their objections were overcome, however, and the new bureau was formed, headed by Olaf Gylden, a retired Swedish marine officer, and including in its directorate various good Swedish friends of the Allies, such as Mr. de Bildt, Baron Adelsvärd, Otto Mannheimer and Harald Bendixson. Organization was effected late in June, 1918. The right to receive Associated and Allied news dispatches was taken from the old bureau, which thereafter was able

to furnish news only from the Central Powers.

The new bureau was in operation for only a little more than four war-months, but it was maintained until the summer 1919, when it coalesced with the old bureau. The breaking up of the service of the old Telegram Bureau during the war had, however, the further sequence that it was unable to arrange with the whole Swedish press as before and that during 1921 it had to meet increasing opposition and was transferred to the Swedish press as its property, and is now directed as a co-operative news agency, the Tidningarnas Telegram Bureau (T. T.) on the same basis as the Associated Press of America.

We also had a visit from Mr. Edgar Sisson who had obtained the famous and much disputed so-called Sisson documents.

Mr. Edgar Sisson, who was working with the Committee on Public Information in Washington, came to Stockholm and conferred with me about the distribution of news on matters connected with Russia and the Baltic provinces. I was able to assist him in getting into Russia—and in getting him out again. The latter was a

much more difficult task, for he was caught between the lines of the "White" and "Red" armies during the Bolshevist uprising in Finland, and suffered many hardships before he reached Stockholm again.

In Russia he succeeded in obtaining the documents mentioned. I had copies made of those that seemed to be the most important, and cabled some of their contents to Washington. After Mr. Sisson had reached America with the papers extensive selections from them were cabled to Sweden and all over the world and published in newspapers everywhere.

The propaganda work on the whole in Sweden was cleverly performed and very successfully. We met the Germans on their own ground, and, with greater resources, outdid them. Much use was made of films, a branch of the work which I regarded as especially valuable. In many messages to Washington I laid stress on this kind of propaganda, and was able to arrange for the exhibition of all the films we could get over.

The general outlines of the work were the same as in all countries, and need not be gone

into at length here. But there was, perhaps, one unusual feature. The Germans were buying up waste paper and rags in Sweden, and I succeeded in having large quantities of propaganda literature enclosed in many bales of such materials that were shipped to Germany. I hope they came into the right hands.

A telling bit of propaganda was due to the cleverness of Mr. Herman Bernstein, a well-known New York journalist and author. Mr. Bernstein, whom I had known in America, came to Stockholm in June, 1917, as a representative of the New York *Herald,* and was desirous of getting to Russia. He had himself been born in Russian Poland, near the German border, and, although he went to America as a boy, he speaks Russian fluently. It was difficult at the time to get foreigners into Russia, for the Kerensky government was nearing its end and conditions were badly disorganized, but I succeeded in getting permission for Mr. Bernstein to go to Petrograd.

Through his connections there and his knowledge of the language and the situation, he was able to get hold of the famous "Willy-Nicky"

letters, correspondence exchanged between Tsar Nicholas and Kaiser Wilhelm. Mr. Bernstein showed these letters to me upon his return from Russia, and I was able to make good use of some of them. Later he published them in America and they were republished generally in Europe.

Our entrance into the war brought many capable American correspondents to Sweden, and from then on until the end there was a constant coming and going of journalists. Among them were Cyril Brown, of the New York *World;* Karl H. von Wiegand of the Hearst press; James O'Donnell Bennett, Chicago *Tribune;* Basset Digby, himself an Englishman but representative of the Chicago *News;* George Odell, New York *Mail;* Arno Dosch-Fleurot, the *World;* Robert T. Small, the Associated Press; Arthur Ruhl, *Colliers Weekly;* Arthur Mann, the United Press, William G. Shepherd and many others whose names escape me at the moment.

Our propagandists by no means had everything their own way. There were often strong counter-currents. A part of the press was openly inimical to our cause, and frequently

published savage attacks on the Allied Powers in general and America in particular. One provincial paper with a large circulation was particularly vicious. I translate the following article from an issue of December, 1917:

"An acquaintance met an American lady who had a married daughter in Germany. She desired a passport and was promised one at the American Consulate, provided she would take the following oath:

" 'I promise and swear by God and His holy gospel, so help me God, that I shall not have the least connection with my daughter, but hate and detest her as an enemy all the time until the end of the war; that I will hate and detest every German; that I will break off every connection with that country; that I will support and assist the present government of the United States in everything it does, and that I honestly hope that Germany will be crushed in this war.' "

It is difficult today to see how any clear-thinking person could take any stock in such rubbish, but one must remember that the number of clear-thinking persons is very small dur-

ing such a conflict as the World War. It is not merely bodies, but minds as well that are deformed by war.

The Swedes' jealous regard for the liberty of the press—a liberty which has never been abridged for more than a century—made it impossible to prevent the publication of such articles. All we could do was to try to meet them. Mr. Sheldon Whitehouse, Chargé d'Affaires during a brief visit of mine in the United States, did on one occasion complain to the Swedish Foreign Office against a big Stockholm newspaper which had published a sharp article entitled "America the Obstacle to Peace." The Foreign Office promptly caused the public prosecutor to bring proceedings against the paper in question. A jury, however, refused to convict, and the incident made a not very favourable impression on even many of our newspaper friends, who, resentful of any attempt whatever to restrict the freedom of the press, were naturally more resentful when this attempt was made by foreigners.

The press was also suffering from the blockade. Supplies of good printer's ink ran out,

and certain necessary ingredients, notably tar, could not be had. The result was that Swedish manufacturers had to resort to substitutes. The ink thus produced gave a very poor impression, soiled the hands of the reader and smelt like—I cannot think of any adequate comparison. It was necessary to air the papers for a half hour before reading them, and even then it was safer to defer the reading until after breakfast in order not to spoil one's appetite.

As early as August, 1917, I cabled to Washington about the situation and recommended that an export license be granted for 500 tons of printer's ink.

"I think we could accomplish more good thus than by spending large amounts on other propaganda," I wired, "for the supplying of the Swedish press with ink for even a short time would do much to gain its good will."

My recommendation was not adopted, but I am still firmly of the opinion that the refusal was a mistake.

One of the most serious factors with which I had to contend was the general resentment

aroused by the action of the American government in drafting Swedish subjects into the army. The German propagandists in Sweden made much capital out of this, as did also the pro-German section of the press. In a message to the State Department in November, 1917, I drew attention to this. I tried to allay indignation as much as possible by explaining repeatedly that no citizens of Sweden were compelled to do military duty if they protested against it; only in the event of their failure to protest were they forced to serve. I also transmitted many requests from Swedish parents to have their sons freed from the draft. There was, however, always an undercurrent of feeling that such men never ought to have been subjected to the draft.

Still another thing often handicapped our propaganda work. It was, it is true, an understandable human weakness, but it was none the less serious. Nor were its manifestations seen merely in Sweden; it was a common complaint wherever propaganda work was being done. Too many eager volunteers, flushed with a sense of their own importance and the importance of their work, became loquacious to strangers, and

disclosed details which many times created unpleasant situations for us. An important newspaper in one neutral country was thus enabled to learn in advance the details of an important publicity scheme whose success depended largely on keeping the general public from realizing its nature. The newspaper in question published a long article giving most of the details of the plan and attacking it severely.

And there was nothing one could do to offset it. While the article was not entirely true, it was so close to the truth that it could not be denied. It did our cause a lot of damage.

Despite all the errors of commission and omission, however, the propaganda work was carried on ably and effectively, and achieved really noteworthy results. I feel justified in saying that by the late summer of 1918, sentiment in Sweden was at least evenly divided, and I incline to think that a considerable majority was on our side. In part, of course, this may have been due to the growing realization that Germany was doomed to defeat, and to the accompanying desire to be on the winning side,

but a great part of this change of sentiment must undoubtedly be credited to those men who had spent the last year in enlightening the public about the causes of the war and the aims for which we were fighting.

I claim for our propaganda work some share in bringing about what was, in effect, a veiled offer of peace from Germany early in 1918. In the first instance, of course, it was our preliminary successes in arms and the reports of steady arrivals of division after division of American soldiers in France that brought this about, but I am certain at the same time that the gradual change of sentiment in the neutral countries, and by no means last in Sweden, must also in part be credited with it.

In July of that year, 1917, I was approached by a Swedish friend who begged me to receive H—— L——, a Socialist member of the German Reichstag, who had something to communicate to me. I confess to having entertained considerable doubts as to whether I should receive him. Even non-official Americans were forbidden to have any dealings with

Germans whatever, and I was my country's diplomatic representative. However, I decided to receive him.

L—— began by assuring me that while there was a strong peace sentiment in Germany, the war party was also strong. He hoped, however, that the peace party in the Reichstag would be able to overcome it. As a member of a Reichstag committee he declared, he had seen more than one hundred submarines building at Hamburg and Bremen alone.

Shortly thereafter he called again. This time he took pains to assure me at the start that he was acting quite unofficially, but I believed then—and believe still—that the German government was not only cognizant of his visit, and what he said, but had directly commissioned him to see me and told him what to say. It was quite obvious that what he wanted was to get his information sent to President Wilson. L—— declared that a peace was possible on the basis of the *status quo ante*. Germany was willing to restore Belgium and guarantee its independence. She would evacuate all French territory, but Alsace-Lorraine could not be

given up. The German colonies must be restored. Eleven of Wilson's fourteen points could be easily agreed upon, and the other three were debatable.

Again in September L—— called and stated that, whilst Germany did not expect to win the war, they could never be beaten—that they were in a position to entertain peace as the war was not on their territory and that the Belgian question could also be settled. In November he called again. In his conversation he said that in Hertling's refusal to accept office Germany had progressed further as the basis of America's entry was Germany's democratization. No chancellor had ever before conditioned his acceptance of office on the support of the different Reichstag parties. On this support being given the chancellor had accepted office. Germany desired no war with Italy and desired no indemnity or territory from them, and, inasmuch as he considered Russia finished, that the recent upheavals in Italy would cause revolution or a separate peace, and that the withdrawal of three-quarter million German troops from Russia and Italy hurled against a new position

would have tremendous bearing on the war, it was possible that by Christmas England would be bearing the brunt of the burden. Germany had plenty of benzine and oils and good crops from Servia, and Roumania had given them much food.

At the end of February, I had another call from Herr L——. This time he said that he had been talking with some "high officials" in Germany, and they desired that he give me full information. The German government accepted Wilson's additional four points. It was felt that if the representatives of the various belligerent governments could come together, much more could be accomplished than by the current method of making speeches in public. The Germans regarded President Wilson as the most important factor in the war. L—— doubted whether England would accept the principle of self-determination for India, Egypt and Ireland. The contemplated great offensive on the western front was being held back, he declared, to see what the results of Chancellor Hertling's recent speech would be, in which he had declared Germany's willingness to accept the ad-

ditional four points. The Emperor and his advisers felt it their duty to avoid, if possible, the great sacrifice of life which such an offensive would entail. L—— also made the interesting statement that 50,000 Ukrainian prisoners had been selected by the Germans and trained for use as an invading force and as propagandists. This, he said, was part of the campaign to get more food from the Ukraine.

Still another call, the last, was in the middle of April. L—— reported then that the military and chauvinist parties were steadily gaining strength, and that the Independent Socialists —who later brought about the revolution— were growing weaker. He believed, however, that the strength of the militarists was chiefly due to the popularity of Hindenburg and Ludendorff.

I cabled reports of these talks to Washington for what they might be worth. On the whole, they were, as events showed, fairly accurate, with the noteworthy exception as to the strength of the Independent Socialists. As a matter of fact, these were already strengthening their grip everywhere, but working so cleverly under

ground that not even their red comrades of the parent Socialist party knew anything about it, and were taken by surprise when the revolution came.

Chapter IX. Echoes of the Russian Collapse

The world has so completely forgotten the Tsar of all the Russias and his empire in the last five years that it is hard to remember with what boundless astonishment we all heard the news in that fateful March, 1917, that the world's greatest autocrat had been overthrown, was a prisoner, together with his family, and that a Socialist lawyer named Kerensky had taken over the reins of government. I have heard some persons, with the wisdom of hindsight, declare that they saw the revolution coming, but so far as I can recall, any advance prophecies of it must have been the merest guesswork. Russia, to be sure, was hungry—the chief cause of dissatisfaction everywhere and in all ages—and it had suffered terribly from the war. Wherever it had succeeded in holding back the grim Germans, it had done so by the mere force of overwhelming numbers.

It was tired and dispirited, but apart from this, the coming upheaval had cast no definite shadows before it.

Suddenly there came a pause in the transmission of news. The pause lasted a day, two days. Then came rumours, drifting out through Finland, of rioting, of mutinous soldiers, of looting, fires. And then, on the third or fourth day of silence, the definite news that the Russian Empire had ceased to exist. In its stead had arisen a republic.

I do not recall that we took it seriously even then, for the new rulers caused it to be announced that they still regarded themselves as our allies, and that the war would be carried on in the same manner as before. It was announced that prominent bourgeois politicians had joined the cabinet—men like Paul Milyoukoff, for example—and that all parties would work together for the building up of a strong republic and the successful continued prosecution of the war.

But there was one important thing which we did not at first know, and another thing which we knew, but whose significance we did not yet

realize. What we did not then know was that the real power from the day of the revolution lay in the hands of the "Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils"—the "Soviets," a name new to us all, but which was eventually to mean so much for all the world. What we knew, but did not—could not—understand, was that Kerensky's first act had been the issuance of his fatal "Prikas No. 1," which abolished the salute in the army and navy of Russia. It seems on the face of it to be a little thing, but let no one be deceived into believing that it was a little thing. It was instead a thing of tremendous purport; the expression of Socialist hatred for all authority—that manner of thinking which was soon to cause the Russian troops to throw away their arms and retreat, which destroyed the power of Germany's great army in November, 1918, and overthrew the German Empire, and which will destroy any army or any power in which it prevails.

All this we could not yet foresee. Nor could we foresee that the term of office of the few *bourgeois* officials upon whom we had pinned our hopes was to be so short, or that, even while

they remained in office, they would not be able to accomplish anything. We could not know that Kerensky, who could make such fine speeches, was unable to do anything else. And so, although naturally somewhat disquieted by the unexpected turn of events, we were still far from being discouraged.

One aspect of what the revolution meant was soon presented to us in Sweden. This was the sudden influx of Russian refugees, largely from the aristocracy and titled nobility, although virtually all classes of the people were represented. They began pouring into Stockholm and other places in Sweden in great numbers, and their numbers increased proportionately as the revolutionary government's measures against all non-Socialists became more drastic. Some escaped from Russia by means of bribery, for this time-honoured Russian institution still had devotees even among the most faithful "tovarishi," as the Socialists term each other in Russia. Others, among them women and girls of the gentlest breeding, had made their way through the woods, afoot or by sledge, to the Finnish border, and forded the small river there, or,

later, crossed on the ice, always in peril of being shot if found by any of the revolutionary patrols.

Most of these refugees were unable to save anything but the jewels which they wore, although these often represented great sums. The fortunate ones were those who had property in other countries than Russia, but these were comparatively few. It must be confessed that the bearing of a great number of these aristocrats did not gain much sympathy for them in Sweden. On the whole they showed a lack of sense of responsibility and of the value of money which, while understandable in the case of people whose families had for generations not known the necessity of either earning or saving money, nevertheless could not but create a bad impression. They stayed at the best hotels, drank expensive wines and frequented the theatres and most expensive pleasure resorts, selling a pearl or diamond from time to time when it became necessary. Europe is today full of Russian princes and princesses living in one or two-room apartments in actual want—families that once had palaces, a small army of

servants and all the other luxuries which wealth can give.

Among the notable refugees who came later was Baron Roman Rosen with his wife and daughter. Baron Rosen was Russian Ambassador to Japan for many years, and represented his country at the Portsmouth Peace Conference, where he became a close friend of Theodore Roosevelt, then President. He spent some months in Sweden doing literary work, having lost all his possessions in Russia.

Baron Rosen had fallen under suspicion with our governments because he had actively interested himself in a movement to bring about peace, had written much publicly about the necessity of ending the war, and had gone to Berlin to consult with the German government on the same subject. The suspicions were quite unwarranted, for the Baron was an upright patriot, devoted to the best interests of his country and appalled at the war's devastation. His application for permission to visit America was first granted, but the permission was then cancelled. Despite the apprehensions of some of my colleagues I again recommended strongly

that this prohibition be withdrawn, and was able to get permission for Baron Rosen to go to America.

I was just returning from a brief visit in America in January, 1922, when I learned that Baron Rosen had been knocked down by an automobile while crossing the street in New York, I hastened to his bedside, but after a few days he died. The shock was too great for a man over seventy years old. While in America Baron Rosen had written some very interesting articles for different periodicals, and had just completed a book of two volumes of his diplomatic reminiscences, more particularly concerning Russia. I was deeply gratified to learn that one of his last wishes before he died was that these books be dedicated to me as his old friend.

Among the Russian refugees were two American women, Princess Bellosellski, born Whittier, whose husband had been an officer in the Russian army, and Princess Cantacusene, a granddaughter of General U. S. Grant. Prince Cantacusene had been adjutant to the Tsar. The Princess has since become well

known through her writings on Russian affairs.

The Russian Grand Duchess Elizabeth, also a refugee, was in actual distress in Sweden. King Gustaf, who had known her before, was very kind and helpful to her. At His Majesty's request I set about trying to get information about the two of the Grand Duchess' sons, and learned that they had been killed.

Another unpleasant mission of the kind was when I was called upon to tell Princess Helene, daughter of the King of Servia, of the murder of her husband by Bolshevists. The Princess, another of the long list of refugees from Russia, was living simply at a suburb outside of Stockholm after her escape. I had met her before and knew her to be an unaffected, charming woman. I had been requested to ascertain the fate of her husband John and his brother Igor, who were captured by the Bolshevists at Ekaterinaburg. I learned that both had been killed at Alapakevak. If I remember correctly, they were thrown into a well and stones were then thrown down on them. I had to convey the news to the Princess about Christmas time, and it was a sad business.

Echoes of the Russian Collapse

One of the first results of the disappearance of the old government in Russia was to lighten the work of German agents. The trained officials of the imperial government at the border were replaced by energetic but untrained Socialists, who, with the best will in the world—if they had it—were still easy dupes for clever spies. At my suggestion, Lieutenant Kliefoth, a young American officer, was sent from Petrograd to assist the Allied control officers at Torneo in Finland, where great numbers of alleged Russians were crossing the border daily, many of them equipped with American passports, some of which were probably genuine, but which had not been visaed in accordance with the regulations in force.

Although the Kerensky régime started out, as I have noted and as will be remembered, with fervid protestations of loyalty to Russia's allies and of a determination to carry on the war as if nothing had happened, it became obvious to me as early as May that the situation was far from satisfactory. All my private and confidential advices, indeed, went to show that it was already highly unsatisfactory and the out-

look was that it would grow worse instead of better, and I advised Washington to that effect. Naturally, however, I could not say so openly, for, as was but natural, it was our war-policy to avoid any expression which could in any manner encourage the enemy. That the German government was undoubtedly quite as well informed about conditions in Russian as we were made no difference.

Throughout June, July and August all my information indicated the steady approach of the eventual breakdown of Russia as a factor in the war. September brought certainty. In the first week of that month the Swedish minister at Petrograd reported to his government that Russia was very eager to stop the war and negotiate peace with the Central Powers at an early date. It was already as certain as anything in politics can be that Russia not only wanted peace, but intended to have it, whether her allies joined her in it or not. Possibly a wiser treatment of the Kerensky government might have averted, or at least postponed the final calamity. That is a matter for speculation, but that it was not wisely treated is too

plain for controversy. A great many men who should have known better continued to report to the governments banded together against the Central Powers that all was lovely in Petrograd and that there was not need to worry. I believe many of these men had hypnotized themselves into believing exactly what they reported, but in many cases their reports were undoubtedly, to twist the old saying about, made for publication but not necessarily as an evidence of good faith.

At the beginning of September, I had a long talk with one of the most prominent Polish leaders, two of whose sons were in the Russian army. He assured me that it was utterly out of the question to expect any offensive from the Russians. The most that could be hoped for was that their armies would remain at the front and yield ground slowly when attacked, thus holding the opposing German and Austrian armies on the east front. From another excellent private source I learned on the same day that the Russian troops along the whole front were holding regular meetings to discuss political affairs, and that they were regularly

refusing to obey orders to attack. Bolshevist propaganda, it was also reported, was assuming large proportions along the southern part of the front. Food conditions in the Russian cities were desperate, and labourers were working only when they felt so inclined.

I reported this to Washington, and followed it up four days later with more bad news of the same kind. The garrisons outside Moscow, some 50,000 men, were already receiving three hours of political instruction daily, and but two hours of indifferent military instruction, and had appointed soviets which controlled all military orders and without whose approval no orders were obeyed. The situation in Petrograd had by then grown so menacing that the British ambassador there notified his colleague in Stockholm that no British subjects should be permitted to enter Russia. Citizens of the Allied and Associated powers were already beginning to leave the country, for it was evident that even the assumed optimism of their respective governments was now having to be abandoned in the face of the hard facts of the situation.

On September 25th I was able to advise the

State Department from an unusually well informed and able source that conditions in Russia in general were approaching anarchy and steadily growing worse. There was no respect for government and no cohesion between government and people. A wave of crime was sweeping through the land, and the authorities were helpless to punish or even apprehend the criminals. It was already virtually certain that the army could not be depended on to do anything; discipline had utterly disappeared and many soldiers were already leaving the front without permission.

Mr. Goulkevitch, the Russian Minister in Stockholm, with whom I was in frequent conference, had been optimistic, or at least not unduly pessimistic, up to this time, but he now began to lose hope. He had the greatest difficulty in maintaining communication with the Kerensky government, and his passports were often, perhaps generally, flouted by the workmen and soldiers, many of them illiterate, who watched Russia's borders.

On October 1st the former president of the ante-war Finnish Diet broke the seals on the

doors of the Diet and a session was held, attended by about 80 Socialists and some *bourgeois* members. The session enacted several laws. The action of the Diet members was but a further indication of the impotency of the Russian government.

Three weeks later, in a message to Washington, I again pointed out the gravity of the situation. On November 8th I was able to report the beginning of the end—the Bolshevists had defeated an attempt to adopt a vote of confidence in Kerensky. On the next day the Bolshevists seized the Winter Palace and arrested the ministers, and Kerensky fled.

The proclamation issued by the new masters of Russia sufficiently indicated what this second revolution would mean for the Allied cause. It abolished death penalties and expressly permitted political propaganda at the front. The Soviets adopted a resolution demanding that all belligerents negotiate an immediate peace without annexations, conquest of foreign nationalities or indemnities. All peace negotiations were to be conducted publicly and all the nations of the world should participate therein.

The Bolshevists proposed an immediate cessation of hostilities for three months.

In an election held in Petrograd on the following day, the Bolshevists were nevertheless able to elect only half the total delegates, getting six, against four for the Cadets and two for the Socialist revolutionaries. Later events were to show, however, that the Bolshevists did not worry at all at being outvoted.

The means of information which I had spent so much time in acquiring in the last months came in very handy during these troubled days, for Ambassador Francis at Petrograd was rendered incommunicado by the November revolution. Washington cabled me that not a word came from him from November 8th to 16th. A Soviet was controlling the border at Torneo, and another was censoring all telegrams out of Russia. *Bourgeois* homes were being searched.

Inadequate means of communication with Russia was a handicap against which we had to struggle almost continuously, and it was doubtless responsible for a large part of the absurd rumours and alleged news dispatches published in the rest of the world. Later the Soviet gov-

ernment relied mainly on the wireless station near Petrograd, sending to the Karlskrona station in Sweden. I received by this route many messages from Tschicherin, who later became Foreign Minister. Some were for the Entente countries and some for Washington alone. I was glad to get them although most of them came collect.

More roundabout routes had occasionally to be employed. In January, 1918, I received President Wilson's peace message to Congress, with instructions to give it to the Swedish press and also cable it in full to our embassy in Petrograd. After three or four days I was informed from Petrograd that it had not been received. I learned that Paris had a more or less workable connection with Russia, and I forwarded the message by that route. It was published by the Swedish press, by the way, with marked expressions of approval.

It is sadly interesting to recall that rumours of the overthrow of the Bolshevik government began immediately after the revolution of November 9th. On the 13th it was reported that they had been ejected from Petrograd, but I

was able to contradict that rumour authoritatively the next day. In the three years and more since those days the Bolshevists have, I should say, been overthrown regularly on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays of each week, but they still display an amazing vitality nevertheless. I have never been among those who expected that their rule would be quickly or easily terminated. On the contrary, I cabled Washington on November 27th following the *coup* that all my information was of such a nature as to destroy all our former hopes that any help could be thereafter expected from Russia. I pointed out that the Bolshevists were not only in absolute control of the situation, but that there also were no anti-Bolshevist leaders capable of challenging their supremacy.

Further than that, I committed what, as I have since realized, must have appeared decidedly heterodox at that time. In other words, I question whether the Allies should not take prompt steps to effectuate some kind of co-operation with the new government, in an effort at least to prevent the utter disintegration of the Russian front. I knew the Russians

would do no more fighting, but I had a slight hope that perhaps enough of them could be retained at the front to hold some hundreds of thousands of enemy troops there and prevent their employment on the west front. I recommended also that efforts be made to undertake in Russia some propaganda work to overcome the German propaganda. Neither suggestion was acted on.

A prominent New York paper of (I think) November 29, 1917, published a Washington dispatch in which it was declared that there was no reason to be alarmed about the events in Russia. Despite the change in Government, it was asserted, the Russians were still our loyal allies and could be depended on to stand loyally by us. The dispatch proves a good many things, but I'm not sure just what they are. I would like to know who inspired it. From the perspective of five years' distance I find it psychologically interesting. In the following year I repeatedly advised Washington that Lenin's position was growing stronger and that there was no reason to expect that he would be overthrown soon.

The changing situation in Russia made it both more important and more difficult to get adequate information from there, and the added work was a heavy burden on the Legation. To meet the situation I asked the Secretary of State for permission to establish what I called my "Russian Bureau." It was my intention not merely to gather and pass on what information could be obtained, but to have this information handled in such a manner as to make it valuable and understandable. It is hard enough to know all sides of a question affecting any country, but especially so of the Slavic, semi-oriental Russia.

Permission to establish the bureau was granted. The work was mainly entrusted to three men. All three had a very wide knowledge of Russia. The first man had been over 20 years in Russia, a native American and an expert business man and knew Russia through and through. He was a strong conservative and of imperialistic tendencies. The second man was a radical and extreme Socialist, who had served in Russia for many years and was sympathetic to the Bolshevists, with whom he

was at least *persona grata.* He had worked with the American Red Cross at Archangel and other Russian points and through his connections we were able to get much information which it would have been impossible to secure otherwise. The third man had been many years in Russia, was born in Poland, had been broadly educated in different universities and was a professor in modern sciences and a journalist. Politically he stood midway between the other two.

In the beginning I requested each of the three to write out for me a personal statement, telling all about himself and giving his political views in so far as they affected the Russian situation. I sent copies of these statements to Washington for use in estimating the respective men's reports.

The Russian Bureau covered all matters relating to the economic, political, social and financial situation not only in Russia, but in the Baltic provinces as well. Its reports were sent in extenso, both by cablegram and letter, to Washington and also to our members of the Peace Conference in Paris. In addition to

these, we received constantly valuable reports from emissaries whom I had sent into the Baltic countries, and also from friends in those countries.

The State Department, which sent so many good men to help in the Legation's work, sent me to assist the Russian Bureau Professor Archibald Coolidge of Harvard University. His co-operation was very valuable.

I was rather proud of the Russian Bureau, and not the least so because I felt that, in providing for reports from all points of view, I had done something worth while for everybody who wanted to hear all sides of the question. My astonishment was boundless when I learned later that it was being gossiped about in some quarters that I had been in conference with persons of radical views and that, still more horrible, I was myself pro-radical and pro-Bolshevik.

I should not have shaped my previous actions differently even if I had foreseen this. What I was trying to get at all these years, and what, I hope, I shall always be trying to get at, is the truth. I know of no way of getting even

approximately close to the truth without knowing what every side has to say, and I am frank to say that it seems to me that the man who is afraid to hear all sides is an—well let us say, an unwise person.

A man who fell under suspicion because he tried to view Russian affairs objectively and hence reached certain unpopular conclusions was General Judson. The general, who had been at the head of the American Military Mission in Petrograd, came to Stockholm in January, 1918, on his way to Washington. He remained there several days.

General Judson was extraordinarily well versed in the Russian situation and the occurrences of the last year. Because of the importance of getting accurate information to America as soon as possible, I asked him to draw up a statement of his views. This I cabled to Washington. General Judson's views were widely at variance with those of the members of some commissions, which had visited Russia in the previous spring and found everything lovely, and they were also at variance with the views of all those well-meaning persons who

were overthrowing the Bolshevist government thrice weekly and occasionally on an extra holiday for good measure.

Because of this, the General's views fell under suspicion when he reached America, and his reports did not receive the consideration generally which they should have had. The events, however, have unfortunately demonstrated that he knew what he was talking about.

I had one striking object lesson which went to convince me, if I had not already been convinced, how important it is to neglect no source of information, however insignificant, and to maintain, as far as possible, every connection which can be made. After many months of Bolshevik rule in Russia and after the war was ended, I was spending a few days in the mountains near Christiania, Norway, when a card bearing the name Gruesenberg was sent to my room, with a request that I receive the caller. An American military official who was with me at the time advised me strongly against seeing the man, who, he said, was a well-known, important Bolshevist agent and had been ordered to leave Norway on the following day. I decided, how-

ever, not to break my rule of seeing anybody who wanted to talk with me.

The visitor proved to be a haggard, worried man, who wanted me to do what he called a great favour. His wife and child were in Chicago, he said, and he begged me to send them a message saying that he had been expelled from Norway and must return to Russia, but that he was safe and in good health. He might, he declared, be in a position to do me a favour some day, and he would always respond to any call on him.

I was not greatly impressed by this, for I could not see how he would ever be in a position to do anything for me, but there appeared to be no danger in sending the message requested. I complied. A few weeks later I received a letter from his wife, and, after reading it and finding it quite innocuous, I sent it on to Gruesenberg by a newspaperman who was going into Russia.

I thought nothing more of the matter, had, in fact, quite forgotten the incident, when I received news through our Ambassador in Japan and also from Washington that Consul R. S.

Treadwell had been arrested by the Soviet authorities and had been in jail several months. Efforts to get him released had been futile. I recalled Gruesenberg and his promise, and sent him word that if he wanted to show his appreciation for what I had done, he could do it best by having Mr. Treadwell released.

I had really looked for no result from the message, but some six weeks later I received a telegram, signed Gruesenberg, and saying that I might expect Consul Treadwell soon. Much to my surprise, Mr. Treadwell appeared in Stockholm almost on the heels of the message.

Chapter X. Red, White and German

The new Bolshevist saviours of the world hardly waited to consolidate their position before they began planning to confer the blessings of Soviet rule on other nations. In fact, it would be more accurate to say that their plans had been formed long before the revolution; what they began doing now was putting them into effect. Only eight days after the revolution I received information which struck me at the time as worth communicating to Washington, although I did not at that time realize its full significance. From a confidential source I learned that Radek, whose real name was Sobelsohn, an extremely clever man at the head of the Bolshevists' propaganda department, had stated that it could confidently be expected that "certain elements in Germany would cause the German government serious difficulties even-

tually." This was a piece of excellent prophecy.

I was also informed at the same time that the Russian Bolshevists had already begun cooperating with the Socialists of Finland, and that their agents were swarming into the country, bringing funds and arms.

The Finns, as I have already reported, reopened their diet even before Kerensky's fall. The senate was now also organized, and Finland set up in business as an independent country. The parliament had had a slight majority for the Socialists up to October, 1917, but at the general election held then the Socialists were beaten and this was the first step toward the insurrection owing to the anger at being beaten by the opposing party, and the boring-in of the Russian propagandists began to make itself felt early in the new year.

By the end of January, 1918, the situation appeared ripe for extending the dictatorship of the proletariat another step westward, and the brief but terribly bloody civil war in Finland began. One of the first steps of the Bolshevists, working together with the radical wing

of the Finnish Socialists, was to disperse the parliament. President Svinhuvud, surprised in Helsingfors by the revolution, succeeded in hiding there. The other ministers fled. A provisional government was formed at Vasa, on the Bothnian Gulf, by four members of the former government, with Deputy Renvall as president and Samuli Sario as foreign minister. The Bolshevists and Socialists at the capital, Helsingfors, also formed a government. The conflict was on.

At the beginning of February the Finnish revolutionary army, or the Red Army, as it was called, consisted of such Russian troops as had been garrisoned in Finland before the revolution, and of the Red Guard formed by the Finnish Socialists. Its strength was estimated around 75,000 men, splendidly armed and equipped, for the Bolshevists, refusing to shoot at their German "proletarian brothers," had sent a superabundance of rifles, artillery and ammunition into Finland to be used in killing off the hated bourgeoisie. The Renvall-Sario government could not at this time muster

more than a few thousand men and these were insufficiently armed and munitioned.

The situation of the White Army was rendered more difficult by the fact that it commanded only the northwestern corner of the country. The rebels held nearly all the principal cities, such as Viborg, Tammerfors, Helsingfors, and others, and were plundering their stocks of provisions and clothing, while the government troops had almost no resources. Only from the other Scandinavian countries and Germany could any help be expected.

It developed speedily that the Scandinavian countries were not in a position to do anything, due to the fact that the Socialists in all those lands, including even the Right Socialists of Sweden, Hjalmar Branting's party, were strongly opposed to any intervention in the Finnish civil war. Sweden's Liberal Premier, Professor Eden, was also unwilling to adventure the country's strict neutrality by letting arms be sold to any land. General Baron Mannerheim, who had distinguished himself as a Russian leader in the war against Germany, now took

over the command of the White Army. Many Swedes, it is true, came to Finland and fought with the White Army, but no arms or ammunition could be officially sent into Finland because of the Socialists' attitude. One of these volunteers was a mere schoolboy, Baron Styrbjörn von Stedingk. He was killed in his first action. The body was brought back to Sweden and the funeral was the occasion for a patriotic demonstration on the part of all those Swedes who, irrespective of their views about war, were proud to pay homage to the memory of this youth who had at the supreme cost proved that the rugged manhood of the days of Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII was still preserved among the people.

The White leaders turned to Germany with a plea for help. Germany, although herself beset on all sides and already fighting with her back to the wall, responded by sending some munitions of war, and promised also to send troops as soon as possible. By the end of February the White forces had been greatly strengthened and were moving slowly forward. White troops repulsed a strong Russian force on

the Karelian border. In the first week of March the White government issued a proclamation declaring the Aaland Islands to be a part of Finland, and on the 7th of that month Germany and Finland signed a treaty of peace, in which Germany recognized and guaranteed the independence of Finland. The Finnish government also issued a proclamation declaring that German troops had been landed on the Aalands with the government's consent, and would shortly land on the mainland and co-operate with the White Army against the Bolshevist rebels.

It was already obvious that the Red Army's cause was lost, although much fighting was still to be done. The White offensive was gradually nearing Tammerfors. A new Right Socialist party, formed from the better elements of the old party, went on record as opposed to the attitude of their more radical brethren. The White Army took Tammerfors on March 29th, the Reds losing some 2000 killed and 15,000 prisoners.

German troops landed on the mainland in the first week of April, which drew a formal

protest from the Russian Soviet government against what it termed a violation of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Through the Finnish (White) authorities the Germans issued a proclamation setting out that, since they had landed at the request of the Finnish government, they themselves and the government as well guaranteed the inviolability of all diplomatic and consular representatives in Finland, together with their personnel, and the safety of life and property of all aliens generally.

German troops entered the harbour of Helsingfors on April 12th and the city fell the next day, the Red forces suffering heavy losses in killed and prisoners. This was the beginning of the end. Twelve days later the Red leaders asked for peace negotiations, but General Mannerheim replied that he would accept nothing less than unconditional surrender. Swedish Socialists called a mass-meeting in Stockholm to protest against what they termed "encroachments on the rights of Finland's democracy" and "atrocities against the Finnish proletariat." Similar protests came from the Socialists of Norway and Denmark, but the White troops in

Finland were not at all moved by them. On April 29, Viborg, the last Red stronghold, and especially important because of its location near the Russian border, was captured. The insurrection was ended.

The wise man accepts with great reserve, and with a large measure of incredulity, all atrocity stories that crop up during a war. Most of them are not true and the rest can be strongly discounted.

The days of civil warfare in Finland will be long remembered by a number of Americans who learned at first hand a good deal more about what it meant than was at all pleasant. On March 13th I was informed that our naval attaché at Petrograd, our consul at Helsingfors and Mr. Sisson, and about 25 other Americans were at Björneborg, on the west coast of Finland, unable to get away. They had been permitted to come through the lines of the Red Army, but General Mannerheim refused to let them pass through his lines.

I immediately begged the Swedish Minister of Marine to send a relief boat. He replied that it would be impossible to do so because

of the ice. Thereupon I sent Lieutenant C. H. Thorling of my Legation to Finland, to co-operate with the British and French officers in securing permission for the Americans to leave the country. Lieutenant Thorling joined Lieutenant Jack O. B. Hitching of the British Army and the two proceeded to Vasa, headquarters of the White government. Their reception was more than cold; it was discourteous and unpleasant. They found not merely a strong pro-German sentiment, which was natural and understandable in the circumstances, but also an equally strong anti-American and anti-British sentiment. Police and military authorities both reproached them with their governments' alleged responsibility for the civil war, declaring that it would not have broken out if America and England had sent the food which Finland had bought and paid for. This was of course, nonsense, but it is true that Finland had some time earlier bought and paid for 40,000 tons of food in America, and that it had been requisitioned by the American food administrator.

In the evening Lieutenants Thorling and

Hitching went to the city's principal hotel for dinner. Both were in uniform. The dining-room was full of Finnish officers, and the two men observed immediately that their appearance had made a tremendous stir. A group of Finnish officers held a whispered conference, after which one of them approached the American and British officer and told them that they would be allowed two minutes to get out. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, they got out. Discretion was undoubtedly much the better part of valour on such an occasion.

Five Swedish journalists from Stockholm, who were sitting in the dining-room at the time, followed the two out and expressed their sympathy. They declared that the Foreign Minister Sario, who was also present, had not only made no move to prevent the insult, but had smiled a satisfied and sarcastic smile. Undoubtedly this feeling had been stirred up by German agents who thought General Mannerheim too favourable to the Entente and many of the best Finnish officers felt grieved about this incident and extended their sympathies to Thorling and Hitching. General Mannerheim

telegraphed his regrets to Thorling and Hitching on the following day, and no further action was taken. I was not able to make a formal protest because the United States had not recognized Finland, and thus Thorling really had no official status in the country, and a protest might conceivably have brought about an embarrassing situation.

When Thorling first reached Finland he had been informed that Mannerheim was willing to let the refugees at Björneborg cross his lines, but he would accept no responsibility for whatever might happen. Furthermore, said the general, he could name no date when the crossing could take place. It might be months before it would be possible.

A few days later, however, on March 23d, he sent the following curt despatch to Sario:

"Please tell the foreigners who are waiting in Vasa that the military situation is such that I cannot now keep my promise to let them cross. I expect to take Tammerfors soon, but it is impossible to say definitely when. As I expect to give the foreigners in that place an opportunity to leave the

country as soon as the place is taken, I hereby beg to inquire if the special mission at Vasa, which after this will have no duties to fulfil, had not better return to Sweden, instead of remaining and awaiting an event which they can in no way exercise control over and the outcome of which nobody can foresee."

One gets the impression that Mannerheim did not greatly long for the continued presence of the mission in Finland.

Lieutenant Thorling learned later that Mannerheim, in private conversation, had suggested that the Allied officers would be wise if they made no attempt to cross the lines. A good many officers of the White Army were Germans or German-trained, and the feeling against Americans, English and French was so strong that there was more than a good chance that any member of these nations trying to pass through the lines might be shot in the back.

The situation brought about by the incidents described above was by no means the only part of my troubles in the same month. On the next day after I had been informed of the plight of the refugees at Björneborg, Mrs. Henry C.

Emery appeared at the Legation and reported that her husband had been arrested by the Germans on the Aaland Islands, and taken to Germany. Professor Emery had been attached to our military mission in Russia, and he was also a representative of the Guaranty Trust Company of New York. With a party of twenty-eight persons, mainly English, he had crossed from the Finnish mainland to the Aalands on the ice. As soon as they reached the islands they were seized by the Germans, who declared that they would all be sent to Danzig. The Swedish officials on the islands protested so vigorously that the Germans consented to allow the women and children and the men over fifty to proceed to Stockholm. Emery was detained, together with sixteen Englishmen, including the British vice-consul at Helsingfors.

I wired immediately to Lieutenant Thorling, directing him to protest to General Mannerheim. I also sent a protest to M. Gripenberg, Finnish Minister in Stockholm, asking him to inform his government of this flagrant violation of neutral rights and to request it "to formulate a strong protest to the government at Berlin and

require not only the release of Emery, but also a guarantee that as long as Finland remained neutral, no American citizen should be arrested by Germans on Finnish territory." I then informed the State Department of the steps I had taken. Here also as in the case of the insult at Vasa to Lieutenant Thorling I was not able to follow the matter up as vigorously as I should have liked to do because of our not having recognized Finland. The British minister in Stockholm was authorized by his government to protest in any terms he deemed fit.

Minister Gripenberg complied with my request, and the Finnish government sent to Germany on March 19th a request for the release of Professor Emery. He was not actually released, however, until the following October. The British government offered in April, 1918, to recognize the independence of Finland provided the British subjects arrested by the Germans on Finnish territory were released, and provided also that adequate guarantees were given for the maintenance of Finland's neutrality and the protection of the life and property of British subjects.

Sweden recognized Finland's independence on January 4, 1918. The American consul at Helsingfors recommended urgently in February that the American government take the same action. I was unfortunately unable to support this recommendation, since the Red government at that time was in complete control of not only the capital of Finland, but of nearly all the other important cities as well, and it seemed to me that recognition might very possibly accrue to the benefit of the wrong faction, but the American government took no steps in that direction until March, 1919, when it advised me that it felt that recognition as a *de facto* government could be given to any properly constituted government which Finland might establish on democratic principles and with policies not opposed to the interests of the Allied and Associated powers. It was pointed out, however, that this statement was to be taken *eo ipso* as granting such recognition. Formal diplomatic relations were not established with Finland until nearly a full year later, Mr. A. R. Magruder being sent to Helsingfors in the winter of 1920 as chargé d'affaires.

The fighting in Finland had an unpleasant and significant sequel in Sweden in February, 1919, when General Mannerheim officially visited Stockholm as Regent of Finland. The news that General Mannerheim was coming set the Socialists of the Left into paroxysms of rage. The Swedish labouring classes had long been in an ugly temper, and the government had many reasons to be disquieted. The sharp blockade maintained against the country had compelled a reduction of the bread rations early in 1918 to an amount even lower than the weekly ration in combatant Germany. This caused much actual suffering among the poorer classes, and their discontent assumed such a patent form that some country regiments were brought to Stockholm to replace those already there, for it was feared that the city regiments might have become contaminated by revolutionary doctrines.

On May 1st, the European labour day, there had been a clash between police and Swedish Bolshevists in front of the foreign office, in which the police had been compelled to use their sabres. The unrest increased rapidly, and by November not only the bourgeois parties, but

the Right Socialists as well were decidedly uneasy over the agitation of the Left Socialists. The Right Socialists themselves, however, were also busy in making trouble for the government. At mass-meetings in various cities of the Kingdom they had adopted resolutions demanding universal suffrage for men and women twenty-one years of age, a universal eight-hour day, and the abolition of compulsory military service.

In view of all these circumstances, the feeling against Mannerheim, strong as it was during the Finnish rebellion, had grown to fever heat. On the day of his arrival the Left Socialists held a meeting in the front of the foreign office to formulate a protest against the visit, and distributed leaflets denouncing Mannerheim as "the murder of our brothers," "devil," "bloody monster," and various other invectives of the class-conscious vocabulary.

Great precautions were taken to prevent any untoward incident. A strong guard of police and soldiers was at the quay at Skeppsbron, near the palace, where the general debarked. He was received in great state, as the guest of the Swedish King and Government. Later a

special performance was given at the Royal Opera. The large square in front was strongly policed, and only holders of invitations to the performance were permitted to pass the lines. General Mannerheim sat in the Royal box with King Gustavus. In the midst of the performance a speech of welcome was made by an official, and General Mannerheim rose and bowed his thanks, but did not speak.

The situation, even during the performance, was tense, and rendered more tense by the knowledge that Socialist meetings of protest were continuing outside. General Mannerheim had intended to make a longer stay, and afterwards to visit Denmark and Norway. Instead he left quietly the same night for Denmark, and it was given out afterward that he had become suddenly indisposed. I think it was a wise and judicious indisposition. His proposed visit to Norway was abandoned.

I had the pleasure of entertaining the general at luncheon at my home during one of his visits to Sweden. I found him a man of high culture, striking personality and that magnetism which a great military leader should have.

It will have been observed that the Swedish Socialists are a very determined party. This is particularly true of the Left Socialists, who later did not hesitate to let me know in plain terms what they thought about certain occurrences in the United States, which the more radical of them were inclined to put on the same plane as the treatment allegedly meted out to the Finnish rebels by General Mannerheim. In April, 1919, I received from the chairman of a meeting of workingmen held at Gössäter a formal protest against "the unexampled punishment" of Swedish subjects by a Chicago court.

The men referred to were Carl Ahlten, sentenced to twenty years inprisonment and a fine of $20,000, Ragnar Johansson ten years and $35,000 and Seigfried Stenberg, ten years and $35,000.

"We considered these punishments unnaturally severe and cruel as the men's crime consisted in nothing but defending Swedish workingmen in America," said the protest. I communicated it to the State Department, which informed me that the sentences were inflicted not "for defending workingmen," but for conspiracy to

delay or hinder the execution of United States laws relating to the prosecution of the war, and to cause insubordination in the military and naval forces and obstruct recruiting. The defenders were among 97 I. W. W. members tried together in a trial extending from April to August, 1918. Stenberg was manager and Ahlten and Johansson were editors of the newspaper, *Alarm,* which, of all foreign-language newspapers, was declared to be the most violent in its attitude against the government and the war.

In October, 1919, I received a communication from the Left Socialists of Sweden, protesting against the sentences inflicted in America upon political offenders. The protest read:

"Why is it that America, which claims to represent a régime that is liberal and progressive, which entered the war 'to make the world safe for democracy,' has inflicted such ferocious sentences on political offenders? In no other civilized country is the political prisoner treated with as little liberality and understanding. Amnesty to political prisoners has been granted in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Russia and Bulgaria. Italy has freed

most of her anti-militarists, and France will probably soon take similar action. England, in line with her traditions of political freedom, is expected to pursue a liberal policy. Only America remains adamant."

The communication pointed out that the American convicts included anarchists, members of the I. W. W., Socialists, Pacifists, Sinn Feiners, Conscientious Objectors, Hindus, Quakers, Russellites, Mennonites and many others. It named specifically William D. Haywood, Vincent St. John, John Speed, Eugene Debs, Kate Richards O'Hara and Rose Pastor Stokes, "whose only crime is that they have sided with the poor and weak against the rich and powerful." The protest further referred to the lynching of Frank Little at Butte, the outrages in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and the details given by Winthrop D. Lane of the staff of the *Survey,* of cases of brutality, imprisonment in cages etc., in the Federal prisons.

The protest was signed by representatives of the Swedish Young Socialist party and the Swedish central labour organization.

In November, 1921, I received a strongly worded protest from Swedish Socialists against the death-sentences of Sacco and Vanzetti. The Socialists of the Right—Branting's party did not participate directly in these protests, but they were and are in complete sympathy with them. European Socialists in general regard America as the world's chief stronghold of reaction and privilege.

Chapter XI. The Incubation of New States

The collapse of the Russian Empire created an almost endless array of new and difficult political complications. The formerly independent kingdoms, duchies, etc., that had been slowly absorbed in the last seven centuries into the conglomerate making up the vast realm of the Tsars, began to talk of separate statehood almost as soon as Nicholas II had been overthrown. The avowed principles of Kerensky's followers, and, after them, of the Bolshevists, compelled both revolutionary governments to go further than they liked in admitting the justice of these claims. As early as June 17, 1917, a Socialist Congress in Petrograd adopted resolutions declaring that Lithuania had a right to self-determination, and should be permitted to elect an assembly and decide its own course of action. The first revolutionary government did

not concede this right, although it formally acknowledged the existence of a similar right in respect to Poland. Finland, as has earlier been set forth, assumed the right of self-determination for itself in the closing days of the Kerensky régime, and its claims were acknowledged by the Bolshevists, as also were the claims of Lettland and Esthonia. Later, also, the Bolshevists acknowledged *pro forma* Georgia's right of self-determination, but later rendered it illusory by occupying the land and forcing a Bolshevist form of government upon it. Another would-be independent state was the Ukraine, but this claim was never admitted.

Former nationals of most of these states domiciled in the United States took an active part in the propaganda in favour of the independence of their native lands. Early in the summer of 1917 the Nationalist Lithuanian group in America sent Dr. John Szlupas of Scranton to Lithuania to investigate the situation. Dr. Szlupas submitted to me on October 3d of that year a report in which he set forth that as a result of four months study of conditions he could declare that the Lithuanians and

Letts were agreed upon the necessity of a union of their two countries into an independent state. Neither state, he asserted, was willing to join Russia, even as a Republic, and both were strongly antagonistic to any plan for joining them to Poland. They were looking to the United States to help them in their battle for independence.

Dr. Szlupas reported also that the old Russian government had virtually agreed to hand Lithuania over to Germany, and that the Germans had already begun preparations for colonizing the two lands.

The eyes of the Poles were also directed toward America in their campaign for independence, and, as was the case with the Lithuanians, they found strong support among the Poles in the United States. These facts were set forth in a report handed to me in November, 1917, by W. S. Olszewsky, head of the Polish commission, and by me transmitted to the State Department. Mr. Olszewsky, however, after declaring that the cause of Polish independence found its strongest supporters in America, complained bitterly that the American newspapers in general

knew almost nothing about either Poland or the Poles, their State affairs, aims and needs.

"Even their leading articles are ridiculous when they try to discuss Polish affairs," he said.

The aspirations of the Poles and the Finns for independence found favour in the United States, although the recognition of Finland was long delayed. It was different as to the Baltic provinces. As late as August, 1920, nearly three and a half years after the overthrow of the Tsar, Secretary of State Colby, replying to a request of the Italian Ambassador for a statement as to the attitude of the United States government in respect to the liberated provinces of the former Russian Empire, declared that, "the government would regard with satisfaction a declaration by the Allied and Associated powers that the territorial integrity and true boundaries of Russia shall be respected. These boundaries should properly include the whole of the former Russian Empire with the exception of Finland proper, ethnic Poland and such territory as may by agreement form a part of the Armenian state."

In a note made public the same month Secre-

tary Colby approved the demands of Finland, Poland and Armenia for independence, but not those of Esthonia, Lettland, Lithuania, the Ukraine and Georgia, as to which he desired to await the action of an eventual Russian assembly, elected on a democratic basis. His attitude as to the last five named states was that they had no old national life and that no manifestation of political life was observable on their part when they were incorporated into the Russian Empire. Mr. Colby also opposed any recognition of Russia.

Secretary Colby also hoped that the Swedish government would take the same stand. One prominent member of the Swedish cabinet at that time expressed his willingness to do so, but the majority of the cabinet regarded Mr. Colby's attitude as based upon a historical misunderstanding and also as contravening the principle of the right of self-determination. Economically, too, Sweden's interests were all in the line of recognition of the Baltic provinces, with which the Kingdom's export and import trade has been important for centuries.

As to one of the countries which he did not

desire to recognize, I cannot fully agree with Secretary Colby. This was Lithuania, which was not only a power with a very marked national and political life, but even a great power. From the historical mists overhanging the East it emerged suddenly in the thirteenth century, and in the next two centuries increased its power with gigantic strides. Neither German colonization under the Teutonic Knights nor the opposition of the Tartars in the southeast was able to hinder or even materially check Lithuania's development. In 1320 its greatest military leader, Gedimir, defeated the Russians, annexed Volhynia and then extended the state southwards past Podilia and Kieff and eastward as far as Tchernigoff. By the fifteenth century the grand duchy of Lithuania extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Gedimir's son Olgerd even fought his way as far as Moscow.

A marriage of state was the beginning of the end of Lithuania's greatness. Grand Duke Jogaila (or Jagiello) married in 1386 the young Queen Hedwig of Poland, thus founding a personal union between the two states which enabled the Poles of the fifteenth century to impose their

rule upon Lithuania and gradually extinguish nearly all the former grand duchy's rights. Its subjection lasted three centuries, and in that period the Poles were able to put their imprint deeply upon the folk and land. The great majority of big estates are still owned by Poles, and Polish is generally spoken by the highest class. Among the common people and peasants, however, the hatred of Poland and the Poles is so intense that any union of Lithuania with the former masters' state would appear to be inadvisable, if not impossible.

Lithuania is by far the largest of the Baltic provinces, having some 275,000 square kilometers of area.

A case could possibly be made out against Esthonia and Lettland on the grounds assigned by Secretary Colby. Lettland was originally peopled by an Esthonian race, long since extinct. Its first organization as a political entity was due to the Hansa merchants of Bremen, who came to the land for the first time in 1158. The German Monk Reinhard christianized the people at the end of the twelfth century. In 1202 Bishop Albrecht organized the Order of

Lettish Knights, which later joined the Teutonic Order and subjugated all Lettland, Courland and Esthonia. In 1561 Lettland became a Polish province, but fell in 1660 to Sweden, which lost to Russia in 1721 as a result of the Great Northern War. The Swedes laid the foundation for the existing religious, educational, administrative and agrarian institutions, and all Lettish literature and art has been most strongly influenced by the Swedes. The country is one-sixth as large as Lithuania.

Esthonia, but half the size of Lettland, has also not known independence for more than 700 years. In 1219 it came under the Danes, then, as stated above, was subjugated by Lithuanias and Germans, became in the year 1561, Swedish, and finally Russian in 1721. The country has a rather remarkable literature for such a small land.

It is, I should say, quite true that no manifestations of political life was noticeable in any of these states when they were incorporated into the Russian Empire, but just what manifestation there could have been in the circumstances is not clear to me. The situation was much like

that when the kind-hearted elephant of the fable, having accidentally stepped on a mother-bird, said to the fledglings, "Poor orphans, I will be a mother to you," and sat down on them. It is not recorded by Æsop that there was any manifestation of life in the orphans nest at that time, either.

Apart from all the foregoing consideration, however, I believe I know what was in the back of Mr. Colby's mind, and I begin to fear that he was right in doing all that was possible to avoid a further Balkanization of Europe.

Self-determination is a beautiful and perhaps a natural principle, but at the risk of appearing heretical, I venture to say that it can be overdone. I am not so sure that it has not already been greatly overdone. And that it has its limitations appears to be shown by the fact that we rejected it for ourselves, in one respect at least, in the troublous years of 1861–65. A very considerable part of the ills that today afflict most of Europe is due to the severing of economic legs and arms from the bodies to which they belonged. Social and economic structures

that had been built up with decades of effort until they formed an economic unit have, in too many instances, I am afraid, been ignorantly shattered for the gratification of sentiments which are beautiful and commendable in themselves, but which, if they are to be preserved and cultivated, will probably eventually cost a good deal more than they are worth, either to separate peoples or to the world at large.

On the new patchwork map of Europe one can today put his finger on a half dozen states of which it can be said with assurance that they will never be strong either economically, socially or politically, and there is at least one whose very existence for more than a few years is extremely doubtful. However much one could object to the oppression of the small nationalities by Russia, these were at least parts of a mighty economic system and thus benefited by resources which not one of them could have ever secured for itself. One readily understands that they had no desire to become members of Bolshevized Russia, but whether the creation of these small, impotent states was

wise, either in their own interest or the interests of the rest of the world, only time will show. I am doubtful and not optimistic about it.

Perhaps the case of Georgia and Armenia is different. I am not well enough informed about the situation there to speak confidently. But I do feel that I know something about the Baltic provinces especially, for I sent many agents thither at various times in 1918, 1919, and 1920 commissioned to find out what they could about the situation, at first military, then, after the war had ended, the economic and political situation in particular, and send in reports. Much of the material thus secured was very valuable, and all of it was, of course, available to Secretary Colby in the reports which I had forwarded.

Of all the states carved out of old Russia, I believe that Finland is the most promising. Its natural resources are very great, and its people frugal, intelligent, honest and ambitious.

During my eight years sojourn in Sweden I have had many dealings not only with representatives of the Finnish government but with its business men, shipowners and others, and my work with them has been most gratifying and

pleasant to me. I have always found them most trustworthy and prompted in their dealings by the highest patriotic motives, and I sincerely hope that their country will progress and succeed as it well deserves.

Chapter XII. Russian Interventionists

I have said that I was from the very beginning under no illusions as to the strength of the Bolshevists in Russia. Even if they were weaker than I believe them to be, there was no strong opposition party in sight, to say nothing of the lack of any real leaders. On frequent occasions, well into 1920, I continued to advise the State Department that, in my opinion, the Soviet government was growing steadily stronger.

The Bolshevists had not been in the saddle more than a week before talk of armed intervention began to be heard in the various circles and countries. It was, I should say, originally started by men who had been personally sorely affected by the November revolution—formerly well-to-do Russian refugees themselves, and various foreigners, who had been owners of

industrial plants or other big businesses in Russia, but had suddenly lost everything they possessed. These men fled from the country, full of hot anger at those who had reduced them from affluence to poverty and loudly demanding that their respective governments throw troops into Russia to crush the Bolshevists. Their feelings were only too natural and quite understandable, and one cannot deny one's sympathy for them.

The idea of overthrowing the Soviet government by force found quick adherence in influential circles of several countries, and with the governments of those countries as well. At least, one country, France, was in much the same position as the refugees from Russia. She had lent Russia many billions of francs for various purposes, and this money, like the money of the refugees, was also lost. It came more closely home to the private citizens in France, too, than would have been the case in any other country, for France is a land of small investors, and these feared for the fate of their investments.

It is to be deeply regretted that thus far the way is not clear whereby France and the Allies

will be repaid the loans which were made to Russia. Of all the countries, France has suffered so much that the sympathy of the world goes out to her for the great losses which she has sustained both in the noble sacrifices of her men and in the terrible economic losses which the country suffered. My experience in Sweden during the war proved to me that there was no effort too great or no sacrifice too much for the French during the war, and it is to their redounded credit that their diplomatic, military and national affairs were so admirably carried on.

There was also interventionist sentiment in some of the smaller countries. On February 2, 1918, M. Diamandi, the Roumanian Minister to Russia, told me that he was convinced that Russia was doomed to general anarchy, with all its attendant consequences, unless foreign troops should step in and restore order at the point of the bayonet. He even feared that the war situation was so seriously changed by the Russian collapse that it might be advisable to consider things from a new point of view. I reported Minister Diamandi's views

to Washington without any recommendations.

Even some Socialists were affected by the interventionist plan. Vladimir Bourtzeff, a well-known Russian Right Socialist leader, expressed himself to me as strongly in favour of foreign intervention. He declared that this was the sentiment of the whole party, which had sent him to Europe as its spokesman. He purposed at the time going on to America to make propaganda there in favour of armed action against the Bolshevists.

Later on and at various times expeditionary forces were organized against the Soviets. Some of the better known of these expeditions were led by those well-known generals Yudenitch, Denikin, Koltschak, Semenoff and Wrangel. So much has been written regarding these expeditions that I hesitate to describe them more fully. The best informed people on the Russian situation with whom I have spoken regarding the advisability of these expeditions seem to be more or less divided. Many claim that these expeditions gave the Soviets the strong weapon of propaganda which they could use throughout Russia by claiming foreign aggression, and thus

they were better able to nationalize the people. I am not prepared to discuss the advisability of these missions. That they were all unsuccessful in accomplishing the desired result is generally known.

Even at the time of this writing there are still many officers and men who took part in these expeditions scattered in the various parts of Europe. Many of those who took part with General Wrangel are now eking out an existence in Turkey and some of the Balkan states. Officers and soldiers from some of the other expeditions are still in Finland doing what they can to re-establish their lives.

The Serbian Minister to Sweden requestd me already in March, 1920, to help obtain the release and transfer to Serbia of 2000 Russian officers and soldiers formerly with the Yudenitch army, and still in Esthonia. The Minister declared that the Esthonian government refused to allow the men to leave the country. They had been already decimated by hunger and disease, and were in a pitiable condition. They were, moreover, in daily terror of being turned over to the Bolshevist army. (Why this was

so I do not know: I merely give what the Minister told me.) The Serbian government was willing to receive the men and make them grants of land.

The State Department replied that, while it had the fullest sympathy with the men and with the Serbian government's plan for their relief, the United States unfortunately had no funds available for their transportation. It was, however, willing to use its good offices to secure permission for them to leave Esthonia. The American Relief Administration and the American Red Cross in the Baltic lands were informed by the Department, and American food was distributed.

Although these expeditionary forces accomplished nothing, yet the valour and courage displayed by those taking part in them cannot be overestimated. Russian officers of the old Emperor's régime, though penniless and in dire want of the necessities of life, struggled by one means or another to reach places where these armies were being organized and begged to be made use of in any way possible. That they were prompted by the highest motives of

patriotism and showed the greatest unselfishness and heroism is well known, and I have heard of many of their deeds of valour and self-sacrifice which would be most thrilling to relate if the space of this book would have permitted it. Many of these men engaged in these forces against the Soviets left their families and gladly sacrificed their lives, holding on to the vague hope that Russia could still be saved from the Soviets.

Concerning the report that Russian women had been nationalized, it is hard to understand just how any person with any knowledge of human nature could have ever believed this story. I took pains to investigate this particular story, and could find no evidence whatever to support it. Consul Treadwell reported that he had seen a placard containing an alleged proclamation nationalizing women, but that there was no doubt that it was the work of counter-revolutionaries who endeavoured thus to arouse sentiment against the Bolshevists.

Sentiment in Sweden was strongly opposed not only to all intervention in Russia, but also the Allied governments' blockade policy. In

October, 1919, Mr. Branting informed me that he and the whole Swedish government disapproved strongly of the blockade against Russia and regarded it as strongly unwise. Norway and Denmark felt the same way. The labour parties of Sweden even protested formally against it.

Already in the spring of 1920 the Swedish General Export Association concluded an agreement with the "Centrosojus" (the Central Cooperative Organization of Russia) with a view of establishing trade relations between the two countries.

In March, 1922, a delegation appointed by the Swedish government, after many weeks of negotiating, finally arranged a trade agreement with representatives of the Soviets. This trade agreement very much resembles the one entered into between Norway and the Soviets. When placed before the Swedish Riksdag, or parliament, for ratification, the agreement was rejected in May of the same year. There is some talk of its again being submitted to the Riksdag after the Hague conference.

From Article 1 of this agreement I quote

the following paragraphs, showing the diplomatic status it provides for:

"The official representatives as well as their personnel, if they are not nationals of the country where they reside, shall enjoy—within the territory of the other country—such immunity to person, private property, residence and offices as is usually granted to diplomatic representatives and their personnel, in accordance with international law. Furthermore, they are to be exempt from taxation to the same extent as the personnel of other foreign representatives. The official representatives of both countries will have quality and full power to act in the name of their governments.

"The official representative of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in Sweden should be regarded as the only representative of the Russian state with all consequences deriving therefrom.

"The representatives of both countries shall have the right to use the flag and other official emblems, established by the laws of the respective countries."

The general feeling in northern Europe is that of disappointment that the United States

could not find its way clear to be represented officially at the Genoa conference. The feeling is generally one of hope mixed with doubt as to what the Genoa conference will be able to accomplish.

Our government maintained its prohibition of trade relations with the Soviet government until into July, 1920, when restrictions upon trade were removed. At the same time, however, I was instructed to notify all Americans entering Russia that no protection would be given them by the government. The extreme Socialist viewpoint that all means are justifiable in the war against the *bourgeoisie* led the Soviet government from the very beginning to forge, steal and buy American passports whenever and wherever possible, and this compelled the State Department to require all Americans entering Russia to surrender their passports to the nearest diplomatic or consular official of the United States in the country from which they intended to depart. Receipts were given, and the passports were returned only upon presentation of the receipts by the persons to

whom they had been issued. This rule was promulgated in November, 1920, but was abrogated in December, 1921.

I have referred earlier in this book to passport frauds, but much more could be written about them. All through the summer of 1920 we had continuous trouble from this source. It was by no means only American passports that were misused. All the European lands and even Brazil were represented. Certain neutral lands harboured great numbers of Bolshevist agitators. I have a single list of nearly 2000 names of such suspects, and many supplemental lists were issued later. The names included all nationalities, even French officers' names figuring in them. The decree permitting Americans entering Russia to retain their passports appears to indicate that the State Department has reason to believe that there will be no more trouble from thefts in Russia. I hope that this is true.

The unjustifiable imprisonment of American citizens by the Soviet government did much to incense American opinion against the Bolshevists, and made much work for me. In June, 1919, Tschicherin, the Bolshevists' foreign min-

ister, sent me a long protest against the alleged arrest in America of Ludwig Martens, the Soviet government's agent there. Tschicherin declared that all diplomatic and consular representatives in Russia were treated with utmost courtesy, "despite the fact that for a year America has openly sided with all the forces arrayed against the peasants and workers of Russia." He hoped that the government would not be "reluctantly compelled" to resort to reprisals against Americans in Russia, but that he might soon have the pleasure of hearing that Martens had been released.

The State Department replied on July 1st:

"The statement purporting to emanate from Moscow is wholly untrue. Mr. Martens has not been arrested, nor does this government contemplate any action against law-abiding Russian citizens in this country. It is understood that Mr. Martens claims official status as the representative of a régime at Moscow which the United States has not recognized as a government. At the same time he is a German citizen, having voluntarily so declared himself when he entered this country in 1916. This government has not forgotten the un-

warrantable arrest and detention for months of Consul Treadwell and the illegal and unjustifiable imprisonment under severe hardships of Vice Consuls Burri and Leonard contrary to the fundamental practice of civilized nations, nor has it forgotten that an American citizen, Kalmatiano, has been held in prison at Moscow for months without proper trial and without opportunity for his government to assist him. The government of the United States now views with grave concern the reported threat of the authorities at Moscow to take further illegal measures in the form of reprisals against American citizens in Russia. Such a course, if adopted, would be certain to arouse in the United States an overwhelming public sentiment of indignation against the authorities at Moscow responsible for such acts."

I transmitted this not to Tschicherin, who replied that the Soviet government had no record whatever of any one named Burri or Leonard. Kalmatiano, he declared, had had a fair trial and had been duly convicted of high crimes against the state. (Consul Treadwell's release has been referred to earlier.)

The Kalmatiano case was responsible for much correspondence and some grave misunderstandings. He had been attached to the American Consulate at Moscow. Efforts to secure his release began immediately after he had been found guilty of espionage and sentenced to death. In February, 1919, Mr. Hermod Larssen, chief assistant to the director of the Danish Red Cross, presented to me a memorandum from Tschicherin, in which I was requested to inquire of my government its views on the exchange of Kalmatiano and George Albers, also an American prisoner. The State Department replied that it had already received a similar proposal directly from the Soviet government, and that negotiations were being considered.

On March 4th, M. Gruesenberg, to whom I have previously referred, and formerly one of the Soviet government's representatives in Norway, wrote me from Moscow that Kalmatiano would be released if the United States government would agree to permit Professor Lomonossoff and his associates to leave the United

States, and if the "Soviet co-workers" under arrest at Vladivostock were released and given safe-conduct to Soviet territory.

Professor Lomonossoff was a well-known, highly trained, technical authority on engineering in Russia, and headed a commission which was sent by Kerensky to the United States for the purchasing of locomotive engines and other engineering materials, and he had remained in America from that time until these negotiations for his return took place. Since his arrival in Europe he has been one of the Soviet representatives.

Two weeks later M. Gruesenberg gave Lincoln J. Steffens a memorandum stating: (1) that he had interviewed Lomonossoff several times in the United States, and that he wanted to return to Russia as soon as possible; (2) in order to facilitate his return, Tschicherin had sent a note to Secretary Lansing, proposing the release of Kalmatiano provided Lomonossoff be given safe conduct as far as the Russian-Finnish border; (3) that this proposal had been sent in the middle of February, but no answer had been received. Mr. William C. Bullitt urged at the

same time that Captain Pettit, who had accompanied his mission to Russia, be permitted to enter Russia to negotiate for the release of Kalmatiano and a number of other prisoners.

The Swedish Foreign Office instructed the Swedish Legation at Washington to visa Professor Lomonossoff's passport. He arrived in Stockholm June 7th and immediately telegraphed Moscow to that effect, adding that he was informed by the American Legation that his departure from Stockholm for Russia was conditioned on Kalmatiano's release into Finland. He asked for instructions.

The reply was surprising. Litvinoff wired from Moscow that "no offer regarding the release of Kalmatiano was ever made by Tschicherin or any representative of the Soviet government, either direct to Lansing, the American Legation or through Steffens." The message added that it had no knowledge of Gruesenberg's whereabouts, that he had no connection with the government and no authority to negotiate for it.

On June 19th Tschicherin wired to Lomonossoff:

From an American Legation

"Cannot trace any offer on part Soviet government regarding your exchange against Kalmatiano, who has been tried by revolutionary tribunal and found guilty of grave offences, and who can on no account be released. Please inform whether your departure is being prevented by the Swedish government, and on what account."

I had earlier got into touch with Mr. Archibald Parker, who was arranging the transfer of British prisoners of war from Russia, and he had promised to do what he could to facilitate the release of Kalmatiano and get him safe-conduct to the Finnish border. He was, however, not able to accomplish anything.

The men named were unfortunately far from being the only Americans in prisons of Soviet Russia. Others included Royal R. Keely, an American engineer and specialist in industrial economics; John Flick, W. B. Estes, Thomas Hazelwood, Emmet Kilpatrick, W. Jancqura, Mrs. Harrison, a woman journalist; Alfred Boni, a New York publisher, and several others. These names are all from the winter of 1920–21.

Whatever lay in my power to help them was done, but my position was rendered difficult,

just as in the case of the Thorling incident in Finland, by the fact that our government had not recognized the Bolshevist government. Thus, in November, 1920, certain negotiations for the release of prisoners had to be left in the hands of the Norwegian, Dr. Frithiof Nansen, the great Arctic explorer, who had added so greatly to his fame and deserts in the last two years by his work for humanity.

Mr. Bullitt, to whom I referred above, was, of course, the head of the famous Bullitt Mission to Russia, whose report made so much stir in the United States. He frequently conferred with me when he came through Sweden en route to Russia. While I could do nothing officially, I managed, through a Swedish friend who stood well with the Soviet government, to secure a proper escort and even a special railway carriage for the mission. Some members of the mission remained in Stockholm on the return trip, and we had many conferences about the Russian situation.

Chapter XIII. Diplomatic "First Aid" to Americans

It was not merely in Germany and Austria-Hungary that the entrance of America into the war placed large numbers of American citizens in an embarrassing position. The situation of our countrymen in the Turkish Empire was much more unpleasant, much fuller of hardships. This was particularly true as to those in the far-off districts of Asia Minor. How many there were of these altogether I do not know, but in April, 1918, 1009 Americans were registered at the Swedish Legation in Constantinople and the Swedish consulates elsewhere in Turkey, and it was estimated that at least 3000 more had been unable to register. Eighty-five per cent of the whole number were without resources and dependent on outside help.

One of the first Americans to suffer from the change wrought by America's entrance into the

ranks of the belligerents was Mr. Charles A. Dana, treasurer of the Syrian Presbyterian Church. In November, 1917, the police visited Mr. Dana's home in Beirut, confiscated all his private papers, and ordered him to leave the city. After vain efforts to have the order rescinded, he started for Constantinople. After suffering terrible hardships on the way, especially from Aleppo to Konia, he reached his destination, only to find that the Turkish government had refused to permit any Americans to leave the country until safe-conduct should be given Ottoman subjects in the United States to leave America. This order was issued in February, 1918.

I have spoken elsewhere in this book of how the United States was asked to use its good offices in looking after the interests of Germans and Austria-Hungarians in some of the belligerent countries before the entrance of the United States into the war and explain how this was customary for nations to do during such a time. Therefore, I was not surprised when I received a telegram from Washington asking me whether I could arrange for the Swedish govern-

ment to look after the American interests in Turkey. After some conferences with the Swedish Foreign Minister I succeeded in arranging this, and all matters concerning our interests in Turkey were henceforth communicated to me and I in turn communicated with the Swedish Foreign Office in Stockholm, who instructed their representatives in Turkey. Through the Swedish government I directed my best efforts to ameliorating the lot of the Americans there, and, in the early winter of 1918, to getting permismission for them to leave the country. Advised of the Turkish government's order of February, the State Department advised me that no Turkish subjects were being detained in the United States except such as had been connected with enemy plots against the government. It was declared that a safe-conduct would be given to all others desiring to leave and urging that the Ottoman government accord reciprocal treatment to Americans in Turkey.

As late as April of the same year there were still some 160 American citizens in the city of Constantinople alone. I believe all of those

who desired to get out were eventually permitted to leave, but for thousands in Asia Minor it was not possible because of material hindrances. Most or practically all of those, however, were aided by funds placed at my disposal by generous Americans and by the government.

Nor was aid confined merely to American citizens. In the spring of 1918 it was calculated that there were 4800 necessitous persons in Syria and 22,000 in Palestine and its environs. So far as possible, these were helped. The State Department authorized me in the spring of 1918 to draw and forward some $75,000 for maintenance of Jewish soup kitchens and later on I was further authorized to draw some $25,000 more for general relief and continuation of these kitchens already established in Constantinople. Tens of thousands of dollars were paid out in the first three months of the year, and in April there was $600,000, available for relief work. My Legation was constantly sending large sums through the Swedish Foreign Office and the Swedish diplomatic and consular offices in Turkey. The money came from the most varied sources, mainly missions and other

religious bodies. Catholic, Methodists, Presbyterians, and Jews probably predominated, but all religious interests and sects were represented, and no distinction was made in distributing the funds, except a restriction against aid to enemies or allies of enemies of the United States. The record of this work alone takes up several of the large volumes making up the official records of the Stockholm Legation.

In many cases I was able to obtain help direct from friends or relatives in America of the sufferers in Turkey. I was also able to secure permission for a considerable number of Americans to return to Jerusalem, whence they had been deported at the beginning of hostilities. It is pleasant to be able to note in passing that the Roberts College kept open throughout the war, and that the number of Turkish student girls there remained nearly or quite normal.

In January, 1918, I learned that the Ottoman authorities had placed a guard around the *U. S. S. Scorpion,* which was lying at anchor in the Golden Horn when the war came, and that the crew was allowed to go ashore but once in a fortnight. The officers were treated more

liberally, being permitted one hour's shore-leave daily. At my request the Swedish Minister at Constantinople formally requested of the Turkish government more liberal treatment for the men. Colonel Ahlgren, counsellor of the Swedish legation in June, 1918, visited the *Scorpion*. He found the men apparently healthy, and receiving abundant and wholesome food. They were as contented as could be expected of virtual prisoners, but complained that they received little or no news from home.

Later I endeavoured to have arrangements made by which the crew would be interned in Switzerland or some other neutral country for the duration of the war. The Turkish government consented to this late in the summer, but so far as I remember, the war ended before any such steps were taken.

I find in my records that I was able to advise Washington early in the winter of 1918 that there was much discontent in Turkey with the Germans, and also strong feeling against Enver Pasha. Turkey was already very tired of the war, and the government, according to information which I believe accurate, had sent out some

feelers on the subject of peace with Russia, whose grain, coal and oil from the Black Sea regions were sadly missed. With the exception of Ambassador Morgenthau's able book and his various magazine articles, not much has been written about war conditions in Turkey.

I cannot speak too highly of the ready and generous assistance and co-operation granted me by all the Swedish authorities in looking after needy Americans in Turkey. I should perhaps make particular mention of the manner in which the Swedish consul at Smyrna protected the interests of the American Society for Excavating Sardis. Professor Howard Crosby Butler of Princeton University was the director of this work. I was pleased to have the opportunity to convey the American government's thanks to the Swedish government on July 29, 1919. I again had a similar pleasure, when I was able to convey to the Swedish Foreign Office our government's thanks for the services rendered by the Consuls-General Wiederström in Petrograd and Asker at Moscow in looking after American interests.

I may perhaps here refer to one rather

humorous incident in connection with the protection of American citizens, although this one occurred shortly before America entered the war. One of our diplomatic representatives in a southern European country appealed to me to make the Germans be less reckless in their shooting and bombing. German shells and airplane bombs, he reported, were constantly falling all around his place, despite the fact that he kept the American flag flying in a conspicuous position. I was always ready to do whatever I could to protect our people, but on this occasion I did not see how anything could be done. Any kind of a flag looks pretty small from an airplane a half mile high or a gun position five or six miles off.

In one other case I was unable to afford any effective protection to a number of Americans for the reason that Swedish hospitality, both official and private, while broad and generous, is not broad enough to extend to a certain religious sect. This is the Mormons. The hostile attitude of both government and people toward the Latter Day Saints made a good deal of work for me, first and last.

On June 21, 1912, more than two years before I came to Sweden, the government had issued a proclamation exhorting the police to use increased vigilance in watching and suppressing Mormon activities. In the proclamation it referred to a royal edict of 1873, which contains certain regulations concerning religious bodies not affiliated with the State church. This edict, which regulates the activities of all religious associations desiring to form separate religious communities with the recognition of the State, is still in force.

Dissenting religious bodies, while tolerated in Sweden, are not viewed with any great degree of favour, no matter whether Protestant or Roman Catholic. Both ethnically and religiously the most homogeneous people in the world, the great mass of Swedes see in that fact one of the main sources of their national strength, and they are naturally reluctant to see the nation weakened by a multiplicity of sects. Even as I write this the press of the whole country has been stirred to a series of bitter anti-Catholic articles by the attempt of a Roman Catholic bishop assigned to Sweden, *in partibus*

infidelium, as it were, to bring about a revision of the text-books used in the Swedish schools, which, he alleged, are full of gross historical misstatements concerning the Roman Catholic Church. The attachment of the Swedes to the Protestant faith, as exemplified in the tenets of the Lutheran Church, was strongly evidenced by the fact that every prominent newspaper was able to command the services of the best known men in the Kingdom in meeting the Bishop's offensive, which failed completely. All the dissenting bodies in Sweden—Methodists, Baptists, Catholics, or what not—play virtually no rôle whatever in the country's life. Members of the Swedish Cabinet are required to be of "the pure evangelical faith," and there is little likelihood of dissent making much headway in this generation.

Against the Mormons, however, there is a special grievance of many decades' standing. This is their alleged encouragement of emigration. Sweden has been a fruitful field for Mormon missionaries for forty years or more. Whenever they could be found at work they were expelled from the country. Two were

expelled in 1914, the first year of my stay here.

In 1915 and 1916, the head church voluntarily recalled 27 Mormon missionaries from Sweden, as a result of a highly effective propaganda carried on against them in the Kingdom, chiefly by the press and the moving-picture theatres. In February, 1916, I made an extended report to the State Department concerning Mormon propaganda in Sweden, but no further action was taken at the time. A year later two missionaries were arrested and ordered expelled from the country. I believe they went voluntarily, without an escort.

It must be admitted that the Church of the Latter Day Saints has that admirable quality—persistence. It never gives up. Despite its many setbacks in Sweden it continued to send over missionaries, and some of these found themselves in trouble early in 1921, when four of the total eleven at work in King Gustaf' Kingdom were informed by the police that their continued presence in Sweden was not regarded as desirable.

The case was reported to me by Mr. Oscar Söderberg, vice president of the Church in

Sweden, who hoped that the order of expulsion might be rescinded. I took the matter up with the Foreign Office, but was informed that the attitude of the government was firm. The case, I was told, had been passed on in a special crown council, and the decision was not to be altered. At my special request, permission was granted Mr. Söderberg to remain for one month to wind up the affairs of the Church.

I reported the matter to Washington on April 2nd, but complaint had evidently been made to the State Department already by the Mormon Church, for a cablegram from the Department crossed mine, informing me that the Department had been informed of the Swedish government's order of expulsion. It was, it declared, unaware of the reasons for the order, and instructed me to request the Foreign Office to take no drastic action until the case could be thoroughly investigated.

I cabled Washington that I had informed the Foreign Office of the Department's instructions, but that Count Wrangel, the Foreign Minister, had declared flatly that the government's action, taken the Crown Council, could not and would

not be reversed. Count Wrangel told me again, however, that Mr. Söderberg would be permitted to remain in Sweden for a month. He informed me that the property of the Church of Latter Day Saints in Sweden was held in the name of Swedish subjects of the Mormon faith, since, under Swedish law, foreigners are not permitted to acquire or possess real estate without the King's express permission, which had never been granted to any Mormons.

The State Department, however, was still unwilling to let the matter rest. It cabled me on April 7th, instructing me to telegraph the Swedish government's reasons for expelling the Mormons, and to request once more that no drastic action be taken until Washington had had an opportunity to investigate the matter fully.

I placed this request for reconsideration and delay before the Foreign Office once more, with the result that the matter was taken up again. Two days later Count Wrangel informed me what had been done. The Cabinet he said, had considered exhaustively the petition of the Mormons for a modification of the order of expul-

sion, but had emphatically and unanimously declined to make any change.

The Foreign Minister had consulted with Archbishop Söderblom of Sweden and with the Minister of Public Instruction—who also has charge of the ecclesiastical department—and the matter had been investigated at length. The action of the government was, moreover, not regarded as drastic. They declared that the presence of the Mormons was regarded as highly undesirable, because they were proselytizing in contravention of the royal ordinance of October 31, 1873 (referred to earlier in this chapter) and were inducing people to leave the State church.

I advised the State Department of this report, and also pointed out that under the Swedish law the right to expel foreigners from the country is a prerogative exercised in the last instance by the King in council, and that no appeal can lie from such a decree. This, by the way, is pretty generally the rule in European countries. The person whom the sovereign authority orders to leave the country has nothing to do but go.

I explained also that the form of the expul-

sion was really not drastic, since the missionaries had not been and were not to be conducted to the border. What had been done was merely to withdraw their visas permitting them to remain in Sweden: their bodily expulsion would not be resorted to unless they failed to leave the country within "a reasonable time."

I pointed out further that I had done everything possible to induce the Foreign Office to postpone action, but that it had declined, stating that the question was by no means a new one. I informed the Department also that the leaders of the Mormons had assured me that they were satisfied that everything possible in their interest was being done by my Legation.

The leaders of the Church in America must have been very busy during these days. I had hardly filed the cablegram referred to in the last paragraphs before I received another from the State Department instructing me to inform the Swedish Foreign Office that the Mormon Church in America invited investigation by the Swedish government and would bear all expenses of such an investigation, including travel-

ling expenses to and from Utah. I communicated this to Count Wrangel. I imagine that he must have been rather weary of the whole matter, for I did not get his reply until sixteen days later. In it he informed me that the invitation of the Mormon Church had been declined. The Swedish government, he said, had vast quantities of information about the Church, which had been secured by fully qualified investigators sent long ago to Utah to study Mormonism in all its aspects. The government's stand in relation to Mormon missionaries was based upon accurate information.

On the day Count Wrangel's communication came, I received a cablegram from Washington, asking me to expedite the report on the case. All I could do was to report that there had been no change in the situation since my wire of April 9th. However, although eighteen days had elapsed the missionaries whose visas had been cancelled were still in Sweden, and had not been asked to leave.

I have continued to watch carefully the case of the Mormons in Sweden and have at various

times had an opportunity of looking after and reporting to Washington upon this unusual situation. There are still members of this Church in Sweden.

Chapter XIV. Post-War Hunger

The *de facto* end of the World War—the armistice of November 11, 1918—was greeted with universal satisfaction and rejoicing in Sweden, for both sentimental and material reasons. In common with all other peoples of the world, the Swedes had long been appalled by the terrible slaughter that marked the long conflict, and their intellectual and political leaders had done all that men in a neutral land could do to bring about peace. The will for peace of all Swedes was strong and earnest.

Material reasons also played a large part. I have spoken earlier in this book of the hardships necessarily imposed upon Sweden by the blockade, but there is much more that could be told. The bread ration, for instance, was even smaller than the ration in Germany during the last year of the war. So also, strikingly enough,

was the ration of butter and lard. The legumes—peas, beans and lentils—and pork, ham and bacon could not be had, except illegitimately, by the members of the better situated classes. The government, with its strongly developed social sense, had reserved these cheaper articles of food for the poorer classes. Persons with an income below a certain figure received special passbooks entitling them to buy the things mentioned and many others—notably macaroni, spaghetti, and some cereal foods—at a price considerably below actual cost, the deficit being added to the taxes of the better situated classes. (I may remark, in passing, that this seems to me a highly commendable exercise of governmental power. I believe that its application by governments generally in times of hardship, especially for the less fortunately situated would do much to draw the teeth of those who profess to find in the doctrines of Karl Marx the solution of all economic and sociological problems.)

With the ending of the war the Swedes expected also the ending of the blockade. Their disappointment was great when they found that

it was to be maintained, and they were indignant as to some of its aspects. After the war, and especially a war of such duration and extent, it is a great problem to demobilize the armies and return to normal life. The economic situation of the Allied countries at war had, of course, been deeply hurt and after the armistice was signed the shortage of food, raw materials and other necessities continued. It was impossible for the Allies to change this policy which they had adopted until they could see their way clear.

As late as May 9, 1919, the Allied governments, although assuring Sweden that it was their desire and intention to abolish the blockade entirely, nevertheless declared that they could not permit Sweden to import any articles in excess of the prescribed ration unless the government would guarantee that nothing would be re-exported without the express permission of the Allies. In April of the same year I was approached by a number of Swedish business men, who told me that they had an excellent opportunity to repurchase at a low price several thousand tons of woodpulp which had been shipped to Hamburg in the previous year.

I was unable, however, to forward their request as the restrictions which were still in force rendered this impossible.

It was a most difficult task in the months following the armistice to bear ever in mind that the war was not ended; that the Allied governments had still before them the work of consolidating their hard-won victory over Germany. The neutrals having no armies to demobilize, could not understand the heart-breaking pressure placed upon the Allies during the period following the armistice to keep their men properly fed and clothed, nor could they understand the danger confronting the Allies; millions of men trained and conditioned for fighting suddenly thrown into idleness, and the danger of their morale dropping. Realizing this state of affairs, I exerted every effort to impress through every available channel the fact that all of the countries involved in the war were short of food and that the neutrals could not expect an immediate relaxation of the blockade even though the demands of humanity seemed to justify it.

Men and women interested in religious work were also gravely disquieted by the outlook that

the cause of Christianity might be unfavourable affected by the peace. In December, 1918, King Gustaf's Chamberlain sent me an appeal forwarded to him on behalf of the Protestant churches of Hungary. The appeal, which purported to speak for four million Hungarian Protestants, implored protection

"against the threatening danger of dismemberment."

It continued:

"The eventual disruption of the country, and especially the loss of Southeastern Hungary, with her 1,200,000 Protestants, would strike a deathblow at the vitality of those churches and rob the newly forming democracy of this part of the world of the most valuable moral and spiritual forces. During four centuries these churches have served and suffered as the furthest bulwark of Western Protestantism in the east of Europe. Now it is the turn of Western Christendom to rescue the future efficiency of these churches for the immense tasks awaiting them."

In the following May Prince Bernadotte, a brother of the King, himself a devoted Chris-

tian worker, wrote me a personal letter, deploring the shutting out of German mission work in the colonies taken from Germany, which was, he declared a great loss to the Kingdom of God. He requested me to forward his protest to President Wilson, and I sent it to the President at Paris.

Similar action was taken by the Danish-Norwegian-Swedish councils of the World Alliance for the Promoting of International Friendship through the Churches, which submitted to me in the same month a resolution emphasizing the necessity of safeguarding Christian work everywhere through the treaty.

Hjalmar Branting, the present Prime Minister of Sweden, who now for the second time since the spring of 1920, holds that office, in a conversation with me expressed his apprehensions as to the consequences of the Versailles treaty. The entire Swedish press was of the same opinion.

I diverge for a moment to say a few words about Herr Branting, whom I have so often had occasion to mention in this book. It is no misuse of the word to assert that his position is unique,

for there is no other Socialist leader anywhere in the world whose leadership is more unquestioningly accepted by the rank and file of his party. A member of a well-to-do family of good social standing, Hjalmar Branting early cast his lot with the labouring classes, and he has devoted his best years to ameliorating their condition. By straightforwardness of purpose, uprightness and thoroughly altruistic motives, much ability and, last but not least, a tremendous capacity for hard work, he has made himself not only the leader, but even the idol of his party in Sweden, and there are few Socialists of the parent party in the Kingdom upon the walls of whose home his picture does not hang. Few men have ever enjoyed to such extent the confidence of their followers.

Despite all his high honours and preferments —some of which, like the recent award to him of a half of the Nobel peace prize, have brought him considerable material gains,—he has remained the simple, unaffected labour leader. I recall going to his home with my wife to tea one day, and meeting him at the door, coming in with his arms full of cakes and other things which he

had bought for the occasion and carried home, like any simple citizen. That the Social-Democratic party of Sweden is a conservative, constructive party, instead of a party mainly devoted to overturning and tearing down the existing order, is in large part due to the sane, patriotic leadership of Hjalmar Branting.

The failure of the United States to ratify the peace treaty was generally regarded in Sweden as highly unfortunate and as complicating a situation already complicated and difficult enough. Indeed, there was a good deal of apprehension as to the unfavourable results likely to follow when the Senate, in November, 1919, adjourned without ratifying.

There was also much regret among the friends of the League of Nations in Sweden at America's failure to join. The Prime Minister, Mr. Branting, particularly felt this, but believed, nevertheless, that Sweden and the other neutral countries should join the League and do all possible to make it a success.

Sentiment in favour of the League of Nations was, however, not merely so strong in Sweden as it has been represented. The Swedish military

authorities in particular were more than a little hesitant about the wisdom of the State becoming a member. The territorial guarantees looked good, but it was questioned strongly whether these were not more than offset by the danger of being drawn into war in the quarrel of some other nation.

Despite the fact that the making of the peace treaty was delayed until the summer of 1919, official Sweden regarded the war as ended many months earlier. This was evidenced, among other things, by the fact that King Gustaf began entertaining and being entertained by diplomats early in the winter of 1919. Throughout the war His Majesty had accepted no invitations either from belligerents or neutral diplomats, nor had any affairs been given for them at the palace. On March 4th, Mrs. Morris and I had the pleasure of entertaining him at Oakhill—the first invitation, I believe, which he had accepted since the outbreak of the war. He was attended by his Chamberlain and other gentlemen of his court, and appeared to be happy at once more being able to move about freely without having to fear that he might

compromise Sweden's neutrality. I recall that he played bridge until about 1 o'clock in the morning, being a great lover of the game, and I am told, an extraordinarily good player.

The final ratification by the United States Senate of peace with the Central Powers was followed not long afterward by the nineteenth conference of the Interparliamentary Union, the first since before the war. It was held in Stockholm on August 17, 18 and 19, 1921. The Belgian and French groups of the Union refused to send delegates because Germany and Austria were represented, but there were delegates present from fourteen lands—Sweden, Canada, the United States, Japan, Germany, Austria, Denmark, Great Britain, Spain, Finland, Italy, Norway, Holland and Switzerland.

The American delegation was composed of Senators W. B. McKinley of Illinois, Thomas J. Walsh of Montana and Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas; Representatives Fred A. Britten and Edwin B. Brooks of Illinois and Albin W. Barkley of Kentucky; former Representative James L. Slayden of Texas, former Governor A. J. Montague of Virginia and Mr. Arthur D.

Call, secretary of the American group of the Interparliamentary Union. It was my misfortune not to be in Stockholm at the time to receive them, but my home was thrown open to them and they stayed there during their visit.

Other prominent delegates at the conference included Lord Weardale of England, Senator Ferraris of Italy and Herr Christian Lange of Norway. To Herr Lange was subsequently awarded a half of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1921, the other half going, as already mentioned, to Herr Branting.

The American delegates made a splendid impression in Sweden, not merely by their high personal qualities, but also their open-mindedness and eagerness to inform themselves about every possible aspect of European affairs.

In connection with the Nobel prizes I may recall here that one of them—for chemistry—was awarded to an American during my time in Sweden. The recipient was Professor Theodore William Richards of Harvard University, who received the 1915 prize, consisting of $38,000 in money, a gold medal and a diploma. June, 1916, was set as the time for the delivery of

the prize, but because of the dangers of travel Professor Richards decided not to come to Stockholm personally. Through the State Department he requested that I be asked to receive it on his behalf. The State Department was glad to accede, and it was a personal pleasure for me to receive these tokens of distinction for American scholarship and transmit them to Professor Richards.

Chapter XV. An Age-Old Controversy

The Russian revolution of March, 1917, which awakened aspirations for independence among the peoples of those states that had once had a separate national existence, at the same time inspired one small community within a state with a longing to be reunited to a state of which it had for untold centuries been a part, before it became a part of Russia.

At the entrace of the Gulf of Bothnia, some twenty-five miles from the Swedish coast, lie the Aaland [1] Islands. The bare name is perhaps familiar to many American readers, but it may be doubted whether many of them know much about the geography or history of the islands, their importance,—so out of proportion to their size—and their inhabitants. And yet they were for more than three years a veritable apple of discord between the Swedish and Finnish

[1] Pronounced "Ohland"

governments. The settlement of the dispute as to the sovereignty over them aroused a resentment which, while it may not be great enough to justify one in speaking of an irredenta, none the less has not disappeared entirely.

Some 300 islands, large and small, make up the Aaland group, which has a total area of 1442 square kilometers. The largest island, Aaland proper, and Eckerö and Lumparland, which really belong to it, being separated by only narrow bodies of water, are together roughly 30 miles long and 25 miles wide. The islands enjoy a comparatively mild climate and possess scores of excellent harbours. Mariehamn, the principal city, has a population of about 1500. The church registers of the islands contain the names of some 27,000 inhabitants, but of those roundly 5000 live abroad, mainly in America. The actual population is 21,356, of whom about 20,000 speak Swedish. The chief exports are agricultural products, fish, wood and timber.

Up to 1809, when the islands had to be ceded to Russia as a result of the Russo-Swedish war of 1808–09, they had belonged to Sweden since time

immemorial. In the peace negotiations of 1809 in Fredrikshamn the Swedish negotiators were instructed that if worst came to worst they might surrender Finland, but not the Aalands, which must remain Swedish "as they have been from time immemorial." The negotiators protested to the last that the Aalands had always been Swedish territory and ought not to be taken away with Finland.

"We have nothing to do with the old Swedish boundaries," said the Russian envoys. "All we are concerned with is the new Russian boundaries."

The loss of the Aalands was not serious from an economic viewpoint, but strategically it was of the greatest importance. Lying but twenty-five miles from an unprotected Swedish coast and within striking distance of the Kingdom's capital, they formed a continuing menace to the country's safety. This menace became greater with the increase of the range of artillery, which eventually reached a point where big guns on the Aalands could easily throw shells into Stockholm. It would, moreover, have been impossible to prevent the assembling of an

enemy army on them from the mainland of Finland, but 50 miles away, because the greater portion of this distance is protected by an archipelago, under whose shelter troop-transports could be moved with comparative safety.

The Russians realized the value of the islands as a base of operations, and in 1835 Tsar Nicholas I had the strong fortress of Bomarsund erected. This was occupied for a time by the French and English during the Crimean War, and in 1856 the three governments signed a treaty under which Russia agreed never to erect fortifications or maintain permanent military or naval establishments on the islands. I have earlier pointed out how Russia, nearly twenty years before the World War, endeavoured to secure the abrogation of this treaty. At the outbreak of the war she erected extensive fortifications and barracks. The Russian government notified the signatories to the treaty of 1856 and also Sweden that the fortifications would be removed after the war. Neither France nor Great Britain protested, and for the four years of the conflict the Swedes sat under

the threat of heavy artillery within effective range of their capital.

The Aalanders reacted quickly to the downfall of the Tsar in 1917. In August of that year the islanders adopted a resolution for presentation to the King of Sweden, setting forth the wish of the inhabitants that the islands might become a part of that Kingdom once more. They also proposed to send a delegation to Stockholm in December, but were discouraged by the French, who declared that the future of the islands could be decided only after the end of the war.

Immediately after the declaration of Finland's independence, which was issued on December 6, 1917, 7135 adult Aalanders signed a petition for presentation to the King of Sweden, praying for reunion. The petition was presented in the following February. This agitation continued throughout the following year, and in November, 1918, a committee representing Aaland's Landsting (Parliament) sent petitions to me and to the representatives of France, Italy and Great Britain, referring to

President Wilson's pronouncement of the principle of self-determination and asking that a plebiscite be held in the islands to determine the people's will as to union with Sweden or Finland.

The Finnish government, however, declared that it could not consent to a plebiscite. The Aalands, it asserted, are geographically a part of Finland, inasmuch as there are hundreds of small islands between the Aaland mainland and the Finnish coast leaving no open water until within about 25 miles from the Swedish coast. They were anciently administered together with Finland, and became an integral part of that country in 1809, with the cession to Russia. It declared that the Aalands had for centuries lived together with the Finns and had never until recently shown any desire to leave Finland. They were not a national unit, and their desire to join Sweden rested merely upon their experience of Russian militarism and their fear that Finland would not be able to maintain its independence. The inhabitants, it was asserted, were not oppressed, but enjoyed the same rights as the Finns themselves. The Finnish govern-

ment had just given the Swedish language the same standing as Finnish on the mainland, and it purposed giving extensive rights of self-government to the Aalanders.

The Swedish government replied that it could not agree with Finland's assertion regarding the history of the islands. It regarded the question of self-determination as the real and only question at issue. It gave notice that it intended to appeal to the Peace Conference for a settlement of the question.

The pro-Swedish agitation on the Aalands was carried on sharply all this time. It was, declared the Swedes, spontaneous. The Finns declared that it was the result of Swedish propagandist activities. On June 1, 1918, a meeting attended by representatives of most of the islands' communes decided to give every man and woman on the islands an opportunity to express himself or herself as to reunion with Sweden. Of a total of 10,195 adults entitled to vote in regular elections, 9,375 voted for reunion with Sweden.

To meet this sentiment the Finnish government announced in the autumn of 1919 that it

intended to grant the islanders a considerable measure of self-government, and the Finnish Diet enacted the proposals into law in the following spring. The Aaland Landsting formally refused to accept the laws as a substitute for reunion to Sweden. The islanders asserted that the laws were so framed that they made it possible for the Finns to colonize the islands and thus outvote the natives. Special tax measures and a certain right to initiate legislation were, in their view, rendered illusory by certain clauses of the laws.

The Aalanders asked the Swedish government to receive a delegation. Permission was granted and the delegation had an audience with the King and his council in May, 1920. They presented a petition for reunion to Sweden, and were assured by His Majesty that Sweden would not relax its efforts to secure the Aalands' right to a plebescite—not because it desired aggrandizement, but because it regarded the wishes of the islanders as justified. The delegation at the same time presented petitions to me and to the French, British, Italian and Japanese ministers in Stockholm.

The Finnish government was much wrought up over the incident, and sent a sharp note to the Swedish government, protesting against Sweden having, "without regard to Finland's rights or interests, made itself the representative for that part of Aalands' inhabitants who wrongfully advocate the islands' separation, and therefore supported their activities."

At the same time the Finnish premier and the ministers of war and commerce went to Mariehamn and met a delegation of Aalanders. In an address the premier criticized the inhabitants' campaign for reunion with Sweden, and emphasized the fact that Finland had made great concessions in the line of self-government. He then asked the Aalanders to discuss the question.

J. Sundblom, editor of the local newspaper and one of the leaders of the pro-Swedish movement, replied that neither threats nor promises could induce the Aalanders to surrender what they regarded as their right to a plebiscite. Moreover, they rejected the new laws, which, he declared, were not what they appeared to be.

On the following day Sundblom and Carl

Björkman, the latter president of the Landsting, were arrested on a charge of high treason and taken to Abo, on the Finnish mainland. In response to a request of the Swedish government to be informed whether the arrests were due to the men's appeals to the Peace Conference and the great powers, the Finnish government answered that the matter was a purely domestic one and it desired no outside interference. The two men were traitors, it declared, and only the degree of their guilt remained to be determined.

The Council of the League of Nations, meeting in London, took up the troublesome question in July, 1920, and appointed a commission of eminent jurists to investigate the legal aspects of the situation and report. This commission was made up of Professor F. Larnaude of France, dean of the jurists of Paris, Professor A. Struycken of Holland, a state councillor, and Professor Max Huber of Switzerland, juristic councillor of the Swiss government's political department.

The commission reported two months later. Its report was unfavourable to Finland. As to

Finland's claim to be considered as a state already existing before its declaration of independence, the commission found that, even if it became a distinct state in 1809, it ceased to have any existence as such in 1899, when it became merely a Russian province and was "indissolubly united with Russia." Even after the revolution of March, 1917, the commission found, the new government of Russia continued to send governors-general to Finland, thus treating it as a mere province. Not until the Bolshevist proclamation of November 17, 1917, said the commission, could Finland be said to have even a potential existence as a state. The Soviet government recognized its independence on January 4, 1918, and Sweden and France also recognized the new state on the same day, Denmark and Norway six days later and Switzerland on February 20th. Conditional recognition was not granted by Great Britain until May 6, 1919, and complete recognition first on January 21, 1920.

The jurists' commission was in doubt as to when, despite these early recognitions, the Finnish state actually began to have any existence

as a separate sovereignty. In view of the fact that the Finnish rebels were in actual control of a great part of the country for the first months of 1918, and that the revolt was not finally put down until May of that year, the commission inclined to date the existence of the state from the last named month. As to the assertion of the Finnish government that Sweden by not expressly exempting the Aaland Islands from its recognition, had surrendered its claims to them, the commission found that Sweden "had continuously indicated by its conduct that it had not ceased to interest itself for the Aaland question, and it acted at all times as if its recognition of Finland had been made with reservations."

The commission was further of the opinion that the recognition of new states during time of war cannot be regarded in the same light as recognition in time of peace, and that such recognitions "have often been nothing more than a recognition of a people or a nation or, at time, merely of a government."

The commission found as matters of law that the Aalands were not *de jure* a part of Finland, and that the question as to their sovereignty was

not a domestic Finnish question, but an international one, and as such belonged to the League of Nations, of which both Sweden and Finland were members.

The Finnish government filed a lengthy protest, attacking sharply all the conclusions of the jurists. It declared that neither its findings of fact nor of law were defensible, and that its logic was utterly at fault. It declared that Premier Branting of Sweden, after having referred in one note to Finnish "sovereignty" in the islands, later altered this wrongfully to Finnish "domination," and it asserted that there was no just ground on which the islands could be taken from Finland.

The Council of the League of Nations, after considering the report of the jurists' commission, decided, to appoint a further commission of three *rapporteurs,* or reporters to study the question and advise the Council what disposition to make of the islands, the jurists' report having merely established, as a primary fact, that the matter was one falling under the competency of the League of Nations.

Such a commission was accordingly appointed,

consisting of Baron Beyens, formerly Foreign Minister of Belgium; Felix Calonder, once President of Switzerland, and Abram J. Elkus of New York, former Ambassador to Turkey. I had advised strongly against America mixing herself into this quarrel in any manner. In October, 1920, when the appointment of the reporters was being considered, I cabled the State Department that in my opinion it was highly inadvisable for us to have a member on the commission or to take any part in the controversy, since, no matter how it might be decided, the decision would create bitter feelings on the part of the losing nation. I communicated my views also to our diplomatic and consular representatives in the Scandinavian capitals and asked for an expression of their views. Chargé d'Affaires Magruder at Helsingfors and Consul-General Murphy at Stockholm replied that they fully agreed with me. However, Mr. Elkus was appointed. Although the Swedish government accepted the adverse decision of this commission without exhibiting any bitterness against the reporters' respective countries, I still wish that we had had nothing to do with it.

For the reporters, as will be remembered, found against Sweden. They were able to agree with the jurists only as to the fact that the Aaland question was not a domestic Finnish matter. They recommended that the islands be given to Finland without any plebiscite, holding that "the Finnish state's right of sovereignty over the Aaland Islands is in our view incontestible." They declared, however, that if Finland would not give and carry out certain guarantees, "then we would recommend taking away the islands on the basis of a plebiscite."

The reporters upheld Finland's contention that Sweden, in not expressly reserving the Aalands when it recognized the new state, had consented to the inclusion of the islands within Finland's borders. It found, furthermore, in disagreement with the jurists, that Finland had existed for more than a century as a state with definite borders, and that Sweden had no claim on the Aalands because its King, in the treaty of Fredrikshamn, had formally ceded the Aalands "for all time."

The reporters were unable to discover any evidences of a desire of the islanders to join

Sweden later than 1854, in which year a French writer had visited the islands and written that the people were unanimous in their wish to be reunited to the mother country.

Another reason for giving the islands to Finland was, according to the reporters, the fact that Sweden was really saved from Bolshevism by the Finns' fight against the Finnish rebels in the winter of 1918.

"It would be a very peculiar way of showing gratitude to the Finnish republic if one should take away from it a district on which it sets the greatest store," said the report.

In accepting this report, the Council of the League of Nations recognized the sovereignty over the islands as belonging to Finland. Such a decision, it declared, was "that solution which contains the greatest possible security for both the islands' inhabitants and the interested parties." The islands would be neutralized and must not be fortified. Certain guarantees must be given to the inhabitants, and the Council promised to see that these guarantees were carried out.

This, of course, ended the conflict, so far as actual ownership of the Aalands was concerned.

Chapter XVI. Thoughts towards Reconstruction

So far I have been writing about things that are past—matters of some interest, I hope, but after all, matters which cannot be altered. For better or worse, they are now a part of history. A knowledge of them may and ought to help us in shaping our course, but what principally concerns the whole world today is what the future has in store for us, what the developments of the coming years are likely to be, and to what extent we can determine the aspect of these developments. The wise man, I take it, studies history with that end in view—to learn what mistakes have been made and how to avoid repeating them, and to learn further what has been good and how to assure the world of a continuance of its benefits. And that is what the whole world needs to do today more than ever before in its history.

Much has been written about the results of the World War, its unexampled slaughter of the pick of all belligerent nations' manhood, its destruction of economic values, and—by no means the smallest count in the whole indictment—the manner in which it has lowered the ethical plane of the whole world, neutral as well as belligerent countries. I have noted with sorrow the last named result. Sweden, for example, which I naturally know best of all Old World countries, has been perceptibly materialized by the great conflict. Not that the country's intellectual and ethical life is not still on a very high plane, but I am sure that observant Swedes themselves will agree with my assertion that a certain downward leveling in the higher things of life has come as a result of the war. I believe this will be counteracted in the next few years, but I am writing about present conditions. The same situation can be observed in all the belligerent countries, and, as I have said, in neutral lands as well, at least in those neutrals that were closest to the scene of the war. Many old ideals have disappeared —to reappear later, one may hope—and ethical

standards in general have suffered greatly.

After all, however, it is the economic situation which must first claim one's attention. Until that idyllic period shall have come which the Marxian reformers promise us—the period when nobody shall have to worry about his bread and butter, his raiment or where he shall sleep—these are unfortunately the considerations that must, for most men and women, inevitably take precedence over all others. A certain degree of prosperity, or at least, decently comfortable surroundings and comparative freedom from worry about earning a living, are a *sine qua non* to a really high civilization and culture. How are we to attain this degree of prosperity?

It is today a repetition of the merest platitudes to point out the economic interdependence of the whole world, and the impossibility of this great economic organism being healthy as long as any one of its chief members is not healthy. Yet there are some platitudes that must be repeated and repeated, until an understanding of their significance is hammered into the consciousness of everybody, and this is one of

them. Before the World War there were comparatively few persons who realized this interdependence of all the lands of the earth; we Americans realized it least of all. It was but natural that this should be so, for our great territory contains all the things that we need to support life. No other land, with the exception of Russia, was so little dependent on other countries for the absolute necessaries of life.

But there were even many Europeans who did not realize that the world's economic life is really one vast organism. Too many of them thought that they could destroy one of the members of this organism not only without suffering any ill results themselves, but actually to their advantage. Observers who, like Norman Angell, in his book, "The Great Illusion," ventured to point out the fallacy of this manner of thinking, were disregarded. Too many people are still unable to understand it, or, still worse, refuse to try to understand it. Such people have learned nothing from the war and the three years following it, and while their number

is plainly diminishing, there are still so many of them that they form a distinct hindrance to the world's convalescence.

There is still another platitude which I venture to comment on. This is the matter of the unfavourable rate of exchange against the United States. I feel that I have a right to talk about this matter, although it may have become a commonplace, because I was one of the first to see what was coming. As long ago as February, 1920, that is, some two years before this is being written and long before the results which I foresaw had actually made themselves felt, I called the attention of our government to the fact that the dollar was selling at a premium of some fifty per cent above the English pound. This, I pointed out, gave British traders an advantage so great that it was bound to be highly unfavourable for us. I ventured to suggest that steps be taken immediately to remedy a situation so full of threatening possibilities.

At that time, too, there was another unpleasant aspect. Not only was the dollar at a premium as compared with the pound, but the pound was

at the same time at a premium as compared with the currency of certain other lands. Hence the prospect was that the British manufacturer would be able to buy his materials in a land whose cheaper currency gave him in effect a big discount, and sell his finished products in America, whose dearer money gave him a big bonus. What this would mean should have been immediately obvious to everybody, but it was not generally realized at first.

The next half year, however, brought realization to everybody. Great Britain's promised advantage disappeared with the continued fall of the currency of the Central Powers. Unemployment figures began to swell disquietingly, not merely in America and England, but in most or all of the neutral lands as well. Probably America has never, even in the historic panic-years, had so many men out of work as now, and that means, of course, so many factories idle or running on short time. What is the reason?

There are many reasons. Long wars have always been followed by a period of economic depression. They require an increased productivity for their conduct, and they destroy a

great part of what is produced. When they end, the abnormal demand for increased production stops. The great industries, either enlarged or newly created to meet the abnormal requirements of war, suddenly lose that part of their market which brought them into being or caused their enlargement. This in itself would be disastrous enough, but that is not all. The nation, heavily taxed, a great part of its wealth destroyed, inevitably exhibits a materially reduced purchasing power—both absolutely and because its dollar (or pound or franc) is worth relatively less than before. And thus industry, equipped to meet a still greater demand than that existing before the war, actually finds itself facing a buying public which can take less. The result can be but one: stocks on hand remain in the warehouses—dead capital—and the new production must either be stopped altogether or else materially cut down. Wages of the fortunate employed have to be reduced, and there is no work at all for many.

This is what happened to America. The domestic market, still the great stand-by of our industry, despite the extent to which we had

begun to become a great exporting nation, is badly lamed. But the war-ravaged countries of Europe need goods, must have goods. Billions of dollars' worth of values have been destroyed and must be replaced. What an opportunity for America, with its highly specialized methods of production its wealth of raw materials!

But what has actually happened? Business has become stagnated. Imports and exports have diminished and yet Europe needs incalculably more than they needed prior to the war.

In the face, then, of tremendously increased requirements of foreign countries for the things which we can produce, our exports have shown an absolute decrease and a really disquieting relative decrease. The export trade which we should have secured—but did not—would have given employment to a great part of the workmen who are today unemployed. Why did we not secure it?

One of the reasons is, of course, the fact that the whole world's purchasing power has been so reduced that the inhabitants of the lands to which we might have hoped to export are getting along with as little as possible. But

another reason, and a big one, is the dearness of the dollar. There are very few if any countries who do not have to pay what amounts to an exchange premium of ten to thirty per cent for the privilege of buying from us. And what of the Germans? The Austrians? The Poles? The Czecho-Slovaks? The Russians? For all these American goods are a luxury in which they can indulge only if similar goods cannot be had elsewhere.

Until the whole problem presented by the constant shifting of currency values shall have been solved, we cannot convert our natural advantages into trade. A way must be found of stabilizing exchange everywhere, and this cannot be done without the co-operation of all the civilized countries of the world. Many earnest efforts have already been made in this direction. There are also the problems presented by Germany and Russia—by the one because it is working too much and selling too much; by the other because it is working too little and buying too little. These two countries are, it seems to me, two big sores on the body politic of the world, and until they are healed

it seems the stabilizing of exchange will be dubious.

It was both inevitable and just that Germany, defeated in the war, was required to pay the losses which her aggression had caused. To do this, however, she has had to lay staggering burdens of taxation upon the people, already impoverished and exhausted by the long conflict. In order to pay these taxes, the average German is compelled to work harder and longer than anybody else. The eight-hour day in Germany is already but a pleasant fiction in many factories, and in those great industries where most of the work is home-work, the working day stretches out to fourteen or sixteen hours. The toys, dolls, Christmas tree decorations, bijouterie —these things and scores of other products in which the Germans dominated the markets of the world before the war are all made in the homes of the workers, and the whole family, from parents down to the small children, work on them. If one of these families of four persons can earn fifteen dollars in a month, it can manage to exist. Where is the American

family or even individual that can exist for a month on fifteen dollars?

This is one of the reasons why our exports are so much smaller than they should be. We cannot meet such competition. Labour paid in dollars cannot compete with labour paid in depreciated paper marks. Labour accustomed to comfortable homes and warm meals with meat is at a hopeless disadvantage against labour subsisting on black bread and potatoes and sleeping six in a room. The Germans are outworking and underselling everybody because they must. England started during the war to build up a toy industry, and the beginning was a promising one. Recent reports show that a big majority of the firms concerned have had to give up the unequal struggle. They could not compete with Germany.

I quote the following from *The Trans-Pacific,* a magazine published in the Orient:

"Activities on the part of German mercantile and shipping companies which are reaching out to obtain a substantial share of the Far East trade are

coming more and more into evidence. While they are making their appearance particularly in the regions of more or less friendly powers, their intention to return in force to the domains of their former enemies is becoming plain. One need only study the manifests of vessels passing through Hongkong," writes *The Trans-Pacific's* corespondent at that port, "to discover that Germany is again sending to China and Japan a considerable quantity of goods, mainly iron, steel and hardware. German manufacturers have already established something resembling a monopoly on imports of these goods in the Dutch East Indies, the quality of their wares being good, in fact, quite equal to that of their pre-war products. *The Germans possess a considerable advantage over their competitors in the matter of prices, as, owing to the low exchange value of the mark, they can make quotations similar to those ruling before the war. As a consequence, the large imports of American and Japanese machinery, which reached their climax during the war and the time preceding resumption of British and German industrial activities, have decreased considerably.*" (Italics mine.)

The same magazine reports further:

"Mr. M. Nagano, president of the Nagano Trading Company, who recently came to Japan on a business trip, states that both American and Japanese trade is suffering severely from the inroads of German competition in Batavia. . . . Mr. Nagano believes that Germany will eventually resume in the Dutch East Indies the control she enjoyed before the war."

I hear also disquieting reports of German commercial penetration in Brazil, Argentina and other South American states where the American trader ought to dominate the market.

Two factors, as has been seen, make this competition possible—hard work and an exchange rate that works strongly against us. The most pressing task for the statesmen and financiers today is to find a way of remedying this.

There remains the question of Russia—that land of unlimited possibilities, both as a buyer of finished wares and a producer of raw materials.

I am not so sure that this is not a more difficult problem to solve than that presented by the Ger-

man situation. Germany got rid of her Kaiser and became a republic; Russia got rid of her Tsar and set up a class-government more tsaristic than that of the Tsar, and one which does not even make a pretence of being democratic. On the contrary, it is admittedly a dictatorship, ruling by brute force and terror. Such a government cannot find the approval of the democratic peoples who won the World War. Yet the economy of the whole world suffers as long as Russia remains isolated.

What is to be done about it? Forcible armed intervention has been tried repeatedly, and has failed. As I have said earlier, I believe all such interventions have actually contributed to strengthen the position of the Bolshevist government. For better or worse, it is already apparent to me that Russia will largely have to work out her own salvation. This, however, does not mean that she must have no help from outside. On the contrary, I believe as much help should be given her as possible, but a way of doing this must be found which will make it clear that we cannot approve of or support any such form of government as that now dominat-

ing the country. The great hindrance to any effective help comes from the blind, fanatical doctrinarianism of the Bolshevist rulers themselves, who will not or cannot understand that the whole social and economic structure of the world, the natural growth of centuries, cannot be fundamentally altered overnight, much less by the efforts of one country alone. Until they shall have come to an understanding of this, Russia will remain one of the big handicaps to the world's return to complete economic health.

I do not venture to say what the solution of the problem may be. Of one thing, however, I am certain, and that is that the solution can be reached only by objective thinking, and there has been much too little of that everywhere.

Chapter XVII. "Hope Springs Eternal from the Human Breast"—Pope

Any thinking man who watched the great war from a European vantage-point, and who has closely followed the events since then, may be pardoned for entertaining a considerable degree of pessimism. How was it possible at all that, after nineteen centuries of Christian teachings, such a war could come about? How is it possible that the whole world has learned so little from history, and that there are still so few indications that one may hope with any confidence that the world has seen its last war? How was it possible that the passions of the whole world could have been whipped up to a pitch never before attained in any modern war? And that those passions still run so high three years and more after the last shot was fired?

And yet I am not without hope, not without

something which begins at least to approach what may fairly be called optimism. I seem to see light ahead.

The conference at Washington for the limitation of armaments was a step toward a goal which may some day be reached. Not that I believe war can be prevented by limiting armaments. Armaments are merely a symptom, not a disease. The only way to stop war is to remove its causes, for as long as economic greed is combined with the atavistic belligerency that is a part of almost every man's spiritual and mental makeup, just so long we shall have war, even if we have to fight with clubs and stones.

But I see nevertheless in the move of the American government an expression of idealistic aims which redounds not only to the credit of President Harding, Secretary Hughes and the other true Americans responsible for it, but which, I am very sure, was also a symbol of the American people's upright love of peace, and really was, in the last analysis, directly due to this feeling. The American people, if I read their feelings aright, are determined that there shall be no more war if they can prevent it. I

do not know whether they can prevent it, but it is a splendid thing to have this will for peace, and it cannot but be a tremendous factor in helping to bring about the day when war shall have been outlawed by all civilized peoples as the very negation of civilization—which it is. It was undoubtedly this feeling that brought the Washington conference into being, and irrespective of the tangibility of the results of the conference, it is a splendid thing to have taken this initiative.

This is but a beginning, a small beginning, I think, but it marks out the way which we—and the rest of the world—must go. I should like to see a more general understanding of the fact that something more than the limitation of armaments, or even complete disarmament, is necessary, if war is to be prevented.

But we have made a start. Let us hope that the results of these years of war experience have at least brought home to every thinking person the necessity of a better understanding among individuals as well as the nations of the world. Let us hope that the limitation of armaments will be successful, and also, what to my mind

is of even greater importance, that the light of a better spiritual understanding among the nations will clarify those human and national frailties which make war possible. We can then wholeheartedly feel that the sacrifices of the millions fallen in the war have not been in vain.

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